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SUMMARY
Embedding content from third parties to enrich features is a common practice in the de-
velopment of modern web applications and mobile applications. For example, functionalities
such as social integration, programming enhancement, visitor tracking and advertisements
can be provided by including simple code snippets from third parties. Such practices can
pose serious security and privacy threats to an end user, because sensitive data about a user
in an application can be directly accessed by third-party content that usually operates with
the same privilege as first-party content. Third parties can often abuse their privilege to
compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the hosting applications and harm end users.
The confidentiality and integrity of a user’s indirect data, such as a user profile, may also be
compromised by such practices.
This dissertation aims to identify new threats posed to end users by the practices of
embedding third-party content and develop techniques to mitigate these threats. We first
demonstrate how a malicious first-party application can pollute a user’s indirect data in a
third-party service or application by embedding it. In particular, we show that the person-
alization systems of popular websites can be abused by a malicious publisher to pollute a
user’s profile in a third-party website. In addition, we demonstrate that a malicious Android
application can infer a user’s profile that is already learned by a third-party ad network. The
pollution and inference of a user’s indirect data in other applications are two new classes of
threats to end users. We then propose defense techniques to mitigate these two new classes
of threats.
This dissertation also aims to design mechanisms that enable end users and developers to
limit the privilege of third-party content to prevent unintended behaviors. First, third-party
content (e.g., trackers) has the ability to link a user’s activities across multiple applications
and then build a profile of the user to serve personalized content. Third-party tracking
often happens without the user’s consent and has raised serious privacy concerns. In this
xvi
dissertation, we present TrackMeOrNot, a client-side tracking control mechanism that
allows end users to selectively opt out of third-party web tracking based on their demand.
Second, existing web security mechanisms offer all-or-nothing restriction on the privilege
of third-party content, e.g., embedded JavaScript code. Most developers have to trade
security for the benefit of embedding third-party JavaScript code, making these mechanisms
ineffective. To this end, we study how third-party JavaScript code accesses a user’s direct
data in a web application in general through a large-scale measurement. Our results show
that third-party JavaScript code is over-privileged and such privilege is abused to access
sensitive user data. To address the limitations of existing web permission mechanisms, we
propose the fine-grained Access Control Policy for the Document Object Model (DOM-ACP).
DOM-ACP can help web developers restrict the privilege of third-party JavaScript code in their
applications. The new mechanism enables web developers to specify the access permission
of a third-party script at per-object granularity to deny unauthorized accesses and protect the





Modern web applications1 and mobile applications extensively collect data about their end
users to improve user experience. Data associated with a user can be categorized into two
classes: direct data and indirect data. Direct data is any personal or personalized data that is
directly presented (accessible) to a user in an application. For example, an application may
display the user name or email address in its interface after a user has been authenticated.
On the other hand, indirect data such as the recently browsed items of a user, is gathered
and stored in the back end servers of an application, which uses the collected indirect data
to provide end users with better and personalized services. For instance, by building a user
profile from the collected indirect data, an application can tailor content to be more relevant
to a specific user. The compiled user profile is also one type of indirect user data.
In the development of modern web applications and mobile applications, embedding
content served by other providers to enrich features is a common practice. For instance,
functionalities such as programming enhancement (e.g., jQuery), social integration (e.g.,
widgets of Facebook and Twitter), visitor tracking (e.g., Google Analytics), and advertising
(e.g., Google DoubleClick) can be easily implemented by embedding a simple code snippet
provided by a third party into one’s own application. Many users are not aware of and/or can
not recognize the presence of third-party content. As a result, an end user may unintentionally
interact with third-party content in addition to the application that she or he currently uses.
While interacting with an application, data about an end user is collected by the application
the user directly interacts with, as well as the third-party content that is embedded within
1Throughout this thesis, we use websites and web applications, as well as JavaScript and script inter-
changeably.
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the application. In many cases, such data is collected and used in ways that are out of the
user’s control and without the user’s consent.
Third-party content can pose serious security and privacy threats to an application and
its users, because it usually operates at full privilege as the embedding application. Sensitive
user data, e.g., user credentials, billing information and user inputs, can be directly accessed
by third-party content if the data is not well isolated. A malicious third party can even modify
the hosting application to cause unintended behavior. Web developers can rely on modern
web browsers to isolate third-party content and limit its permission if they embed third-party
content (e.g., a third-party web page) within an iframe tag, because the Same-Origin Policy
(SOP) prohibits the interaction between content loaded from different origins2. However,
a lot of third-party content such as JavaScript code and Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) can
be directly embedded within a hosting application, which is exempt from the restriction
imposed by SOP and hence violates fundamental security principles. In the Android mobile
operating system, third-party content is not well isolated from the hosting application either
and can inherit all the privilege of the hosting application.
It is well known that third parties can often abuse their privilege to compromise the
confidentiality and integrity of the hosting applications and harm end users by stealing or
modifying direct user data. However, the problem that whether a user’s indirect data can be
compromised by a malicious third party or even a first party is not well explored. Moreover,
neither the end users nor the developers can easily limit the privilege of third-party content
to prohibit unintended behaviors.
1.2 Dissertation Overview
This dissertation aims to identify new threats posed to end users by the practices of embed-
ding third-party content in modern web applications and mobile applications, and develop
techniques to mitigate these threats. Furthermore, we aim to advance the state-of-the-art on
2A web origin is defined as the tuple of protocol, host and port number. Cross-origin request can still be
allowed with the Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) mechanism.
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defense techniques against over-privileged third-party content for preventing unintended
behaviors.
In the first part of this dissertation (§2 and §3), we study the security of indirect user
profiles in applications of popular service providers. Specifically, we have identified and
proposed mitigation techniques for two classes of new threats that are posed by a malicious
first-party application to a user’s indirect data. A malicious first-party application can either
pollute or infer a user’s profile on another application by embedding it. The second part (§4)
presents TrackMeOrNot, a system that allows end users to selectively opt out of unwanted
third-party web tracking. In the last two chapters (§5 and §6), we study the threats posed to
a user’s direct data in a web application by third-party JavaScript code. We first conduct a
large-scale measurement with DOM-Logger, a system that helps web developers monitor
and understand the web content access behavior of embedded JavaScript code. We then
design DOM-ACP, a fine-grained permission mechanism for web applications, as the last
contribution of this dissertation. We introduce each of the studied problems and the research
approaches taken in the following subsections.
1.2.1 Pollution Attacks
Personalization is an emerging technology that is embraced by modern applications. For
example, personalization has been widely used in recommending search results (Google),
videos (YouTube, Netflix, etc.), items (Amazon) and targeting certain users in online
advertising (DoubleClick). Serving more relevant content not only improves user experience
and increases user engagement, but can also help the growth in a business’s revenue.
To customize content based on a user’s interest, gender, age and other personal traits,
an application needs to first collect a user’s past interactions with it and then build a user
profile based on the collected historical indirect data. However, many applications do not
properly validate the collected user interaction data. Furthermore, these web applications
can be embedded by other web applications as third-party content, thus allowing a malicious
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application to trick a user’s browser to load the content of embedded applications. The above
observations present a new attack surface for attackers to interfere with an application’s
personalization system and compromise the integrity of a user’s indirect data.
In §2, we study whether the personalization systems of popular web applications can be
abused by a malicious publisher website. In particular, we experimented with popular web
applications that a user interacts with either directly or indirectly. We attempted to inject
artificial user interaction data to the personalization systems of these applications by either
embedding content of them or exploiting vulnerabilities such as Cross-site Request Forgery
(CSRF). We observe that a malicious first-party application was able to alter the customized
content of these applications because the input to their personalization systems was polluted.
We have proposed several techniques such as browsing context identification to mitigate
such threats.
1.2.2 Inferring User Profile with Personalized Mobile In-App Ads
Tracking and advertising libraries are one class of the most commonly embedded third-
party content in today’s web applications and mobile applications. By collaborating with
thousands or even millions of applications, the providers of these third-party libraries have
the ability to link a user’s activities (indirect data) across multiple applications and build
an accurate profile of a user. As a result, the personalized ads are highly correlated with a
user’s personal information such as her or his interests and demographic information.
In web applications, the personalized ads are usually isolated in iframes from other
content by the Same-Origin Policy (SOP). In today’s Android applications, such isolation
does not exist. Much effort has been put to understanding and mitigating the security and
privacy threats posed by embedded third-party content on Android. Little has focused on
studying whether a malicious hosting application can also put threats to user privacy.
In §3, we estimate how much a mobile app can learn about a user by abusing its privilege
to inspect the personalized ads loaded in app runtime. In particular, we sought the ground
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truth regarding users’ demographic and interest profile and personalized ads served by
Google AdMob from more than 200 real users. Our analysis shows that the personalized
mobile in-app ads are highly correlated with a user’s profile. Furthermore, we find that a
mobile app was able to predict some personal traits (e.g., gender, age group and parental
status) with significantly higher accuracy than random guess. These findings demonstrate
the necessity of enforcing strong isolation of third-party content in Android applications to
protect both the hosting application and the user data in the embedded application.
1.2.3 Selective Control on Web Tracking
A user’s browsing activities across multiple applications can be observed and aggregated
by providers of third-party content to infer her or his personal traits and provide targeted
advertising and other personalized content. Some third-party tracking scripts do not directly
read nor modify the content of the embedding application, which is usually considered
harmless. Many first-party applications also track their users’ activities. However, such
first-party and third-party web tracking practices generally occur without a user’s consent
and are considered as abuses. To gain trust from end-users, many web trackers (vendors)
have provided control mechanisms, e.g., opt-out and DoNotTrack, that allow users to restrict
how they use the collected data. These server-side mechanisms, however, do not prevent
trackers from collecting data. Thus, many users seek protection from client-side controls,
such as third-party Cookie blocking, ad blockers, and private browsing mode in browsers.
Client-side controls usually harm user experience because vendors cannot serve relevant
content without collecting users’ online footprints.
To achieve a trade-off between privacy and user experience, we propose a new client-
side tracking control mechanism, TrackMeOrNot, which automatically stops unwanted web
tracking when a user visits privacy sensitive content and shares only non-sensitive visits with
trackers for a better user experience. TrackMeOrNot provides a user with two browsing
contexts and enables seamless context switch within a browser tab. TrackMeOrNot starts a
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navigation with the anonymous browsing context and summarizes the web content with its
content analysis engine. The user’s persistent profile is seamlessly switched within the same
tab if the content does not violate any privacy policy (preference) defined by the user. Our
evaluation with more than 140 user preferences shows that TrackMeOrNot achieved high
accuracy with low performance overhead in selectively sharing users’ online footprints with
web trackers.
1.2.4 Monitoring and Understanding Web Content Access Behavior of JavaScript
Third-party JavaScript code is widely embedded in modern web applications. The embedded
third-party scripts can help enhance the functionality and improve the experience of a web
application. On the other hand, they inherit the full privilege from the websites that
embed them. It is generally known that the third-party JavaScript codes can perform lots
of privileged and unsafe operations, e.g., document.write() and window.eval(). It is,
however, not well studied that how third-party JavaScript code interacts with the content in
the embedding web applications. The lack of knowledge about the behaviors of third-party
scripts leads to the under-estimation of the risk of embedding third-party JavaScript code.
To help web developers understand how the embedded JavaScript code accesses their
content, e.g., Document Object Model (DOM) elements and Cookies, we design and
implement a new monitoring tool, DOM-Logger. By inserting access monitoring codes in
the implementation of the DOM inside a web browser, DOM-Logger can report all the DOM
accesses made by any script. Using DOM-Logger, we collected and analyzed DOM access
logs from Alexa top 100K websites. Our analysis shows that a lot of third-party scripts were
abusing their privileges, e.g., accessing Cookies and user inputs and accessing (all) elements
created by other scripts. What is worse, those over-privileged scripts, including popular
ones provided by Google and Facebook, were commonly found on most websites in our
measurement.
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1.2.5 Fine-Grained Access Control Policy for the Document Object Model
Embedded third-party JavaScript code has the same privilege of the hosting web application.
It can further include scripts from other domains into the hosting application. As a result, a
malicious third-party script can compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the hosting
application. A web developer can define Content Security Policy (CSP) rules to prevent
unknown JavaScript code and other resources from being loaded. However, CSP and
other existing web security mechanisms offer only all-or-nothing restriction. Specifically,
CSP does not further limit the privilege of permitted scripts, which can be loaded from a
compromised web server. Furthermore, such strict and coarse-grained restriction usually
harms functionality. To most developers, the benefits of embedding third-party content
often outweigh the risks of embedding it. More alarmingly, many developers do not clearly
understand what the risks of embedding content from a third party is. Thus, many of them
do not enable these security mechanisms, making the protection offered by them in vain.
In order to protect sensitive user data in web applications, it is necessary to limit the
privilege of third-party JavaScript code to its minimum. In particular, third-party JavaScript
code does not need to access all content (especially the sensitive content) presented in a
web application. Existing solutions such as information flow control systems can prohibit
sensitive data from being leaked. However, they do not prevent a third-party script from
modifying the content in a hosting application.
To help web developers protect both the confidentiality and integrity of their applications,
we propose DOM-ACP, a fine-grained access control mechanism for the Document Object
Model. The mechanism allows web developers to define the access permission (read and/or
write) of any third-party script at per-object granularity through a policy language. The
developer defined policies are enforced by a web browser to mediate all JavaScript accesses.
We design and implement a prototype of the new mechanism with the Chromium browser
that can prevent direct read or write access to sensitive content in web applications. We also
develop a tool to assist web developers in generating a basic policy for their application.
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Our evaluation with popular web applications shows that DOM-ACP is effective in preventing
unauthorized JavaScript code from accessing protected DOM objects.
1.3 Dissertation Contributions
In summary, this dissertation makes the following technical contributions to the security
research community:
• New threats: This dissertation identifies two classes of new threats that compromise
the confidentiality and the integrity of a user’s indirect data in other applications by a
malicious first-party application.
• New observations: The findings and observations gained in this dissertation have
advanced the community’s understanding of emerging threats posed by the practice of
embedding third-party content.
• New techniques: This dissertation presents two new mitigation techniques to help
end users and web developers limit the capability of over-privileged third-party content
to prevent unintended behaviors.
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CHAPTER 2
POLLUTION ATTACKS AGAINST PERSONALIZED WEB SERVICES AND
APPLICATIONS
2.1 Motivation
Personalization is an emerging technology that is embraced by modern web services and
applications. By collecting a user’s past interactions with a service and then building a
user profile based on the collected historical data, a service provider can tailor content to
be more relevant to a particular user. Personalization has been widely used by popular
web applications in recommending videos (YouTube, Netflix, etc.), products (Amazon) and
search results (Google) to users. As the primary revenue source of millions of websites,
advertisements are also becoming more personalized. The online advertising industry has
been putting a concerted effort to increasing the relevance of ads targeted at users by tailoring
the ads to their stated or inferred interests.
Serving relevant content not only improves user experience and increases user engage-
ment, but also contributes to growth in revenues. A recent study found that 11.5% of the
revenue on a group of e-commerce sites was attributable to personalized product recommen-
dations [1]. On the other hand, a great user experience could attract new users and keep
existing users active, thus increases the traffic volume and the ad impressions of a website.
Studies have also shown that ads targeted based on a user’s online interests have a 40%
higher chance in leading to a financial conversion over non-targeted ads [2]. Consequently,
the average price online advertisers pay for these targeted ads is 2.6 times higher than
non-targeted ads [3].
The increasing use of personalization in modern web applications has also presented
a new attack surface for miscreants who try to exploit the new technology for their own
interests. In this chapter, we demonstrate that contemporary personalization mechanisms
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are vulnerable to exploit. In particular, we show popular web applications are vulnerable
to a new class of attack, which we call pollution attack, that allows an attacker to alter
the customized content they return to users who have visited a web page that is controlled
by the attacker. Pollution attack exploits the fact that a service or application employing
personalization incorporates a user’s past history to customize the content. More importantly,
the personalization systems for some web applications do not properly validate the user
interaction with them, and their content can be embedded as third parties by attackers. As a
result, an attacker can embed other applications as third-party content in the background and
hence inject artificial user interactions into personalization systems of these applications.
Based on how a service or application collects user interaction data, pollution attacks can
be categorized into two classes. The first class of pollution attacks targets applications that
collect data as first parties that a user directly visits. For example, end users interact with
websites such as YouTube, Amazon and Google directly. These applications personalize
their content based on users’ direct activities. The second class targets services that collect
data as third parties. In particular, most advertisements are embedded as third-party content
by affiliated partner websites a user visits. By logging which websites a user visits, ad
networks/exchanges can infer the user’s interest and serve ads that target specific user groups.
We first demonstrate that attackers can launch the first class of pollution attacks to pollute
a victim’s profiles on websites that the victim directly visits in §2.2. We then show that a
malicious website can pollute the interest profile of a victim on third-party ad networks to
display higher-paying (but irrelevant) ads to increase its revenue in §2.3.
The ability to trivially abuse personalization systems to alter a user’s content on other
web services and applications is especially worrisome because such abuses do not exploit
any vulnerability in the user’s web browser. Rather, they leverage the design defects in
personalization systems of web services and applications. We discuss defense techniques to
stop such abuses in §2.4 and related work in §2.5.
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2.2 Pollution Attacks against Popular Websites
In this section, we present the first class of pollution attacks that pollute a user’s profiles on
popular websites that the user directly visits. We first discuss the overview and attack model
of the attack in §2.2.1, and then present one concrete attack example against Amazon’s
product recommendation in §2.2.2. We also apply pollution attack to YouTube’s video
recommendation and Google’s personalized search. Readers interested in these two attacks
could find more details in our previous paper [4].
2.2.1 Overview and Attack Model
In this section, we first present a brief overview of personalization as it is used by popular
web applications. We then present a model of pollution attacks against websites that end
users directly visit.
Personalization
Personalization can help web applications deliver information that is tailored to users’
interests and preferences. Users receive more relevant information. Meanwhile, the service
providers present content that the user is more likely to purchase or click, which potentially
increase the revenue of the service providers.
In addition to the current query (a visit or a search) from a user, the other primary input
that personalization algorithms use to customize the content is the user’s interaction history.
For example, based on the items a user has recently viewed or the keywords a user has
searched for, a web application can recommend similar items to the user. Besides the user’s
past interaction activities, other factors including from geo-location and time of day, may
also affect the personalized result. In this section, we focus on how an attacker can pollute a
user’s interaction history to alter the customized content generated by the personalization
algorithm of a web service or application.
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Pollution Attacks
The goal of a pollution attack is to affect the personalized content of a website a user directly
visits, given a particular query from a user. To achieve such goal, an attacker can trick a
user into visiting his website and use techniques such as Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)
to inject artificial input to a victim’s history log on the target website. This attack requires
three steps:
1. Model the personalization algorithm. We assume that the attacker has some ability
to model the personalization algorithm that a website uses to customize its result. In
particular, we assume the attacker has the knowledge about what inputs may be used
by the personalization algorithm. Such knowledge is often available in published
white papers, or can be learned through exploration and experimentation in some
cases.
2. Craft “seed” input to pollute the user’s interaction history. Having some knowledge
of what type of input data may be used by a personalization algorithm, the attacker
needs to carefully craft seed input that may affect the personalized results. Depending
on the application and the query of a user, the seed inputs vary from visits, clicks,
queries to any other activity that might be employed by the personalization algorithm.
For example, the most recently browsed or searched products may affect the product
recommendation results on the homepage of Amazon. The past queries and clicks that
are related with a user’s current search keywords may affect the personalized search
results on Google.
3. Inject the seed input into the victim’s interaction history. To pollute a user’s history,
an attacker needs to automatically create interaction event that will be logged by a
personalization system. The interaction events have to be associated with the victim’s
current session. An attacker can directly steal a user’s credentials to pollute her/his
history, which is very difficult but still possible. A more practical scenario is that
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the attacker can use attack vectors such as CSRF to make it appear as though the
victim user is interacting with a website (e.g., browsing an item, searching for some
keywords).
2.2.2 Pollution Attack against Amazon’s Product Recommendation
Amazon’s personalization is very direct and obvious to an end user. On the one hand, it
makes pollution-based attacks less insidious, as they will be plainly visible to the observant
user. On the other, Amazon has the most direct monetization of its screen real estate – users
may directly purchase the goods from Amazon – so it is possible that any exploitation of
Amazon’s personalization can be profitable to an enterprising attacker.
Amazon tailors a customer’s homepage based on the previous purchase, browsing and
searching behavior of the user. Amazon product recommendations consider each of these
three activities individually and explicitly labels its recommendations according to the
aspect of the user’s history it used to generate them1. We focused on the personalized
recommendations Amazon generates based on the browsing and searching activities of
a customer because manipulating the previous purchase history of a customer may have
unintended consequences.
Amazon Recommendations
Amazon displays on a customer’s homepage five separate recommendation lists that are
ostensibly computed based on the customer’s searching and browsing history. Four of
these lists are derived from the products that the customer has recently viewed (view-
based recommendation lists); the fifth is based on the latest search term the customer
entered (search-based recommendation). For each of the view-based recommendation lists,
Amazon uses relationships between products that are purchased together to compute the
corresponding recommended products. For the recommendation list that is computed based
1We performed the study in 2013. Amazon may have changed how it recommends products to users on its
homepage today.
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on the latest search term of a customer, the recommended products are the top-ranked results
for the latest search term. Because customers frequently browse Amazon without being
signed in, both the latest viewed products and search term of the customer are associated
with the session cookies on the user’s browser.
Identifying Seed Products and Terms
Because Amazon computes the view and search-based recommendation lists separately, the
seed data required for exploiting each list must also be different.
Visit-based pollution. To promote a targeted product in a view-based recommendation
list, an attacker needs to identify a seed product as follows. Given a targeted product that
an attacker wishes to promote, the attacker visits the Amazon page of the product and
retrieves the related products that are shown on the same page. To test the suitability of these
related products, the attacker can visit the Amazon page of that product and then check the
Amazon homepage. If the targeted product is shown in a recommendation list, the URL of
the candidate related product can be used as a seed to promote the targeted product.
Search-based pollution. To promote a targeted product in a search-based recommendation
list, it suffices to identify an appropriate search term. If automation is desired, an attacker
could use a natural language toolkit to automatically extract a candidate keyword set from
the targeted product’s name. Any combination of these keywords that successfully isolates
the targeted product can be used as the seed search term for promoting the targeted product.
For example, to promote product “Breville BJE200XL Compact Juice Fountain 700-Watt
Juice Extractor", an attacker can inject search term “Breville BJE200XL" to replace an
Amazon customer’s latest search term through CSRF.
Injecting Views/Searches
The attacker embeds the Amazon URLs of the desired seed items or search queries into
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Figure 2.1: Promotion rates across Amazon categories.
seed search term is “Coffee Maker”, the seed URL would be something like http://www.
amazon.com/s/?field-keywords=Coffee+Maker. Similarly, an attacker could embed the URL
of a seed product into an invisible img tag as the src of the image. When a victim visits
the attacker’s website, Amazon receives the request for that particular query or item and
customizes the content of victim’s Amazon homepage based on that interaction event.
Experimental Design
To evaluate the effectiveness of the pollution attack against Amazon, we conducted two
experiments. The first experiment measured the effectiveness of our attack when targeted
toward popular items across different categories of Amazon products. The second quantified
the effectiveness of our attack on randomly selected, mostly unpopular Amazon products.
Popular Products. Amazon categorizes sellers’ products into 32 root categories. To select
products from each category, we scraped the top 100 best-selling products in each category
in January 2013, and launched a separate attack targeting each of these 3,200 items.
Random Products. To evaluate the effectiveness of the pollution attack for promoting
arbitrary products, we also selected products randomly. We downloaded a list of Amazon
Standard Identification Number (ASIN) [5] that includes 75,115,473 ASIN records. Since
each ASIN represents an Amazon product, we randomly sampled ASINs from the list and
constructed a set of 3,000 products that were available for sale. For every randomly selected
product in the list, we recorded the sale ranking of that product in its corresponding category.
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Evaluation
Because Amazon computes search-based and visit-based recommendations based entirely
upon the most recent history, we can evaluate the effectiveness of the pollution attack without
using Amazon accounts from real users. Thus, we measured the effectiveness of our attack
by studying the success rate of promoting our targeted products for fresh Amazon accounts.
Promoting Products in Different Categories. To evaluate the effectiveness of the pollu-
tion attack for each targeted product, we checked whether the ASIN of the targeted product
matches the ASIN of an item in the recommendation lists on the user’s customized Amazon
homepage.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the promotion rate of target products in each category. The view-
based and search-based attacks produced similar promotion rates across all categories, about
78% on average. Two categories had significantly lower promotion rates: Gift-Cards-Store
and Movies-TV (5% and 25%, respectively).
To understand why these categories yielded lower promotion rates, we analyzed the top
100 best selling products for each category. For Gift-Cards-Store, we found that there are
two factors that distinguish gift cards from other product types. First, the gift cards all had
similar names; therefore, using the keywords derived from the product name results in only
a small number of specific gift cards being recommended. Second, we found that searching
any combination of keywords extracted from the product names always caused a promotion
of Amazon’s own gift cards, which may imply that it is more difficult to promote product
types that Amazon competes with directly.
Further investigation into the Movies-TV category revealed that Amazon recommends
TV episodes differently. In our attempts to promote specific TV episodes, we found that
Amazon recommends instead the first or latest episode of the corresponding TV series or the
entire series. Because we declared a promotion successful only if the exact ASIN appears in
the recommendation lists, these alternative recommendations are considered failures. These
cases can also be considered successful because the attack caused the promotion of very
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative promotion rates across varying product ranks for different Amazon
pollution attacks.
similar products. Therefore, we believe that for all categories except for Gift-Cards-Store,
an attacker has a significant chance of successfully promoting best-selling products.
Promoting Randomly Selected Products. We launched pollution attacks to promote
3,000 randomly selected products. We calculated the Cumulative Success Rate of products
with respect to their rankings. The Cumulative Success Rate for a given range of product
rankings is defined as the ratio of the number of successfully promoted products to the
number of target products in that range.
Figure 2.2 shows the cumulative promotion rates for different product rankings for
the two different types of pollution attacks. As the target product decrease in popularity
(i.e., have a higher ranking position within its category) pollution attacks become less
effective. This phenomenon reflects a limitation of Amazon recommendation algorithms,
not our attack. Products with low rankings might not be purchased as often; as a result,
they may have few and weak co-visit and co-purchase relationships with other products.
Our preliminary investigation finds that products which rank 2,000 or higher within their
category have at least a 50% chance of being promoted by a visit-based pollution attack,
and products with rankings 10,000 and higher have at least a 30% chance to be promoted
using search-based attacks.
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2.3 Pollution Attack against Targeted Advertising
In this section, we present the second class of pollution attacks that pollute a user’s profiles on
services and applications that the user usually not directly visits, i.e., third-party applications.
In particular, we demonstrate this class of pollution attacks using targeted online advertising
as an example. We present a new ad fraud mechanism that enables publishers to increase
their ad revenue by exploiting the role played by the user’s online interest profile in the
ad selection process. Our attack exploits the fact that advertisers mainly set up campaigns
to target users with specific online interests and are willing to pay higher for such users.
Since the user’s interest profile is inferred by third-party advertising and tracking libraries
based on the web pages a user visits, it is vulnerable to exploits that use Cross-Site Request
Forgery (CSRF) [6], clickjacking [7] or cross-site scripting (XSS) [8] that can pollute users’
profiles by generating camouflaged requests to web pages not explicitly visited by them.
A fraudulent publisher can use these exploits to pollute the profiles of users visiting the
publisher’s website to mislead advertisers and the ad exchange to deliver more lucrative ads
to these users, and thereby increase the publisher’s ad revenue.
While the above described attack seems intuitive, it is not trivial to design and launch
the attack such that it is practical, effective, and lucrative. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to design and successfully deploy a pollution attack on the existing targeted
advertising ecosystem. Achieving this requires addressing the following challenges which
also form the main contributions of our work. First, the attack should not require any
explicit cooperation from the ad exchange or advertisers, and should be effective for the two
commonly used ad targeting mechanisms – behavioral targeting and re-marketing. Second,
polluting user profiles should be effective even without explicit knowledge about external
factors that impact ad revenue (campaign budgets, bid costs, publisher preferences and ad
inventory, etc.). Third, it should be feasible to load the pollution content in a camouflaged
manner such that it is not discernible by the users while deceiving the ad exchange and
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advertisers. Finally, the polluted user profile should result in biasing the ads targeted at the
user towards the intended higher-paying advertisers.
To address the above described challenges, we set up and validate the attack against
one of the largest ad exchanges, DoubleClick, and study the monetary value of the attack
for live publisher web pages. Instead of polluting live traffic, we emulate user traffic to the
publisher websites by replaying web traces collected from 619 real users from 264 distinct
IP addresses and recording all ads delivered to these emulated users. This setup enables an
end-to-end characterization of the different aspects of the attack under controlled settings
that is otherwise not feasible. Our results show that the attack is successful and effective in
deceiving DoubleClick to deliver higher-paying ads on the fraudulent publisher’s website.
Using our attack, the polluter can influence up to 74% and 12% of the total ad impressions
for re-marketing and behavioral pollution, respectively. Finally, we show that the attack is
lucrative, enabling the fraudulent publishers to increase their ad revenue on average by 33%.
The main contributions of this section are:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to demonstrates a practical application
of a profile pollution attack with clear monetary benefits to the attacker. We perform
an end-to-end validation and characterization of the attack on the online advertising
ecosystem and study the monetary value to publishers.
• We present novel approaches for selecting content used for polluting users’ profiles
in a way that influences the two most commonly used ad targeting mechanisms –
re-marketing and behavioral targeting – while not being discernible by the polluted
users.
• We validate our attack against one of the largest ad exchanges, DoubleClick, and show
that it is successful and effective in deceiving DoubleClick to deliver higher-paying ads
on the fraudulent publisher’s website. Using our attack, the polluter can influence up
to 74% and 12% of the total ad impressions for re-marketing and behavioral pollution,
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respectively.
• Finally, we show that the attack is lucrative, enabling the fraudulent publishers to
increase their ad revenue by 4% to 23%. We also present a detailed study of the primary
factors that influence revenue generated and discuss potential countermeasures.
2.3.1 Ad Targeting and User Profiles
In this section we describe the ad targeting mechanisms available to advertisers [9] and
discuss the critical role played by a user’s online interest profile in the existing ad ecosystem.
Ad Targeting Mechanisms
Contextual Targeting. Contextual targeting involves matching the ad with the context of
the page that it is displayed on (and ignores the visitor interest profile). The targeting is
implicit and the user’s online interests are largely ignored: a car insurance company will
place ads on auto-related sites because it is assumed that visitors to the site are likely to own
a car (or want to) and will need insurance.
Re-Marketing. Re-marketing is used by advertisers to target users who, in the past, have
indicated a very specific interest in a particular product. For example, consider a user who
visits a car insurance website, clicks on a link to get a quote, but leaves without buying the
insurance offered. The insurance company (via the ad exchange) can then target this user
with re-marketing ads, e.g., showing insurance discounts. These ads will be delivered to
the user on other websites, which may be completely unrelated to cars or insurance, to lure
the user back to finish the purchase. Here, the advertiser targets a user by exploiting a very
specific signal.
Behavioral Targeting. Behavioral targeting is used by advertisers that target users who
have shown an interest in some categories (e.g., cars or college football). This mechanism
goes beyond the “single domain” aspect of re-marketing, and selects ads that might relate to
the user’s online interests as observed from her browsing patterns. This form of targeting
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often results in ads that may be unrelated with the page being viewed [10]. For example,
with behavioral targeting, a user might be targeted with car insurance related ads (potentially
from a company she did not visit online) on a website about Food & Nutrition simply
because she visited multiple different car insurance related websites, and the ad exchange
profiled her to be interested in car insurance.
User Profiles and Targeted Ads
Behavioral targeting and re-marketing make explicit use of the user’s online interests that
are profiled by the ad exchange and other third party trackers. This is achieved by installing
third party JavaScript tracking code provided by the ad exchange on websites that users’
browse. The tracking code extracts details about the page (e.g., exact URL, meta tags about
keywords, description, etc. [11]) and transmits this along with the user’s cookie identifier.
This information, along with other information that the ad exchange has about the website,
is used to profile the user’s interests and are offered to advertisers as targeting options. A
user’s interest profile for behavioral targeting is represented as a set of semantic categories,
structured as a hierarchy (e.g., Movies→Action Films→Superhero films). For re-marketing,
the ad exchange simply maintains a list of users (cookie IDs) that visit a specific page on the
advertiser’s website.
As is evident, the user’s interest profile forms an integral component of the ad selection
process. Advertisers assign a monetary value using cost-per-click (CPC) or cost-per-mille
(CPM) directly to the user’s online interests and are willing to pay up to 2.6 times higher
to target ads at users with a desired profile [3]. Moreover, as we show in Section 2.3.4,
although a user may have online interests accumulated over a long time period, short term
browsing activity can significantly impact the user’s profile and consequently change the
type of ads that a user receives. Our attack exploits this critical aspect and enables publishers
to pollute user profiles towards ad categories that generate higher revenue. In the following
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Figure 2.3: An overview of the profile pollution attack
that are specific to the ad ecosystem and the commonly used ad targeting mechanisms.
2.3.2 Profile Pollution Attack
The profile pollution attack (which we also refer to as a fraud mechanism) introduces a new
entity in the ad ecosystem that we call profile polluter. Figure 2.3 shows the interaction of
the profile polluter with the rest of the ad ecosystem (dashed lines). Specifically, the primary
steps involved in a successful attack are:
1. The profile polluter identifies and downloads content in order to pollute user profiles.
2. A user visits the polluter page (which can be hosted at the publisher’s website) and
pollution content is loaded first in a camouflaged manner. (steps 1 and 1a in the figure).
3. This signals the ad exchange of a legitimate browsing event by the user, and the user’s
profile is impacted (step 1b).
4. When the user navigates to another page on the publisher’s website, the ad exchange is
deceived in using this modified profile in soliciting bids for ads (steps 2-5).
5. The publisher’s revenue increases if the winning ad is from an advertiser that bids higher
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to target the polluted user (step 6).
The attack focuses on polluting users to influence behavioral targeting and re-marketing
ad campaigns, as they explicitly make use of the user’s online interest profile. In order
to simplify the description, we assume that the publisher also plays the role of the profile
polluter. The readers should note under this assumption the attack could only impact ads
of user’s next visit, as the website content and pollution content are loaded by browser in
parallel in each visit.
Identifying Pollution Content
Pollution Content for Re-Marketing. A re-marketing campaign is set up by integrating
a few lines of JavaScript code, i.e., the re-marketing script, which is provided by the ad
exchange, in the advertiser’s website. The JavaScript code encodes the unique identifier of
the advertiser and the associated re-marketing campaign. When a user visits the re-marketing
enabled advertiser website, these identifiers along with the user’s ad exchange cookie are
transmitted to the ad exchange. This enables the ad exchange to tag the user and track her
interactions on the advertiser’s website. The tagged user is then easily re-identified later
on other websites and is targeted with ads from the advertiser. Consequently, a user’s past
browsing history and online interests do not impact re-marketing ads.
This script can be easily detected by parsing the HTML code of a web page2. Thus,
a simple approach to find content for re-marketing pollution is to parse web pages of
advertisers belonging to high-paying categories and identify those that host re-marketing
scripts.
Pollution Content for Behavioral Targeting. The approach of simply scanning websites
in a directory service is not sufficient for finding content for behavioral pollution as the
ad exchange categories may not match those of the directory service. Alternatively, the
polluter can exploit the ad preference dashboards made available by large ad exchanges to
2DoubleClick itself provides instructions on how their Tag Assistant detects re-marketing scripts. For more
details, see https://support.google.com/tagassistant/answer/2954407?hl=en
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build an offline map between web pages and the category label assigned to these web pages.
Specifically, the polluter can impersonate a user with a blank profile (delete all cookies
and create a fresh browser profile), browse pages from a specific category and record the
corresponding profile generated by the ad exchange. This map can then be used to select
pollution content. Unlike re-marketing based pollution, the impact of behavioral pollution
on altering user profiles towards more lucrative advertisers depends on the users’ existing
online interest profile. We empirically evaluate this impact across diverse user profiles in
Section 2.3.4.
Hosting and Loading Pollution Content
The pollution content hosted by the fraudulent publisher should be loaded by the user’s
browser in a way that is not discernible by the user and ad exchange. While there are many
ways to fabricate such camouflaged requests, such as CSRF, XSS and Clickjacking etc., in
this chapter we assume the pollution content is loaded using cross reference issued by hidden
HTML iframes. These iframes are located outside the viewing area of the browser or
layered underneath other content, and are used to reference and load pollution content. The
loading of such content takes place in the background and is completely hidden from the
user. Moreover, since approaches for frame-busting are not ubiquitously deployed, simple
approaches can be used to hide the frame content from web crawlers.
Attack Monetization – CPM and CPC
An important property of the attack is that it can be used to further boost the revenue
generated by existing click and impression fraud mechanisms. This can be achieved if
the bot master has control over the user’s browser such that it can pollute user profiles to
maximize the impact of the fraud. When deployed in isolation of existing fraud mechanisms,
the attack is most effective for CPM-based ad campaigns. This is because CPM-based
campaigns, which are the most common campaigns for display ads [11, 12], provide
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consistent cash flow to the publisher, regardless of whether visitors click on the potentially
unrelated ads. In the rest of the chapter we focus on CPM-based campaigns and assume that
the attack is deployed as a standalone attack without deploying additional fraud methods.
2.3.3 Attack Setup
We set up the attack as follows. Instead of driving live traffic, we emulate users browsing
the websites with web traces. A few domains from the users’ traces are selected as the
fraudulent publishers. As we do not have control over these websites, the profile polluter
is separated from the fraudulent publisher and is responsible for polluting the emulated
user traffic immediately after loading the publisher’s page to approximate a publisher that
pollutes his own users. A distributed testbed of 200 nodes spread across the world (using
PlanetLab) is used to generate web traffic to ensure location diversity. Since the traffic is
emulated from browsers that we control, an ad crawler is used to record all the DoubleClick
ads delivered to the emulated users. The recorded ads are analyzed and the revenue is
estimated using publicly available CPM index values published by DoubleClick [13]. We
also set up our own website as a fraudulent publisher to characterize the effectiveness of the
attack.
User Web Traces & Profiles
Our attack setup replays complete web traces from real users to characterize and validate
the attack. This is important because the ad revenue is not only impacted by the frequency
with which users visit the publisher page but also depends on the user’s online interest
profile before and after pollution; the pollution impact depends on websites visited prior to
pollution and the duration of the impact depends on websites visited after pollution.
We use web traces of real users from a Chrome extension installed by more than 700
users who have been using the extension for 2 years for research purpose. The functionality
of the extension was modified to record all the web-page URLs visited by the user for a one
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week period (March 10th, 2014 - March 16th, 2014)3. In this time period, we collected a
total of 224,855 page visits from 619 unique active users. Our dataset is diverse and consists
of users using the extension across the world.
We create multiple copies of each user’s profile to load under different pollution settings.
The user web traces are replayed to generate profiles that are polluted by forwarding the
request to the profile polluter after visiting the fraudulent publisher. We also create clean
profiles by replaying user web traces bypassing the profile polluter. To eliminate the impact
from time and location on distribution of ads, each user’s profiles are generated by replaying
her web trace at the same time from the same IP address. This provides a seamless approach
to measure the extent to which the pollution impacts the type of ads targeted at the user.
Thus, for every experiment presented in the following two sections, we record the ads
targeted at the user with and without profile pollution.
Pollution Content
As described in Section 2.3.2, user profiles are polluted in order to mislead the ad exchange
and advertisers from more lucrative verticals to target ads at users visiting the fraudulent
publisher’s web page. We pollute each user by generating camouflaged visits to three
websites from the top three most expensive display ad categories of Health, Business and
Education. Beyond the top three ad categories, we pick two additional categories of Sports
and Shopping to study the attack on less valuable ad categories.
Polluting for Behavioral Targeting. In order to find websites that alter the user’s interest
profile towards the above mentioned categories, we first filter websites from the correspond-
ing Alexa category that contain the DoubleClick tracking script. For each website in this
list, we use the Google Ad Preferences Dashboard [14] to build a map between the websites
and categories that are consistent with DoubleClick. Table 2.1 provides the three websites
selected for each category.
3IRB approval was granted and users were notified about the type of data collected and the intent of use for
research purposes
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Table 2.1: The websites we use for polluting users’ profiles in the five ad categories.
Google Category Alexa Category Re-marketing Pollution Contents Behavioral Pollution Contents
Health Health eyemagic.net intensemuscle.com
bimabazaar.com
allacqueredup.com
Business Business incorporate.com bloomberg.com/news/insurance/
bloomberg.com/news/finance/
bloomberg.com/news/industries
Educaton Reference asuonline.asu.edu universando.com
campusleader.com
graphs.net
Shopping Shopping teleflora.com alterationsneeded.com
modernsalon.com
viloux.com
Sports Sports moenormangolf.com bloguin.com
retospadel.com
golftechnic.com
Polluting for Re-Marketing Targeting. Similar to the previous approach, we filter
websites in the Alexa category that host the re-marketing script from DoubleClick. In
addition to verifying that the category matches, we also verify that the re-marketing campaign
is active. Table 2.1 lists the websites used for re-marketing pollution for each category.
Publisher Web Page
The complete attack is validated on two different type of publisher web pages.
Live Websites. We validate the attack on existing live publishers whose ad revenue is
impacted by the dynamic content hosted by them as well as pre-existing preferences about
type of ads that are allowed to be targeted. To this end, we select the top 19 most visited
websites that host DoubleClick ads from the user web traces. Instead of compromising these
websites to host pollution content, we set up the profile polluter as a separate entity. When
emulating traffic traces, we forward the user to the profile polluter immediately after visiting
any one of these 19 websites. We use results from these publishers primarily to estimate the
revenue generated by the attack (Section 2.3.5).
Controlled Publisher. In order to form a baseline of the effectiveness of the attack, we set
up our own publisher website and sign up with AdSense [9]. The publisher website has two
display ad slots (top banner display ad and a side display ad) and uses the default settings
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provided by AdSense. Since AdSense requires the website to host some content before
approving it, we upload static content that describes the different ad targeting mechanisms
available to advertisers. Visiting the web page with a blank profile results in DoubleClick
profiling the user with interests belonging to the Computers category. Similar to the above
setup, the profile polluter is separated from the controlled publisher.
Trace Emulator and Ad Crawler
A critical component of the attack setup is a distributed infrastructure to emulate web traffic
by replaying the traces and recording all the ads delivered to the emulated user.
Trace Emulator. We develop a distributed infrastructure based on the PlanetLab testbed
that is able to emulate real user web traffic. The trace emulator consists of a central control
server and 264 worker nodes distributed across the world. The server maintains a list of tasks
that are fetched by distributed workers periodically. Given a task containing the URL to visit
and a unique user ID, the worker node instance loads one profile of the corresponding user,
visits the assigned URL, records all the ads displayed on the web page and the associated
metadata, and sends this information back to the central server. The user’s profile is updated
accordingly after visiting the assigned URL.
Ad Crawler. Collecting measurements about display ads requires the ability to disassem-
ble the elements of a web page, identify ad elements and associate these with particular
categories. Existing ad monitoring and blacklisting tools – AdBlock [15] and Ghostery [16]
– work by matching URL patterns embedded in a web page against a set of blacklist patterns,
and cannot look deeper into the element and reason about it. The task is made even more
difficult by complex DOM structures, deep nesting of elements, and dynamic JavaScript
execution, that is found on a large fraction of pages on the Internet today. To address these
challenges we extend the PhantomJS headless browser4 to reliably extract the ad elements
of a page, identify the actual landing pages for the ad elements, and associate the ads with
4http://phantomjs.org
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specific semantic categories. The current implementation of the ad crawler is limited to ads
delivered by DoubleClick.
Ad Revenue Estimation
The final component of our setup is to estimate the ad revenue the fraudulent publisher
generates. We estimate the revenue by using the publicly available report provided by
Google that ranks the CPM cost of different ad verticals (categories) and associates with
each vertical a relative cost index [13]. In the Google report, the index for the three most
expensive categories of Health, Business and Job & Education were 257, 221 and 200
correspondingly. The least expensive category was Law & Government with an index of
46. We further manually mapped each of the 13 top-level Alexa categories to one of the
ad verticals used in the published Google report. Our revenue estimation analysis always
compares the revenue generated by the pollution attack with the baseline revenue computed
by running the exact same experiment without pollution.
2.3.4 Validation and Effectiveness of the Attack
In this section we evaluate the extent to which profile pollution impacts the ads by deploying
the attack on the controlled publisher web page. The primary metric used for the evaluation
is the relative change in ads from the desired ad category (behavioral pollution) or domain
(re-marketing pollution) with and without pollution. For both user profile sets, the trace
emulator first visits every website in a user’s trace to ensure that all users have an online
interest profile. We then take one set of user profiles and pollute all users only once.
Subsequently, users from both sets visit the controlled publisher page once every hour for a
duration of 50 hours. For each visit to the publisher web page the ad crawler captures all the
ads.
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Figure 2.4: Effectiveness of pollution attacks against re-marketing ad campaigns across
different ad categories.
Pollution Using Re-Marketing Campaigns
Figure 2.4 shows, for each pollution category, the fraction of ads received with and without
profile pollution across all users. As expected, we observe that only the polluted users
receive ads from the category used in the pollution. Surprisingly, we observe that across
all categories, re-marketing ads aggressively target users, both in terms of time between
the pollution and first ad shown, and number of ads: across all pollution categories users
receive ads from the intended advertisers immediately in the very first visit to the publisher’s
webpage, and approximately 40–50% of all display ads are from these advertisers. We also
verified the distribution of ads across users (not shown) and found that all the users received
ads from the re-marketing campaigns used for pollution.
While the pollution is highly effective once it is triggered, advertisers may set up
specific rules to trigger the campaign that can impact the publisher’s ad revenue. First, as
seen in Figure 2.4 advertisers can set up time based triggers. For example, the advertiser
moenormangolf.com from the Sports category set up the campaign to only run during
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.6: Change in the distribution of ads.
can be set up with frequency caps or they may be paused by the advertiser. Additionally,
the advertiser may set up the campaign with a more complex control flow of user actions
(e.g., went to homepage, placed things in the cart, but never checked-out) and trigger
the campaign only when a user completes all the steps. Thus, the primary challenge in
effectively exploiting re-marketing campaigns is to select pollution content that accounts for
such specific trigger rules.
Pollution Using Behavioral Targeting Campaigns
Impact on Ad Categories. Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of ads across the 13 top-
level Alexa categories for user profiles that were not polluted. We observe that the ad
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Figure 2.7: Percentage increase in ads (pollution - no pollution) from the polluted category.
distribution spans multiple categories as users have diverse online interests. We use this
baseline distribution and compute the relative change in the distribution of ad categories
after pollution. Figure 2.6 shows the relative change in the ad categories across users which
validates the effectiveness of our pollution attack – there is a clear increase in ads in the
polluted category with a maximum increase of 12% for the Shopping category. Moreover,
the pollution manages to increase the number of ads in categories that a user already received
prior to pollution. For example, the fraction of ads in the Health category increases from
23% to 31%.
Temporal Impact. Finally, we study the temporal effect of the pollution. Figure 2.7 shows
the relative increase in fraction of ads received from the category used for pollution. We
observe that the effect of the pollution is immediate and leads to an increase in ads from the
desired category. Moreover, the effect of the pollution persists over the entire time duration
of the experiment. This indicates that categories introduced artificially as an effect of the




































































































Figure 2.8: Average indexed CPM across the top 5 and bottom 5 selected websites before
and after pollution.
Table 2.2: Details of revenue experiments, showing the top 5 and bottom 5 websites we

























bleacherreport.com 231 3.96 133 527 -2.60 120.64 106.81
samanyoluhaber.com 1,396 13.44 85 1142 28.11 34.67 104.52
slideshare.net 120 2.29 146 335 2.78 88.15 93.57
stern.de 1,691 2.58 60 155 18.75 41.43 61.54
thenation.com 13,835 1.50 88 132 -2.88 24.99 55.15
thinkprogress.org 3,960 1.37 91 125 -4.37 19.90 7.70
mangahere.com 1,903 72.71 52 3781 2.43 14.63 6.25
newyorker.com 2,432 1.93 159 307 -7.49 -6.67 1.37
download.cnet.com 104 4.48 69 309 -2.62 0.86 0.95
reliancenetconnect.co.in 1,694 1.79 102 183 2.07 -1.85 -0.61
2.3.5 Revenue Estimation for Live Publishers
In this section, we deploy the attack on live publisher websites and estimate the revenue
generated by the attack for these publishers. Unlike the controlled publisher setting, there
are a number of factors like the hosted content, popularity of the website, and ad preferences
setup by the publisher that impact the ad revenue. While it is not feasible to explain the
specific factors that impacts the publisher’s revenue, we seek to empirically measure the
overall impact of the pollution on the revenue of live publishers.
As described in Section 2.3.3, we select the top 19 most frequently visited websites from
the web traces that host DoubleClick ads as the “fraudulent” publishers. When replaying the
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of the relative increase in the indexed CPM across the 19 selected
websites.
web traces, every visit to one of these 19 domains is followed by visiting the profile polluter.
We emulate these traces four times in parallel for the following four pollution configurations
- without pollution, behavioral pollution, re-marketing pollution, and hybrid (both) pollution
using the pollution content shown in Table 2.1. The revenue is estimated using the CPM
index [13] data reported by DoubleClick.
Aggregate CPM Index Change
Figure 2.9 shows the relative change in the CPM index for the three pollution configurations
across the 19 websites. Overall, we find that behavioral pollution is not as effective as
re-marketing based pollution; for almost 80% of the websites the change in the indexed
CPM is not significant (± 5%). On the other hand, re-marketing based pollution does
significantly and consistently increase the relative indexed CPM; an increase of 4–120% for
about 80% of the domains.
To better understand these distributions, Table 2.2 provides the traffic statistics along
with the relative change of CPM index for the top five and bottom five performing domains
ordered by the CPM index with hybrid pollution. Figure 2.8 shows the average indexed
CPM for the same 10 websites. We make a number of observations from this data:
Website Ranking and Traffic Patterns. Across the five best and worst performing
websites we do not observe any correlation between the website ranking or traffic patterns
with the revenue generated by either one of the three pollution configurations. This indicates
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that our attack is able to deceive the ad exchange in targeting high value ads even on websites
that are ranked much lower or have highly varying traffic patterns.
Varying Performance of Behavioral Pollution. We observe that behavioral pollution
does not consistently increase the ad revenue for the fraudulent publisher. Among the top
five websites listed in Table 2.2, bleacherreport.com, slideshare.net and thenation.com
yield a negative or very low increase in the average CPM index. Looking into the logs, we
find that the behavioral pollution of the emulated traffic to these websites was ineffective.
For example, 83% and 85% of the ads targeted on bleacherreport.com were from a single
advertiser, ford.com, before and after behavioral pollution, respectively. Similarly, 100%
and 93% of the ads on slideshare.net were from academy.com before and after behavioral
pollution, respectively. On the other hand, re-marketing and hybrid pollution for these
domains was effective and led to a significant increase in ad revenue. This potentially
indicates that these websites have pre-sold their ad inventory and consequently behavioral
pollution was ineffective. However, re-marketing based pollution manages to override this
pre-sold ad inventory, potentially because of the higher CPM and CPC costs associated with
these ads.
Low Yield Re-marketing Pollution. As discussed in Section 2.3.4, re-marketing based
pollution leads to aggressive targeting of users independent of their online profile. However,
we observe that for newyorker.com, download.cnet.com, and reliancenetconnect.co.in all
three pollution configurations are ineffective. None of the three domains received ads from
the advertisers used for re-marketing pollution even when users visiting other domains were
targeted with the re-marketing ads. Moreover, the behavioral pollution was also ineffective
for these domains. For example, on reliancenetconnect.co.in, between 65%-73% of the
ads targeted at users before and after pollution (all three pollution types) were automobile
related ads from domains like mazdausa.com, avis.com, budget.com and driveamazda.com.
This potentially indicates a scenario where the publisher website is explicitly configured to
only receive automobile related ads making the different pollution mechanisms ineffective.
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2.4 Countermeasures
In this section we discuss countermeasures and best practices that different entities can adopt
in order to mitigate or at least minimize the attack surface.
General Countermeasures. Commonly, websites are not supposed to be framed within
another website as part of an iframe [17]. Therefore, using X-Frame-Option or deploying
a “frame-busting” method can make it more difficult for the polluter to abuse innocent
websites for the purpose of pollution fraud (other methods, such as pop-unders can still be
used, but are easier to detect).
For a website that allow other websites to embed it, it should check the browsing context
when a user interacts with it. The user’s interaction should not be logged if its web page is
not loaded in the main frame. Similarly, ad and tracking libraries should check the user’s
browsing context before logging any data. In addition, web services and applications should
implement defenses against CSRF attacks for critical endpoints that may change a user’s
history. One effective defense is associating an user interaction event with a server generated
unforgeable token. Thus, attackers can not inject artificial inputs any more because they can
not obtain a valid token.
Advertisers. Advertisers should protect their ad campaigns against pollution attacks by
targeting audiences that have very specific interests. This effectively raises the bar for the pol-
luter to find relevant pollution content impacting a large number of users. For example, find-
ing the appropriate pollution content for the category Jobs & Education→Education→Distance
Learning may be more difficult to compared to finding pollution content for Education.
Similarly, a re-marketing campaign that targets users with a specific flow in the website,
e.g., users who logged in, placed an item in a cart but did not check out, is more difficult to
compromise compared to targeting all users who visited the web page of the advertiser. We
note that the downside of such fine-grained audience targeting is that it may reduce the size
of the target audience.
Ad Exchange and Ad Networks. Recent work, like ViceROI [18], aims to detect click
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spam by comparing the revenue per user for a fraudulent publisher with a baseline set of
ethical publishers. While this approach is limited to catching click spam, ad networks and ad
exchanges should deploy similar approaches to detect impression fraud caused by anomalous
revenue changes in the fraudulent publisher’s ad revenue. Even though the attacker has
control over his ad revenue through configuring the attack settings (e.g. pollution content,
ad preference, and amount of polluted users, etc.), the deployment of systems like ViceROI
could reduce the ad revenue generated from profile pollution.
Ad exchanges like DoubleClick do not check for the domain in which the re-marketing
script is being executed. Consequently, it is sufficient for the polluter to simply copy the
JavaScript provided by the ad exchange. To prevent this, the re-marketing script provided by
the ad exchange should be bound to the designated domain, and at run time the script should
verify that it indeed runs within the intended domain.
A few ad exchanges and ad networks provide users the ability to inspect and modify
the inferred online interest profile or opt out of personalized ads [14, 19, 20, 21, 22].
However, users have no visibility into how these profiles are generated or used to serve
targeted ads [10]. Ad exchanges and ad networks should provide users easy mechanisms
to flag suspicious ads they see that are not aligned with their real interests. Additionally,
ad exchanges should also encourage users to manually adjust their online interests, and
explicitly avoid being targeted in some categories. For example, a user might want to
disallow all Health related ads. In such a case, a polluter attempting to influence the user’s
profile with the Health category would lead to no ads from this category to be targeted at the
user.
A key contributor to the success of the attack is that pollution content immediately
impacts the user profile, thus the polluter can almost immediately benefit from the attack.
The ad networks can increase the duration between page visits and the impact on the
user’s profile, thus mitigating the impact of the attack by profiling users interests across
a large set of websites visited by the user. However, this delay might be in contrast to
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the ad networks’ desire for accurate and timely inference of user interests, especially for
re-marketing campaigns.
2.5 Related Work
Content Manipulation. The line of work most closely related to our pollution attack
is black-hat search engine optimization (bSEO), which manipulate the search engine to
promote certain search results. Since bSEO targets the general indexing and ranking
process of search engines, the promoted results will be visible to all users. bSEO usually
requires sophisticated infrastructure that may consist of hundreds of websites to form a link
farm [23]. Building and maintaining these infrastructures require a considerable amount of
resources [24]. By contrast, our pollution attack targets the customized content of individual
users, which is much easier to launch. On the other hand, techniques that address bSEO are
unlikely to be effective against pollution attacks.
Online Advertising Economy and Tracking. The economics of online advertising is
discussed in detail in [25], which considers the usage of targeting users based on interests as
a key difference between traditional and online advertising. More recently, Gill et al. [12]
proposed a simple model for capturing the effect of user profile (or “intent”) on the revenue
obtained by the ad network and the publishers. Using this model the authors stressed the
significance of the user profile in the ecosystem by showing that incorporating mechanisms
that block tracking, thereby essentially eliminating targeted advertising, can decrease the
overall revenue of ad networks by 75%.
In order to build an accurate user profile, ad networks need to track users as they browse
the web. Several recent papers measure the extent to which users are being tracked and
targeted by ad networks [26, 27, 10]. Rosner et al. [27] showed that online tracking of users
is ubiquitous and covers a large fraction of a user’s browsing behavior. Liu et al. [10] focused
on Google’s DoubleClick network and showed that interest-based targeting is prominent
and spans multiple ad categories, with up to 65% of the ad categories received by a user are
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targeted based on the user’s inferred profile.
In this work we leverage the strong relation between the user interest profile and the
economics of online advertising to propose a method for polluting user interest profile for
increasing the publisher’s revenue.
Fraud in Online Advertising. Fraud in online advertising and countermeasures against
these fraud mechanisms have been the focus of a long line of research efforts [28, 29, 30,
31, 32, 11, 33, 34, 35, 36]. The most common fraudulent activities include those where
fraudulent publishers leverage click-spam networks or pay-per-view networks to increase
the traffic to their sites, and thus increase their ad revenue. Click-spam networks cause
fraudulent clicks on ads in order to increase the income of the publisher or sometimes
deplete the budget of the advertiser. The most recently study by [32], where the authors
conducted a controlled experiment show that click-spam attacks account for 10–25% of
the clicks, highlighting the prominence of such attacks. In a recent study, the authors used
these results and presented a system [18] that ad networks can use for catching click-spam
in search ad networks.
Different from click-spam networks are pay-per-view networks that artificially increase
the number of ad impressions of fraudulent publishers by framing the publisher’s website
within other websites in a camouflaged fashion. Fraudulent activities using pay-per-view
networks typically result in impressions that are registered on the camouflaged pages without
“genuine user interest” i.e., invalid traffic generation. A recent study [11] have shown a
pay-per-view network generates hundreds of millions of fraudulent impressions per day.
Existing online advertising frauds focus solely on increasing the volume of ad clicks or
impressions and have largely ignored the impact of user profiles. Our attack complements
these existing fraud mechanisms by enabling the publisher to further boost the revenue
obtained by participating in either of the networks. Compared to existing fraudulent activities




We have presented a new class of attack to pollute a user’s profile in a third-party application
(service) by embedding content of the third-party application. The attacks exploit the
role played by a user’s profile in the personalization system of a third-party service. The
attacks leverage novel mechanisms to pollute a user’s profile to promote certain content on a
third-party service. We showed that the profile pollution based attacks are robust against
diverse browsing patterns and online interests of users. The attacks are effective in deceiving
popular websites to serve content at the attacker’s choice and drawing higher-paying ads
resulting in a significant increase in ad revenue.
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CHAPTER 3
INFERRING USER PROFILE WITH PERSONALIZED MOBILE IN-APP ADS
3.1 Motivation
In-app advertising allows mobile application developers to generate revenue despite publish-
ing their work for free. As in traditional web-based advertising, personalization improves the
effectiveness of in-app advertising (and thus increases the revenue earned by app developers).
It is well understood that such personalization is only possible if certain user information
(e.g., interests, demographic information) is available to the party that serves advertisements,
and thus privacy leakage is always a concern. While ad personalization has been well studied
for web, relatively little research explores mobile ad personalization in terms of what user
information is being collected. We believe research focused on mobile ad personalization is
a significant pursuit for the following reasons: 1) Mobile devices are a lot more intimate to
users; they are carried around at all times and are being used more and more for sensitive
operations like personal communications, dating, banking, etc.. Therefore, privacy concerns
regarding what information is collected for ad personalization are more serious. 2) Unlike
in-browser advertising, where the advertisement content is strictly isolated from the rest of
the displayed page by the well-known “Same-origin policy”, in-app advertising operates in
a new and less understood environment. Thus, in this chapter we try to answer the following
two questions which will be of great interest not only to privacy-conscious users of mobile
applications, but also to advertisers who try to target specific audience groups:
1. To what degree are in-app advertisements personalized to target different attributes of
a user (e.g. interest, demographics)?
2. How much can an app learn about a user by observing personalized advertisements?
To achieve our goals, we collected ground truth demographic data from more than
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two hundred real users and tested the correlation between the demographic data with
advertisements observed by each volunteer user. This correlation allows us to establish that
certain advertisements are statistically more likely to be shown to users of one demographic
group than another. We also used the data collected to train models to predict a user’s
interest/demographic information based on advertisements he/she receives. The accuracy
of the generated model indicates how much an ad-hosting app can learn about the user by
merely observing the personalized advertisements received.
The work presented in this chapter marks significant improvement in the methodology
for studying mobile ad personalization as well as an extension in scope for such studies.
Specifically, our work is the first that is based on ground truth data collected from real users,
while prior work [38, 39] mostly study advertisements received by synthetic users that are
expected to have certain interests or belong to certain demographic groups. We argue that
results obtained using synthesized users can never be conclusive if we do not know how
the studied ad-network builds user profiles. For example, while one may try to make a user
appear like a middle aged white male to the advertiser/ad network by downloading and
running apps that are predominately used by the target population, one cannot know for sure
that this is actually a signal that the advertiser/ad network is listening for or whether this
signal is strong enough for the advertiser to conclude the user is a middle-aged white male.
Previous studies have shown the possibility of privacy leakage through web advertis-
ing [40, 41]. We study whether the environment of in-app personalized mobile ads presents
new privacy threats. Specifically, we investigate whether users’ demographic profile can
be reconstructed based on the ad content delivered to mobile apps. Ideally, as the case of
in-browser advertising, personalized ads are delivered directly to users in the iframe of ad
networks, and thus only users can know the ad content personalized on their information.
However, unlike web advertising, mobile in-app advertising allows app developers to access
users’ personalized ads. These ads might reflect users’ real interests and other demographics,
because the ads run in the same process space of the app.
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To maintain a reasonable scope for our work, we focus on the Android platform and
Google’s mobile ad network - AdMob. Given the major market share of Android (76.6%)
in current mobile shipments and that of AdMob (35%) on Android devices [42, 43], we
believe they are very good representations for studying mobile advertisements. We note
that even though we only studied one ad network, the same methodology can be applied to
study other ad networks and to determine whether/how much other user data (e.g. sexual
orientation) is effectively used in ad personalization and might be leaked to apps hosting
those ads. The amount of leaked personal data depends on the degree of personalization
of the studied ad-network, e.g., adversaries are expected to learn less or even no personal
information from a less sophisticated ad network than from Google’s ad network.
3.2 Background
In this section, we briefly describe the ecosystem of mobile advertising and its related
targeting mechanisms. We also discuss the differences between web advertising and mobile
advertising that cause potential privacy leakage on mobile platforms.
3.2.1 Ecosystem of Mobile Advertising
Publishers, advertisers, and ad networks are the three main components of both web and
mobile advertising. The only difference between web and mobile advertising is that in web
advertising, the only kind of publishers are owners of websites, while in the mobile case,
publishers can also be developers of apps who might spare some of the screen real-estate for
in-app ads (e.g. banner). Advertisers, on the other hand, set up ad campaigns to show their
ads to specific users in apps if requested by the publishers. In return, the advertisers pay the
publishers for serving their ads, which might potentially generate more transactions later
from users if they are interested. In order for the publishers to connect with the advertisers,
ad networks are formed. By partnering with millions of publishers, it is possible for the ad
networks to integrate user information contributed by participating apps, generate profiles to
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predict various attributes of the user (e.g. age, gender, income level) and use these profiles to
push targeted ad campaigns from advertisers to certain group of users. Such data collection
and profile building is of paramount importance to all three parties, since accurate targeting
is crucial for both effectiveness of ad delivery [2] and increasing publisher revenue [3].
3.2.2 Targeting in Mobile Advertising
Ad networks can monitor app activities, app lists, device models, etc. on mobile devices to
automatically collect and infer the users’ demographic and interest profiles. Information
like demographics, geo-locations, etc. can also be provided from app developers through ad
control APIs [44] for better quality targeting in order to maintain a higher click-through rate
of ads, resulting in higher revenue. On major platforms like Android, since most users would
login to their Google account before starting to use the devices, more personal information
can be gathered from these accounts. With all the potential paths for information collection,
an ad network is able to use these personal features to create/update user profiles, and push
personalized in-app ads to targeted users.
We have studied the interface provided by major ad networks (e.g., Google) for ad-
vertisers to specify their target population, and concluded ad networks generally provide
the following three types of targeting: topic targeting, interest targeting and demographic
targeting. Such offerings to the advertisers suggest that the ad networks have at least some
estimate for each user regarding the attributes that can be used for targeting.
Topic Targeting. Topic targeting lets advertisers place their mobile ads in apps that are
related to the ad content. Simply by selecting one or more ad topics through an ad network
interface, advertisers can have the ad network deliver to apps that are relevant. For example,
by targeting the "Autos & Vehicles" topic, advertisers can ensure that auto-related ads are
pushed to apps that include content about cars or other automotive themes. More precise
subtopics, such as "Truck & SUVs", are also included in the general topic of "Autos &
Vehicles" to achieve more effective topic targeting [45].
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Interest Targeting. Interest targeting involves reaching to users interested in products
and services similar to those advertisers offer, even when they are using apps that are not
directly related to the products or services that are advertised. The interest profiles of users
can be pre-built by the ad network, based on users’ usage patterns on mobile devices, ad
categories that they have clicked on before, and so on. Cross-platform correlation for interest
profile might also be necessary for locating the same user across PC and mobiles. By having
advertisers choose the interest categories, the ad network can advertise to those who have
shown interests in the same categories before in their profiles [46].
Demographic Targeting. Advertisers use demographic targeting to deliver ads to users
who are within a chosen demographic group. For example, if the advertised business caters
to a specific set of users within a particular age range (e.g. younger people like sport cars
better), then targeted ads to that group of people are more effective than others [47].
3.2.3 (Lack of) Isolation for In-App Advertising
In web advertising, the in-browser ads are usually delivered directly in iframe from ad
networks to users [10]. These ads on websites are isolated from publishers of websites in
terms of its content and code due to the Same Origin Policy (SOP). Thus, usually only the
users will be able to view the ad content that is personalized by ad networks based on their
collected personal information. In-app advertising however, has targeted ads running in
the same processes as the apps themselves with the same permission level. Therefore, all
app developers are able to access to users’ personalized ads in their own apps, which can
be reverse-engineered to show users’ real interests and demographics. In fact, Shekhar et
al. have also mentioned the necessity of separating processes between an application and
its advertising for security purposes [48]. In the current study, we are examining the same
argument from the privacy perspective.
Even though a recent report shows that Google has considered utilizing HTTPS protocol
to encrypt ad-related traffic [49], we argue that the protection is not useful regarding current
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privacy concerns. Since encryption can only protect at the level of communication channel
between apps and ad networks, ad content is in plain text at the time received ads are being
displayed to users. Hence, app developers can still access the targeted ads delivered to their
apps in the decrypted form.
3.3 Methodology
In this section, we first describe our research problem, then discuss the challenges and
outline our approaches.
3.3.1 Goals of Study
We seek to answer two key questions regarding user privacy in personalized mobile advertis-
ing:
1. What personal information about real end users can a dominant mobile ad provider
such as Google know and use in personalized mobile advertising? Specifically, we
want to understand how much mobile ad providers know about real users and how
that knowledge regarding real users is exploited for providing personalized ads.
2. Could personalized mobile in-app ads be served as a channel of private user informa-
tion leakage? More specifically, could an adversary (i.e. mobile app developer) with
access to personalized mobile ads gain any information about real users?
To answer the above questions, we need to clearly define private user information on
mobile devices with respect to personalized advertising. We study two classes of personal
information in our work:
Interest Profile. A user interest profile models a user’s behavior on the web or/and on the
phone and is built by online trackers and ad providers. It consists of labels of tens or even
hundreds of interest categories. Interest targeting in mobile advertising targets users who
match the combination of interest categories specified by the advertiser. For instance, Bob
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is a fan of video games and he spends 2 hours playing games on his smart phone each day.
Bob also reads many articles about sports news through specific applications on his phone.
A interest profile like {Games, Sports} well represents Bob’s interest. A developer of a
new basketball game may ask ad providers like Google to target users that have interest
profiles similar to Bob’s. Bob may see and click an ad of the basketball game and then
become a user of this game.
Demographics. In recent years, ad providers have started to provide a more sophisticated
targeting option - demographic targeting - for advertisers. For example, advertisers can
target users by gender, age and parental status on Google AdWords [50]. This indicates
that ad providers are actively tracking and modeling private personal information other than
interests. Google has confidently shown its knowledge of user’s gender, age and parental
status in its personalized service. This raises the question of what other personal information
online trackers are trying to learn from their users, which concerns both consumers and
policy makers. In this study, we examine the following demographic categories: Age, Gender,
Education, Income, Ethnicity, Political Affiliation, Religion, Marital Status, and Parental
Status.
3.3.2 Challenges and Our Proposed Approaches
In the process of designing our experiment to determine which information is used by
Google for personalizing advertisements, we have identified two challenges that any similar
experiment will need to overcome.
Triggering personalization based on target attributes. To determine whether certain
user information is collected and used for advertisement personalization, we need to devise a
method to “provide” the ad network with that piece of user information. For example, if we
want to determine whether the user’s gender is used for advertisement personalization, we
need to make sure that if gender is indeed used, the ad network should have high confidence
in its estimation of the user’s gender when it is serving ads to a user under observation.
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A previous approach to answering this question was to build artificial user profiles by
performing certain actions that are believed to be observed by the ad network (e.g. installing
certain apps that are predominately installed by one gender but not the other).
We find this approach circular in nature. In particular, if we are trying to determine
what user information is used in personalization, we must assume we do not know how
the ad network deduces the personal information by observing the user’s behavior. In fact,
even the set of user behaviors observed/used by the ad network to form the user’s profile is
generally unknown to us. As such, there is no reliable way for us to say, for example, “if the
ad network is providing gender based personalization, it must have concluded that the user
under observation is a male after we have performed these operations”. In other words, if
our experiments based on synthesized user behavior come back negative, we cannot tell if
that is because the studied user attribute is not used for personalization or if it is because of
flaws in the profile synthesis process.
In this work, we overcame the above problem by recruiting real users and collecting
their demographic information as well as the personalized advertisements observed by these
users. By having ground truth from real users, negative results that show no difference in
advertisements observed by people of different demographics can be concluded as “the ad
network failed to provide advertisement personalization based on that piece of demographic
information”.
Isolate personalization from non-target attributes. A related problem we face in trying
to determine if certain user information is used in as personalization is controlling for the
other factors that are known to be used in ad personalization. For example, in in-browser
advertising, we know that the user’s geo-location is an important factor in determining which
ads he/she sees. Similarly, if we collect advertisements seen by different users on apps they
installed, the difference in the ads they receive may not be based on demographic differences;
rather, they may be caused by the categories of ads requested by different apps using ad
control API. From our experience in designing similar experiments, we are certain that such
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noise must be eliminated if we are to draw any statistically significant conclusion confirming
the existence of personalization based on any user attributes that are not previously known
to be used for personalization. To this end, we chose to collect personalized advertisements
seen by different users with our own tailored app that does not employ any ad control API,
and always send requests for advertisements from our own IP address.
3.3.3 Experiment Design
In this subsection, we present the details of our experiments, which was approved by our
Institute Review Board (IRB).
Subject recruitment. We recruited Android users located in the United States from
Amazon Mechanical Turk [51] as subjects to complete surveys regarding the subject’s
demographics and interests. Each subject was also required to install our Android app for
ad traffic collection. Using the surveys, we are able to gather ground truth about end users
for evaluating mobile ad personalization. This eliminates the artifact effect of building
synthesized user profiles. To ensure users pay attention to the survey, we inserted some trick
multiple choice questions in random order. They are considered simple to solve and require
no more than basic skills (e.g. 1+1=?). Subjects’ answers to the survey would be rejected if
they failed to complete those trick questions correctly. The survey questions and multiple
choice questions were also randomized in order, for the purpose of removing potential biases
from subjects’ responses. Using survey responses along with the ads collected in our app,
we were able to analyze the relationship between personal user information and mobile ads.
Ad collection. To isolate the impact of application-based targeting, we designed a blank
Android app dedicated for collecting mobile ads. The app initiates 100 ad requests to ad
networks without setting any targeting attributes. We selected Google AdMob as our target
for ad data collection, due to Google’s dominance in the mobile advertising industry. Since
location targeting is prevalent in practice, we established a secure VPN connection to our
server from the user’s device to isolate impact of the location. In particular, all Internet
49
traffic through all the apps installed on subject’s phone was tunneled through the VPN
service provided by our App, but we only collected advertising traffic generated by our App
during the data collection phase. To avoid collecting ads intended for applications other than
ours, we instructed our Mechanical Turk subjects to keep our app running without operating
other apps until the app finished data collection and turns off the VPN tunnel. The entire
data collection process took about 2-15 minutes, depending on the network condition of the
user’s device.
We note that the VPN tunneling employed in the ad collection process makes all ad
requests from our blank app originate from our IP addresses. As a result, ads collected by
our app are personalized for users at our location, instead of the individual subject’s real
location. While this can be considered a kind of noise we inject into our data, we argue
that this is also an advantage of our experimental design: we can eliminate the influence
of geo-location on ad profiling, and better study how the other aspects of a user’s profile
(demographics, interest) affect the ads she/he receives. Furthermore, if geo-location were
included in the study, we would need a significantly higher number of volunteers to cancel
out its influence.
We believe that our experiment had limited impact on the subject’s ad profile for two
reasons: 1) we believe a subject’s profile is built upon long term observation of how he/she
interacts with his/her phone/apps, and thus any influence we introduce over a short interval
with 100 ad requests will be insignificant, and 2) “blank” ad requests (i.e. requests that do
not specify any information regarding the intended audience) from a blank app, with no
clicks on the received ads, should present the ad network with no useful signals for updating
the subject’s profile.
Landing URL extraction. We use the landing URL (the destination URL that a user
agent will be redirected to after clicking/touching an ad) as the representation of an ad
in our analysis. Specifically, we tried to extract the landing URL directly from the meta
data contained in the HTML source of an ad. Through our analysis on the HTML sources
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representing ads, we identified several attributes and keywords that helped us extract the
landing URL of an ad. The attributes and keywords we used for landing URL extraction were
buildRhTextAd, adurl=, final_destination_url, destination_url, destinationUrl, click_url,
and go.href. For ads that we were not able to extract a valid landing URL, we replayed the
ads on our server by reopening the HTML source in a desktop web browser and clicking
through the ad to reach the final landing page. We also replayed some ads that the extracted
landing URL directs to some known ad networks, which usually further relay the user’s visit
to the final destination or other ad networks. In the end, we had to replay only 2,372 out of
39,671 (5.98%) ads in our dataset to get the final landing URL; thus, our approach allowed
us to minimize the impact of our study on the mobile ad ecosystem.
Landing URL post processing. The landing URLs extracted using the above approach
usually contain a long list of tail attributes, which are used to identify the source of the visit,
e.g. creative_id, campaign_id , mobile app name, and ad network. We cluster the landing
URLs by removing those tail attributes and grouping them into ad campaigns. Ad campaigns
are further merged if they share the same domain and prefix but different resource names,
except for Google Play Store apps which all start with https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?.
Ad categorization. Each ad (landing URL) is categorized into one of the 24 root interest
categories that Google provides for as targeting options. If an ad is of a Play Store app
(identified by the above URL pattern), we use a script to directly extract its corresponding
interest category from its Play Store web page. For the other ads, we rely on Google Ad
Preference [52] for labelling. In particular, we built a Google Ad Preference crawler using a
headless browser - PhantomJS [53]. We crawled the interests that were generated by Google
right after visiting each ad landing URL for a consecutive of 10 times starting with a blank
browser profile. Such interests were used to label the ads correspondingly. Yahoo Content
Analysis API [54] is also used in cases where we do not get any assigned categories on
Google Ad Preference page from the previous method. All the Yahoo categories are mapped
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to their closest representation in the 24 Google root interest categories. For those ads that
cannot be automatically categorized by the above steps, we manually assign the category
that best matches the content of the ad landing page. We had three persons categorizing the
mobile ads independently. If the decisions on an ad from the three human labellers conflict,
a final label is selected based on mutual agreement.
Ad-containing packages detection. Ad networks employ information like the list of
installed apps and apps a user has used to infer his/her personal information [47]. Specifically,
all interaction with one ad network will be captured through apps that contain the code of
the ad network. Ad networks’ libraries are typically called in the same manner by different
developers. The UI elements that are used for renderring ads have the same name or identifier
across different applications. This enables one to learn the applications that include the same
ad library on a user’s mobile device. We detected all packages that include Google’s AdMob
library through the Android PackageManager the user has installed. Such information is
helpful in understanding the profiling mechanism of black-box ad networks. We used the list
of ad-containing packages as one class of features in our privacy evaluation in Section 3.5.
3.4 Characterization of Mobile Ad Personalization
In this section, we first present details of our dataset collected from 217 real users, then
study the correlation between user’s demographic and interest profiles and the personalized
mobile ads.
3.4.1 Dataset
We created a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) on Amazon Mechanical Turk for workers
located in the United States. Each worker was asked to install our app, which will collect
100 ads when executed. After the completion of the data collection process, the worker was
asked to fill out a survey regarding his or her interests and demographic information (as
defined in Section 3.3.1). We had run our HIT for 12 days on Amazon Mechanical Turk. In
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Figure 3.1: Impression distribution of unique ads.
the first 3 days of our experiment, each worker was compensated for $1.00. To attract more
workers to work on our HIT, we increased the reward amount to $1.25 on the 4th day.
In total, we were able to collect survey responses from 284 users and successfully
collected 100 ads for each of 217 users. The other 67 users quit before the ad collection
was complete, and we discarded the partial data collected. Table 3.1 shows the distribution
of the demographics of the 217 users in our dataset. Out of 39,671 ad impressions we
captured, 33,135 ad impressions for 695 unique ads were issued from the 217 users. We
observed that some users had run our data collection application multiple times, and for
these users, we only used the first 100 ads collected. Figure 3.1 displays the distribution of
the 695 unique ads in terms of ad impressions. Surprisingly, two ads (Zoosk - #1 Dating
App1: 3,461, Samsung for Business2: 2,602) accounted for 28% of total ad impressions
in our dataset. In the 695 unique ads, 500 (72%) are of applications on the Google Play
Store, which generate 9,124 impressions (42%). The remaining 195 (28%) ads contribute
to 12,576 impressions (58%). Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the 695 unique ads in
terms of number of users. Five ads were delivered to more than 50% of the 217 users.
Figure 3.3 gives the number of unique ads displayed to each user, Figure 3.4 breaks down
the ad impressions into interest categories, and Figure 3.5 presents the number of users that




Table 3.1: Demographics distribution of subjects.











< $30K $30K-$60K > $60K
107 67 43
49.31% 30.87% 19.82%







18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+
45 106 47 14 5
20.74% 48.85% 21.66% 6.45% 2.30%
Ethnicity
Other Hispanic Asian African American Caucasian
8 12 12 23 162
3.69% 5.53% 5.53% 10.60% 74.65%
Education
High school or less Associates Bachelor Master or higher
78 50 71 18
35.94% 23.04% 32.72% 8.30%
3.4.2 Interest Profile Based Personalization
In this subsection, we study interest profile based personalization. Specifically, we try to
understand how well ad networks learn about the real users’ interests.
We use Puser,i as the real user interest profile derived from the survey response from user
i. The ad interest profile Pad,i is defined as the set of interest categories of all ads delivered
to user i. We use the following three metrics to evaluate the similarity between real user
interest profile and ad interest profile.
1. Size of an interest profile, which is number of categories in each interest profile.
2. Precision, which is defined as |Puser,i ∩Pad,i|/|Pad,i|. Precision represents the fraction
of categories in an ad interest profile that match the user’s real interest profile. It
measures how precisely ad networks know user’s real interests.
3. Recall, which is defined as |Puser,i∩Pad,i|/|Puser,i|. Recall is the fraction of categories
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Figure 3.2: User distribution of unique ads.
















Figure 3.3: Number of unique ads of each user.
in the real user interest profile that are presented in the ad interest profile. It represents
the ad network’s coverage of the users’ real interests.
We first show the sizes of real user interest profile and ad interest profile for each user in
Figure 3.6. The sizes of the two interest profiles vary significantly across users, indicating a
diverse distribution of user interests. As we can see in Figure 3.6, there is no clear correlation
between the sizes of the two profiles, suggesting size of interest profile is not a good metric
for evaluating the similarity between the two profiles.
The distributions of Precision and Recall are shown in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8,
respectively. For over 79% of the users, at least 21% of the categories in the ad interest
profiles are correct. For 11% of the users, at least 83% of the categories in the ad interest
profiles are correct. In terms of Recall, Google could cover at least half of real user interests
for 60% of the users. The results demonstrate that ad networks like Google can build
accurate interest profiles of mobile users and use the profiles built for personalizing mobile
in-app advertisements.







































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.5: Number of users in interest categories.
looked for ads that match real user interests, which we refer to as precise ads. Figure 3.9
displays the number of precise ad impressions of the users. The result suggests that Google
is actively personalizing a large fraction of its ad deliveries. For 41% of users, more than
57% of their ad impressions match their real interests.
Summary. Our analysis shows that mobile ads are highly personalized based on user
interests. The ad interest profiles derived from observation of 100 ad impressions are quite
close to users’ real interest profiles with good precision and recall. More than 83% of the
categories in the ad interest profiles are correct for 11% of users, and more than 50% of real
user interest categories are covered in ad interest profiles for 60% of users. We further find a
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Real user interest profile
Figure 3.6: Number of interest categories in real user interest profile and ad interest profile.














Figure 3.7: Precision distribution of user profiles.
large fraction of mobile ads match with real user interests. More than 57% of ad impressions
for 41% of users fit users’ real interests.
3.4.3 Demographics Based Personalization
As discussed in Section 3.2, since ad networks allow advertisers to target their ads towards
specific demographic groups, we strongly believe the ad networks already have profiles
that capture various demographic information of the users. In this subsection, we seek to
quantify to what extent real users’ demographics may have been used for ad personalization.
Note that as shown in [50, 47], gender, age and parental status are the only 3 demographic
categories that Google explicitly allows advertisers to use for targeting purpose. Thus
our observation of strong correlations between ads and other categories of demographic
information may not be the results of explicit ad targeting. However, for the sake of brevity,
in the following discussion we will attribute strong correlation between ads and demographic
information to (possibly unintended) personalization.
We grouped the 217 users into different demographic sets for each demographic cate-
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Figure 3.8: Recall distribution of user profiles.
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Figure 3.9: Number of precise ad impressions of users.
gory. We employed statistical tests to determine whether one ad is correlated with a given
demographic category. Specifically, we counted the number of times an ad is shown to
users in different demographic groups. Then the ad was tested for independence with the
demographic category by using Pearson’s chi-squared test. We excluded ads with an ex-
pected number of impressions fewer than 5 for any demographic group, which is a common
practice when applying Pearson’ chi-squared test. The null hypothesis is that the ad being
tested is independent of the demographic category. We set the significance level for our
tests to be 0.005. If the p-value of one ad is less than the significance level, we reject the
null hypothesis and label the ad as personalized based on (correlated with) the demographic
category under test.
The number of unique personalized ads in each demographic category is presented in
Figure 3.10. It is not surprising that many ads are targeting users by gender. For example, the
ad for the game Game of War - Fire Age3 is shown to 66 males (70%) for 614 impressions
(64%), while only 28 females (30%) received the remaining 342 impressions (36%). On
3https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.machinezone.gow
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the other hand, the ad impressions of the game Cookie Jam4 are dominated by female users.
182 impressions (96%) were shown to 13 females, while 4 males share the remaining 7
impressions (4%). There are even 33 ads that are exclusive for one gender class.
Parental status is the second most personalized demographic category in our result.
Ads of social applications and websites like Zoosk - #1 Dating App and Facebook5 are
leaning toward users that are not a parent. 2,312 ad impressions (67%) of Zoosk and 403 ad
impressions (70%) of Facebook are shown to non-parent users. Interestingly for Marital
Status, we found social applications and websites also show preference to non-married
groups.
We are surprised that there are many ads that are dependent on users’ income level. In
our dataset we found ads of many games (e.g., FINAL FANTASY Record Keeper6 : 71%,
Cookie Jam : 69%, League of Angels -Fire Raiders7 : 67%, World Series of Poker - WSOP8
: 67%) are shown more toward users in our low income group (with annual gross income
below $30,000). We could not find any income targeting option on Google AdWords
and Google AdMob for advertisers. We do not think advertisers on Google currently are
explicitly targeting users by income. The result suggests that Google may tailor ad deliveries
based on users’ income as a result of its personalization algorithms to further increase
click-through-rate or conversion rate, which we cannot prove for sure. However, the practice
of ad syndication makes it possible that those impressions may be purchased through other
ad networks that offer income targeting and other demographics targeting [55]. It is also
possible that the correlation with income we observed is a result of income’s correlation
with age, parental status, or other demographic information. For example, in our dataset
older people who have children generally have higher incomes.










































































Figure 3.10: Number of unique ads that are personalized based on demographics.
we found only one ad, Peace With God9, which is clearly related to religion. 57 impressions
(57%) of this ad are shown to Christians. We conjecture carefully that the dependencies of
the other 57 ads may be a result of religion’s correlation with other demographic categories.
Similarly, we could not find any explicit evidence of targeting by Political Affiliation. We
cannot explain the correlations of ads with users’ Political Affiliation due to a lack of insight
into ad networks’ secret personalization algorithms.
For age, education and ethnicity, we observed personalization in lower degrees in terms
of number of correlated ads. However, Figure 3.11 gives a different view of demographics
based personalization. We present the number of impressions of the personalized ads in each
demographic category in Figure 3.11. Except for gender, all demographic categories have a
number of personalized ad impressions greater than 10,000 (46%). Although there are fewer
personalized ads in some demographic categories, the effects of personalized ads in these
categories are not significantly lower than those of personalized ads in other categories.
We further quantify the impact of demographics based personalization on individual
users. Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 show the distribution of users in terms of number
of demographically personalized ads and number of demographically personalized ad





































































Figure 3.11: Number of ad impressions that are personalized based on demographics.
are personalized based on demographics. Surprisingly, at least 73 out of the 100 impressions
are of ads that are personalized based on demographics for 92% of the users. Note that the
values derived here include personalized ads and impressions displayed to demographic
groups that are not the primary targets of the ads.
Summary. Using statistical tests, we found ads that are personalized based on (correlated
with) demographics. Gender is the demographic category that we observed the highest
number of unique personalized ads. Personalization may be an explicit targeting option ex-
pressed by advertisers (age, gender and parental status), or it may be result of an ad network’s
proprietary personalization algorithms (income, religion, etc.). Our results in Section 3.5
will shed more light on our observation about demographics based personalization.
We also found that demographics based personalization in mobile advertising is prevalent
in practice. 76% of our users have received at least 10 demographically personalized ads,
and more than 73% of ad impressions of 92% of users are demographically personalized.
Ads that are delivered exclusively to certain demographic groups are highly indicative of
a real user’s personal information. Together with non-exclusive ads that are correlated
with some demographic categories, those ads may be a good representation of real user’s
demographic profile. This raises a great opportunity for adversaries to learn the private
personal information of real users. As we will demonstrate in Section 3.5, personalized ads
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Figure 3.12: Number of unique ads that are personalized based on demographics across
users.
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Figure 3.13: Number of ad impressions that are personalized based on demographics across
users.
serve as a new channel for privacy leakage on mobile devices.
3.4.4 Comparison with Previous Studies
Previous studies showed that demographic information of users was not commonly used
for mobile in-app ad personalization (only found on Google’s ad network), and the user’s
geo-location played a significantly more important role than his/her interests/demographics
in determining what in-app advertisements he/she is receiving [38]. In contrast, our results
illustrate that both demographic and interest profiles of users have a statistically significant
impact on how in-app ads are selected for the same ad network studied (We did not study
geo-location as discussed in Section 3.3). Some explanations for the discrepancy between
the results across studies are as followed.
First of all, what [38] measured to show the significance of demographics information in
ad personalization is very different from what we are measuring. In particular, most of the
results in [38] used keywords/ad-control attributes in ad requests generated by applications to
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measure how often demographics based ad personalization is requested by apps. However,
in this chapter, we studied how often one’s demographics information strongly correlates
with the ads he/she receives and use it as an indication of successful demographics-based
ad personalization. In other words, [38] measured personalization requested by the app
developers, while we looked for evidence of successful personalization performed by the ad
network, which may have a significantly better ability to profile a user than app developers.
Secondly, instead of using synthesized user profiles to harvest mobile in-app ads as in
the previous studies, we collected ads using real user profiles, which led us to observe more
ads that are correlated with user’s interest and demographics. We believe that authentic user
profiles could generate the right signals to trigger ad personalization, while synthesized user
profiles might not. In addition, we studied more complete demographic profiles from users
than previous ones, which enabled us to discover new types of demographics based targeting
that were not observable in previous studies. We believe that our findings compliment those
from previous studies and helps the research community better understand mobile in-app ad
personalization.
3.5 Privacy Leakage through Personalized Mobile Ads
As shown in Section 3.4, mobile ads are highly personalized based on user interests and
demographics. As a result, a set of ads collected from a user’s device can be seen as
an accurate representation of that user’s real personal information, potentially including
sensitive data. We have already shown in our real user study that the ad interest profiles
inferred from 100 ad impressions closely match with real user interest profiles. It is also
possible to infer user’s demographics from personalized mobile ads, as we will demonstrate
in the following subsections. The rest of this section is organized as followed: we first
discuss the feasibility of privacy leakage through personalized mobile ads in Section 3.5.1;
our experiment setup and definition of evaluation metrics will be presented in Section 3.5.2;
finally, in Section 3.5.3, we present the evaluation results. Section 3.5.4 discusses the privacy
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implication from our experiment.
3.5.1 Technical Feasibility
Previous studies have shown the possibility of reconstructing user interest profiles in web
advertising under the threat model that the adversary can eavesdrop on a victim’s unencrypted
ad traffic [40]. To provide stronger security in serving online advertisements, the online
advertising industry is taking steps towards enhancing the security of ad transmission through
HTTPS protocol [49, 56]. The adoption of HTTPS in ad serving could certainly defeat the
above attack in web advertising. However, we argue that in the scenario of personalized
mobile advertising, the threat to user privacy is much greater even with the protection that
HTTPS provides.
In contrast with web advertising where the personalized ad contents are protected
from publishers and other third-parties by the Same Origin Policy, there is no isolation
of personalized ad contents from the application developers on a mobile platform such as
Android. As such, an adversary does not need to sniff the ad traffic of a victim mobile device
user. Even when HTTPS is enforced, any host application can still read the ad contents
displayed within it regardless of whether encryption is enabled during data transmission.
The ability of observing personalized ads on mobile devices opens a new attack vector for
private personal information leakage, which we will demonstrate next.
3.5.2 Demographics Learning from Personalized Mobile Ads
In this section, we will try to determine if the same can be done for the user’s demographics
information, which is potentially more sensitive than the user’s interests. In particular, we
applied machine learning algorithms to build models for predicting a user’s demographic
information (for all studied categories) based on the ads he/she has seen, and evaluated the
accuracy of the generated models.
We use the combination of the number of impressions of ads that are correlated with each
64
demographic category and the list of installed apps that contain the Google AdMob library as
features. Each sample is labeled with one class in the corresponding demographic category
according to the survey response. We tested a set of basic classification algorithms (Decision
Tree, Logistic Regression, Multinomial Naive Bayes, K-Nearest Neighbors, Random Forest,
SVM) to estimate our ability to learn users’ demographic info. A dummy classifier that
predicts by randomly guessing was used as the baseline classifier for comparison.
The classifiers are implemented using the scikit-learn package [57] of Python. All
classifiers are evaluated with 5-fold cross validation to avoid overfitting. Specifically, the
217 samples are randomly divided into 5 different sets (folds), and for each fold, the other
4 folds of samples are used as training set to train the model. The resulting model is then
validated using the remaining fold as test set. For the sake of fairness, all classification
algorithms are cross-validated using the same division of 5 folds.
We used the accuracy of the prediction as the metric for measuring the severity of privacy
leakage through personalized mobile ads. We define the accuracy of a classification model
as the number of accurate predictions divided by number of all predictions. Note that one
prediction is accurate only when the predicted class is exactly the same as the label. Thus
for binary classification problems (e.g., gender and parental status) the dummy classifier
has accuracy of 50%. For multi-class classification problems, which are harder than binary
classification problems, the accuracy of dummy classifier is 1 divided by number of possible
classes. We report the cross validated accuracy (the mean accuracy of the 5 validations) as
the accuracy of one classifier.
A point worth emphasizing is that in a perfectly safe/privacy-preserving system, the
adversary should have no advantage in knowing victims’ personal information, i.e. the
adversary cannot have better accuracy than that obtained from tossing coins. Thus if the
accuracy of an adversary’s model is significantly higher than that of the dummy classifier, it
suggests that the adversary has significant advantage in learning victims’ personal informa-
tion. Our goal is to understand the possibility of privacy leakage in personalized mobile ads,
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thus any result that is above the baseline accuracy (the accuracy of the dummy classifier)
should be considered as a potential source of privacy leakage. We present our findings in
next part of this section.
3.5.3 Evaluation
Table 3.2 lists the accuracy of all the classifiers and the accuracy of the dummy classifier
for each demographic category. The cell in bold represents the highest accuracy score in
each column. Overall, SVM performs the best in predicting all demographic categories. For
all demographic categories, we could find at least one classifier that performs much better
than the dummy classifier. This is particularly true for gender, that three classifiers (Logistic
Regression, Multinomial Naive Bayes, and SVM) are able to predict accurately for over 70%
of the users. The same three classifiers also perform well for parental status, with accuracies
above 65%. Surprisingly, four classifiers are able to accurately predict the ethnicity of
more than 70% of users, in contrast with the 20% accuracy of the dummy classifier, but
this can be attributed to the distribution of our sample. By comparing with the result in
Table 3.1, we find that the distribution of our subjects is highly biased in terms of ethnicity.
74.7% of our subjects are Caucasians, and according to the United States Census Bureau,
72.4% of the U.S. population was Caucasian in 2010 [58]. With this knowledge, anyone
is able to predict with an accuracy of around 72.4% on data set that is randomly sampled.
Thus, we do not claim that the high prediction accuracy of our classifier for ethnicity comes
from the advantage of having access to real user’s personalized ads. High bias in sample
distribution (e.g., ethnicity) is known to result in biased classifiers. Unfortunately, we find
the distributions of our subjects are biased for age, education, income, political affiliation,
religion, and marital status as well, due to the small size of our dataset.
To remedy the aforementioned limitation of our data set, we reorganized our data to
make it more evenly distributed between different classes (i.e. different values in each
studied category). To this end, we merged some of the less popular classes in age, marital
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Table 3.2: Accuracy of classifiers of demographic categories.
Age Education Ethnicity Gender Income Marital Status Parental Status Political Affiliation Religion
Decision Tree 0.51 0.30 0.76 0.64 0.47 0.62 0.62 0.50 0.35
Logistic Regression 0.38 0.37 0.72 0.73 0.45 0.62 0.65 0.50 0.39
Multinomial NB 0.37 0.35 0.61 0.73 0.36 0.49 0.65 0.41 0.43
K-Nearest Neighbors 0.39 0.34 0.75 0.65 0.45 0.47 0.59 0.45 0.40
Random Forest 0.39 0.36 0.68 0.67 0.43 0.59 0.58 0.46 0.41
SVM 0.49 0.40 0.75 0.74 0.47 0.59 0.66 0.49 0.46
Dummy 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.33
status, political affiliation, income and education; the distributions of demographics in the
merged classes are as shown in Table 3.3. As a result, some of the previous multi-class
classification problems are reduced to binary classification problems. We augmented the
dummy classifier by using a majority selection strategy, i.e. it always outputs the most
popular label in the training set. Table 3.4 lists the accuracies of all the classification models
on the new classification problems. Since the number of classes in the 5 demographic
categories was reduced, we observed improvement on the performance of classifiers. The
accuracies of our classifiers for age, income, marital status and political affiliation are
better than random guess and the case with prior knowledge of population distribution. For
instance, we could accurately learn the income, or marital status for more than 60% of users.
The information derived from personalized ads indeed helps one predict a users’ personal
information with better accuracy. However, the price of the performance improvement is the
coarser granularity of the prediction. For example, the new classifier can not differentiate
people whose annual income is higher than $60K with people who earn less than $60K
but higher than $30K per year. None of the classifiers performs significantly better than
augmented dummy classifier for education and religion, which suggests the adversary has
little advantage for the two categories.
In addition to studying the possibility to predict individual aspects of the user’s demo-
graphic, we also try to determine for each user how many of the 9 studied demographic
categories the adversary may learn by monitoring his or her personalized ads. We record the
accurate demographic predictions of each user in the 5-fold cross validation. Figure 3.14
presents the distribution of the number of correct predictions for demographic categories
across users. For 91% of the users, at least 4 demographic categories of the users could be
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Table 3.3: Reorganized distribution of demographics of subjects.











< $30K > $30K
107 110
49.31% 50.69%
High school or less Associates Bachelor or higher
78 50 89
35.94% 23.04% 41.02%
Table 3.4: Accuracy of classifiers of reorganized demographic categories.
Age Education Ethnicity Gender Income Marital Status Parental Status Political Affiliation Religion
Decision Tree 0.52 0.38 0.75 0.64 0.54 0.60 0.63 0.54 0.38
Logistic Regression 0.54 0.41 0.73 0.72 0.57 0.59 0.64 0.59 0.42
Multinomial NB 0.45 0.44 0.73 0.75 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.59 0.41
K-Nearest Neighbors 0.41 0.37 0.74 0.60 0.52 0.62 0.56 0.54 0.43
Random Forest 0.42 0.40 0.71 0.70 0.51 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.38
SVM 0.44 0.45 0.75 0.73 0.54 0.63 0.66 0.59 0.43
Dummy 0.33 0.33 0.20 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.33
Augmented Dummy 0.35 0.41 0.75 0.56 0.51 0.57 0.59 0.50 0.41
accurately predicted10. There are even 2 users that the predictions for all the 9 demographic
categories are correct.
Summary of Results. We demonstrated the possibility of leaking user’s sensitive personal
information through personalized mobile ads to third-party app developers. With data from
about 200 users, we were able to build classifiers that predict gender with over 70% accuracy
and parental status with over 65% accuracy. By balancing the subject distribution in age,
income, political affiliation, and marital status, we could predict a user’s corresponding
demographic class with significantly better accuracy than random guess and the case with
prior knowledge of population distribution. We are not able to build classification models
that have significant advantage over an augmented dummy classifier for education, ethnicity
and religion. We discuss the privacy implication of our results next.
3.5.4 Interpreting our Results
Our results presented in Table 3.2 and Table 3.4 indicate that our ability to predict a user’s
gender, age and parental status is significantly higher than that of predicting other types
10This can be different set of 4 categories for different users
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Figure 3.14: Number of accurate predictions for demographic categories across users.
of demographics information. On the surface, this is neither surprising nor alarming in a
privacy perspective. It is unsurprising because as seen in [50, 47]; gender, age and parental
status are the three targeting options offered in Google’s current ad product. Therefore, one
can deduce user’s demographic information in these categories based on what ads they see.
Simply put, our results confirmed that Google can deliver on what it is offering advertisers;
it can correctly deliver ads to the specified demographic groups. One can also argue that the
privacy concern caused by leaking one’s gender, age and parental status is very minimal.
However, the real surprise lies in the adversary’s non-trivial gain in his/her ability to
predict aspects of the user’s demographic other than age, gender and parental status. Some
of the other demographic information (e.g. political beliefs) is deemed so sensitive that
Google explicitly stated [59, 60] that they will not even be collected as part of a user’s
profile; for the rest, there is no known documentation that suggests Google is using them for
personalization. We believe our success in gaining some knowledge of these other aspects
of the user’s demographic can be explained by the Federal Trade Commission’s study on
data brokers [61], which shows that general non-sensitive information collectively could
be used to infer more sensitive information. In particular, it is very possible that there are
very strong correlations between one’s age, gender and parental status with his/her other
demographic information. For example, parents are much more likely to be married, and
older people generally have higher incomes. This highlights the more profound privacy
implication of our work.
Privacy Implication. In the traditional web settings, Google can protect its users by en-
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forcing published policies that prohibit the collection of the more sensitive user demographic
information. This is an effective protection since none of Google’s profiling information
is leaked to the websites that host advertisements. However, such protection is no longer
effective in mobile settings, where any ad-hosting app can observe the personalized ad-
vertisement being shown to the user. In this new ad-hosting environment, Google is, to
a very large extent, sharing its profile of the user with the app developers and potentially
other ad-networks, and Google cannot dictate how this shared/leaked information is used.
As shown in our results and [61], even the sharing of the most benign user demographic
information can have the adverse effect of allowing third parties to gain some sensitive
demographics information about the users, and the threat from the privacy leak through
this new channel is only going to increase when Google starts using other “benign” user
demographic information for ad personalization.
Due to the lack of separation between in-app advertisements and the rest of the host
app logic, the host app can observe all personalized advertisements without needing any
extra permission. Since ad personalization is inherently performed based on the personal
information of the user, by revealing to the host app what ad is being displayed to the user,
the ad network may be inadvertently leaking some of its collected user information to the
app developer. Our study shows that such leaked information can be used to accurately
derive some of the user’s demographic information. This is especially true for information
like gender, age, and parental status, which are known to be used in ad targeting. In addition,
some information that ad networks might not be explicitly collecting or using could also be
leaked to the app developer. Our results indicate that one can predict significantly better a
user’s income, political affiliation, and marital status over random guess by observing the
personalized ads that are served to a user. The information thus inferred may then be used to
request ads from other higher-paying ad networks. The leaked user information may also be
used for price discrimination. For example, the same good could be sold at different prices
to users in different income groups. Furthermore, the private information can also be sold or
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transferred to other parties.
Our results highlight the need for protecting private user data (personalized ads) from
unauthorized parties (app developers) on Android. The equivalence of Same Origin Policy
should be provided on Android to isolate personalized ads from application context to
protect user’s privacy. Proposals like AdSplit [48] and AdDroid [62] are a good starting
point for separating ads from applications on Android. Furthermore, before such isolation
between in-app advertisement and the host app is established, ad networks should balance
the gain in revenue and the risk of the user’s privacy when they decide to personalize ads
using more detailed or sensitive user demographic information.
3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Limitations
The main limitation of our study is the small sample size and the uneven demographic
distribution of our data set. We argue that such limitations do not invalidate our results.
The ads that are correlated with demographics are selected by applying statistical tests.
And since we are using a significance level of 0.005 in our statistical test, we are 99.5%
confident that the correlations are not observed by chance. Similarly, by using 5-fold cross
validation for evaluating our ability to learn user’s demographic information based on the ads
he/she receives, our results in Section 3.5 confirms that the threat of leaking sensitive user
information through personalized ad is real. Furthermore, we argue that aggressive/malicious
app developers or ad-networks can achieve significantly better accuracy than what we’ve
shown in Section 3.5 for two reasons: 1) they can invest more resources to obtain better
ground truth data, and 2) they can observe ads received by users for a longer period of time
(and thus have more highly personalized ads in their data set). In future work, we plan
to apply our technique to other ad-networks and to attempt to collect ad data for a longer
period of time. We will also try to improve our results in Section 3.5 by experimenting with
techniques to better clean our data set (e.g. remove users who appear to receive a lot of
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non-personalized ads) as well as techniques like multi-task learning to better leverage our
advantage in predicting the user’s gender, age and parental status.
3.6.2 Countermeasures
The root cause of the studied privacy leak from personalized ads to the hosting application
is the lack of isolation between the ads and the app. Thus, adopting HTTPS to protect the
ad traffic will not stop the problem. While previous work [48, 62] highlighted the need for
isolating ad libraries largely from the perspective of separating permissions of ad-related
code from code of the hosting app, our work in Section 3.5 shows that there is also a need to
prevent the hosting app from reading the ad library’s data when that data is derived from the
ad-network’s private information.
As the essential core of the mobile advertising ecosystem, ad networks are responsible
for protecting users’ privacy. Since the above ad isolation techniques have not been widely
adopted, ad providers should build defense mechanisms into their products to protect users’
privacy. One possible defense could be adding noise or randomness into the personalized
results. For example, ad networks could make a larger fraction of their ad deliveries to
be non-personalized or contextual ads instead of maximizing personalization of every ad
impression. A similar technique has been proposed for the scope of privacy protection in
online searches (e.g. adding noise into user’s search history) [63], and could make it more
difficult for an adversary to learn user’s personal information and mitigate part (if not all) of
the privacy threat we identified in Section 3.5.
Besides adding noise to personalized ads, ad networks may also provide coarser grained
targeting options for advertisers. For example, instead of enabling advertisers to precisely
target users that are 26 years old, ad networks may only provide a range (e.g. 25-34)
for targeting. Such approaches may result in coarser granularity of adversary-accessible
personal information and decrease the severity of privacy leakage. Google AdMob is already
offering ad targeting only for coarse-grained age groups; we encourage other ad networks to
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adopt a similar model in their targeting offerings.
The idea behind both of the proposed countermeasures is to trade off the quality of ad
personalization to limit the degree of privacy leak through such ads. We cannot expect all ad
networks to adopt such an approach because less personalized ads may contribute to a loss
in ad revenue. We will leave it as an open problem to identify a strategy that can avoid such
trade-off and still work in the current ad-hosting environment (where there is no isolation
between the logic/data of the ad-library and the main app).
3.7 Related Work
Privacy in Online Advertising. The privacy issues related to online advertising have
been the focus of quite a number of studies. For example, Roesner et al. [27] showed the
prevalence of third-party web tracking and designed a browser extension for defending
against social widget tracking. Acar et al. [64] studied three advanced web tracking mecha-
nisms - canvas fingerprinting, evercookies and the use of "cookie syncing" in conjunction
with evercookies - and suggested that even sophisticated users can face great difficulties
in evading tracking. XRay [65] tried to identify how various tracking information is being
utilized by targeted ads. Korolova [66] presented attacks that exploit Facebook’s advertising
system to infer private user information. Barford et al.[67] found widespread use of ad
targeting mechanisms on the web and showed significant correlation between user interest
profile and in-browser ads. Olejnik et al. [41] examined the leakage of users’ browsing
histories through Cookie Matching and Real-Time Bidding. Datta et al. [68] explored how
user behaviors, Google’s ads and Ad Setting interact in the web settings. Finally, Castel-
luccia et al. [40] demonstrated an attack very similar to what we presented in Section 3.5,
where the adversary tries to reconstruct user’s interest profile from unencrypted personalized
in-browser ad traffic of synthesized users.
These works focus mainly on advertising in web pages. In contrast, our work focused on
similar issues in an in-app advertising setting. As we have mentioned in the introduction, not
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only is the personalization of in-app advertisements less understood, it also has the potential
to raise more serious privacy concerns, due to the intimate nature of mobile phones. Also,
as compared to [40] which requires the adversary to have the capability to intercept the
victim’s network traffic, the attack we presented in Section 3.5 can be carried out by any
app on Android.
Privacy-Preserving Advertising. A number of systems have been proposed for privacy-
preserving personalization. Privad [69, 70], Adnostic [71], and RePriv [72] achieved this
goal by using generalized user profiles and moving ad personalization to the client side.
ObliviAd [73] leveraged secure hardware to provide privacy guarantees. Mor et al. [74]
designed Bloom cookies for encoding a user’s profile in a privacy-preserving manner.
Hardt et al. [75] proposed a differentially private distributed protocol that simultaneously
achieves reasonable level of privacy, efficiency and quality in personalization on smart
phones. While these proposals protect users’ private information or identifiers from being
leaked to ad networks, they cannot stop the attack in Section 3.5, which only requires
observation of the end results of personalization.
Mobile Ad Personalization. Nath [38] presented MAdScope for harvesting in-app ads and
characterizing in-app targeted ads. By studying the keywords/ad-control attributes included
in ad requests from different apps, the author found that only one of the top ten in-app ad
networks is using behavioral targeting, and demographic information is not commonly used
in in-app ads. Book et al. [43, 39] surveyed how app developers used ad control APIs to
show ads targeting their presumed user population, and studied mobile ad targeting using
simulated user profiles and found targeting based on users. In contrast to these two studies,
we focused on personalization in the absence of any input from the app developers, and
instead of using synthesized user profiles, we harvested ads and demographic information
from real users. Our results suggested that a large fraction of ad impressions are correlated
with demographic information.
Ad Isolation on Android. Recent studies on isolating advertising from application could
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provide solutions to the privacy leakage problem we studied in Section 3.5. AdSplit [48]
is an Android extension that allows an app and the ad library to run as separate processes
with different permissions. AdDroid [62] also separates privileged advertising functionality
from host applications on Android. Roesner et al. [76] designed LayerCake to support
cross-principal embedded interfaces on Android.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have studied how user information is utilized by major ad providers
for in-app ad personalization on mobile devices and to what extent ad networks know
about the user’s interest and demographic information. We have also investigated if in-app
advertisements can be a channel for leaking user information collected by ad networks to
apps hosting these advertisements. We demonstrated that a malicious app can indirectly
infer potentially sensitive personal information by hosting third-party personalized in-app
ads. Specifically, we achieved high accuracy in demographic categories that are explicitly
used as targeting options, and showed that information that is not used in serving tailored
ads could also be inferred by app developers. These findings illustrate that more protection
is needed to protect indirect user data from malicious first-party mobile applications.
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CHAPTER 4
SELECTIVE CONTROL ON WEB TRACKING
4.1 Motivation
Recent advance in online tracking technologies are putting an unprecedented amount of
user information into online vendors’ hands. These information are surprisingly vast, from
search queries to web browsing behavior to purchase history and more – and all together,
they can be used to predict user preference. As such, online tracking brings many privacy
concerns [66, 40].
Unarguably, online vendors are generous investors and untiring advocates of tracking
techniques. Using tracking techniques to acquire more information about users, online
vendors can improve their conversion rates and enable their business partners to be more
economical with their advertising and marketing budgets. However, investments in tracking
techniques can be severely undermined if users disable tracking and refuse to share any of
their online footprints with vendors due to privacy concerns. Indeed, we have already seen a
significant growth in the adoption of anti-tracking tools and software [77].
To combat users’ fear of privacy invasion, recent marketing research [78, 79] provides
online vendors with many suggestions, such as being transparent and simple about privacy
policies, building users’ trust in personal information use, and giving users options to
manage the use of their shared information. Presumably, in response to these suggestions,
online vendors take active measures. For example, Uber summarizes their privacy policies
in an easy-to-read bullet format that does not make users’ eyes glaze over [80]. Both Google
and Yahoo provide tools that allow users to manage their privacy sensitive data [81, 82].
While vendors taking care of privacy concerns build users’ trust and increase users’
willingness to share information, there are still a significant amount of users who actively
limit involuntarily sharing of data. The reason is vendor-provided tools do not prevent
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them from logging a user’s privacy sensitive visits but rather restricts how they use these
data, meaning that the protection of such user’s privacy is completely relying on vendors.
Therefore, many users concern if vendors truly have proper mechanisms in place to protect
their privacy sensitive information [83, 84, 85].
An intuitive solution to this conundrum is to provide users with a client side tool that
shares the same functions with the tool provided by online vendors. Different from the
vendor’s tool, however, the client side solution provides users with a power, that is, only to
share information that they are comfortable with but not disclose their privacy sensitive visits.
In achieving this, this chapter proposes TrackMeOrNot, a novel anti-tracking mechanism
that prevents online vendors from tracking privacy sensitive visits specified by users. More
specifically, we augment conventional web browsers with the ability to take a user’s privacy
demand, and shield her browsing activities based on her need.
Existing client side anti-tracking mechanisms completely impede vendors’ tracking
and vendors cannot obtain any information from users. Considering that online vendors
also use user data to offer personalized online experience, these solutions can severely
disrupt user experience. To this end, the goal of TrackMeOrNot is to allow users to trade
the information that they are comfortable to share for a better user experience. In order to
achieve such a goal, TrackMeOrNot has to address following two unprecedented challenges.
First, TrackMeOrNot needs to correctly understand the semantic meaning of a web page
to determine if the visit violates user’s privacy demand (positive). TrackMeOrNot may
leak many privacy sensitive page visits to vendors with a high false negative rate. On
the other side, TrackMeOrNot may negatively affect user’s browsing experience if lots of
false positives are triggered. Our first challenge is how to build an efficient scheme that
accurately determines if disclosing a visit to vendors’ trackers violates a user’s privacy
demand. Second, to avoid exposing privacy sensitive page visits to vendors’ trackers,
TrackMeOrNot needs to examine if a page visit violates the user’s privacy demand in












Figure 4.1: Online tracking workflow.
privacy can introduce unexpected overhead, and sluggish examination can decelerate page
loading and jeopardize user experience. As a result, our second challenge is how to build a
lightweight interception scheme for privacy protection.
In this chapter, we address the aforementioned challenges as follows. First, we introduce
an efficient approach to examine a user’s visit and her privacy demand. This approach
decouples web page content from that of tracking parties, and excludes the unnecessary
page rendering. Second, we introduce a lightweight browser interception scheme. It reduces
memory consumption by maintaining only one additional browsing context for each browser
tab. These two contexts allow a web browser to quickly and smoothly cloak a user’s
browsing session accordingly.
4.2 Background
An online vendor typically partners with many websites. Using a JavaScript snippet embed-
ded on the partner sites, it places a persistent identifier (e.g., tracking cookie) on a user’s
browser. Every time a user visits a vendor’s partner site, the JavaScript snippet reports the
visit to the vendor along with the persistent identifier associated with the user’s browser. As
such, the vendor can link a user’s browsing activities across multiple sites, build the user
profile and tailor his or her browsing experience. Figure 4.1 illustrates this tracking process.
Considering users may not be comfortable with disclosing all her footprints to vendors,
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many vendors provide web portals that allow users to opt out their unwanted footprints. The
opt-out option shows vendors’ respect on user privacy and have been accepted by many
users. However, there are still a significant number of users who are concerned that vendors
may not be able to properly protect their privacy footprints because the opt-out only restricts
vendors to use unwanted data rather than completely preventing vendors from collecting
unwanted data.
Existing client side anti-tracking mechanisms (e.g., disabling third-party cookie or
blocking tracking traffic) could completely impede vendors’ tracking such that the trackers
cannot collect any information from users. While providing strong protection for users’
privacy, such mechanisms jeopardize user experience because – in addition to yielding
profits – vendors cannot tailor user’s online experiences anymore using his or her footprints
in the past.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing controls on web tracking could
protect users’ privacy while preserving usability. We argue that privacy and usability do
not have to be mutually exclusive and observe the need for new anti-tracking mechanisms
that could balance between users’ demands for privacy and usability. Such anti-tracking
mechanisms should meet the following requirements: 1) user’s privacy sensitive browsing
activities should not be known to any vendors; 2) vendors should be able to collect data
about browsing activities that have been explicitly granted by the user. In addition, any
anti-tracking mechanisms should not negatively affect user’s browsing experience (e.g.,
introducing acceptable overheads such as latency, computation and memory usage).
In this work, we propose a new anti-tracking mechanism that allows users to selectively
share their browsing activities with online trackers for better user experience while shielding
their sensitive browsing activities. We emphasize that our goal is not only to develop
algorithms that determine if a visit violates a user-specified privacy need, but also to develop
a system that can effectively and efficiently decouple tracking identifiers from his or her
privacy sensitive visits. Our proposed anti-tracking mechanism is mainly used for defending
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Figure 4.2: The overall workflow of TrackMeOrNot.
against stateful tracking techniques [26], such as HTTP cookies and supercookies. But,
it can also be further extended with stateless tracking defense techniques, e.g., avoiding
browser fingerprinting [86].
4.3 Design
In this section, we present our design of TrackMeOrNot to support fine-grained content-
aware control on first-party and third-party web tracking.
4.3.1 Overview
As is described in §4.2, users have different and unique tracking privacy needs to online
web tracking. To this end, we design TrackMeOrNot and depict its overall workflow
in Figure 4.2. In order to balance between such privacy needs and usability, TrackMeOrNot
employs a tracking preference policy, in which users can easily specify their own privacy
needs regarding online tracking (§4.3.2). TrackMeOrNot separates user’s sensitive browsing
activities from user’s normal browsing activities by leveraging isolated browsing context,
which consists of all local states (e.g., cache, cookie jar, local storage, etc.) associated
with one browser instance. All navigation in TrackMeOrNot starts with an anonymous
and transient browsing context. During the web navigation, TrackMeOrNot analyzes the
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semantic meaning of the target web contents (§4.3.3) to interpolate its analysis results with
a privacy policy. Then TrackMeOrNot leverages such learned information to determine
which browsing context (persistent or anonymous) it should be running to meet the user’s
tracking preference policy (§4.3.4). Finally, TrackMeOrNot carries out seamless browsing
context switch based on the switching decision (§4.3.5).
4.3.2 Tracking Preference Policy
Following the general and well-known beliefs in user’s privacy protection, TrackMeOrNot
allows users to specify their privacy needs on their own. These privacy needs in general
can be expressed with the well known access control concepts, blacklists and whitelists.
Leveraging these basic schemes, TrackMeOrNot introduces two different types of protection
entities, web content category and domain name. Web content category offers the capability
to specify user’s privacy needs from a bag of category words. For example, a user can enlist
the category drug into the blacklist of the web content category, if the user wants to hide the
fact that she or he has browsed a web page related to drugs. On the other hand, drug can
be whitelisted if the user does not feel those contents are privacy sensitive and thus wants
to receive useful services based on those contents (e.g., targeted advertisements from third
parties). Moreover, the other protection entity, domain name, allows users to easily specify
their privacy needs using the domain name itself. For example, a user can whitelist cnn.com,
if she/he believes the contents offered by cnn.com are not privacy sensitive and thus allow
all third-party trackers loaded on cnn.com to trace her/his visits.
Similar to access control systems, TrackMeOrNot also defines override rules on privacy
policies. A user could assign a high priority to a whitelist rule so that TrackMeOrNot disre-
gards blacklist rules with lower priorities if the whitelist rule is ever matched. If two rules
share the same priority, a blacklist rule always precedes a whitelist rule. TrackMeOrNot
supports the following three custom priorities for each policy rule that users can specify:



















Figure 4.3: Tracking preference policy for TrackMeOrNot.
tively. For example, suppose the user specified drug as a category blacklist rule with a
medium priority and cnn.com as a domain whitelist rule with high priority, TrackMeOrNot
will first apply the policy on cnn.com and then disregard the policy on drug if the policy on
cnn.com is matched. By default, all rules have the same priority (medium) if the user does
not define explicitly.
Furthermore, users can specify a fallback browsing mode, which specifies which brows-
ing context would be used in case none of the policies are matched. A privacy conscious
user may select anonymous as her or his fallback browsing mode and specify only a few
web content categories and domains as whitelist rules. On the other side, a user who is more
concerned with usability (e.g., the quality of personalization service) may use normal as
her or his fallback browsing mode and enlist those categories and domains that she or he
determines as sensitive into blacklist. We note that how a user defines her or his tracking
preference policy impacts the performance of TrackMeOrNot as we will discuss in §4.6.
Figure 4.3 depicts an example of the privacy preference policy that TrackMeOrNot
accepts. Each protection entry (i.e., either category or domain) has both blacklist and
whitelist policies. In each policy, the protection entity and priority are specified as a
key/value pair. Moreover, a fallback browsing mode is specified as anonymous in this
example, meaning that the anonymous browsing context would be used as the fallback
mode.
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4.3.3 Content Analysis Engine
In order to determine whether a target website that a user is visiting is against any blacklist
policies, TrackMeOrNot intercepts web navigation processes to analyze web contents that
the browser receives and renders. In particular, TrackMeOrNot first intercepts all the
network responses from the first party, and then it starts the content analysis with the built-in
machine learning classifiers to obtain the representative category of the responses.
TrackMeOrNot collects all the network responses by intercepting the browser’s event on
completing the fetching of a resource. TrackMeOrNot particularly focuses on collecting the
responses only from the first party for the following reasons. First of all, most of the content
semantics are delivered by the first party (i.e., the third party mostly delivers external data
including images, tracking scripts, or advertisements), and these semantics are what users
are concerned about from the privacy point of view. Furthermore, it would require too much
analysis time if TrackMeOrNot also considers the resources from the third party as well
because the loading of third party resources can take quite long time. Again, the resources
from the third party are mostly related to external data, which usually have a significantly
bigger size than those from the first party.
Once such an event is fired, TrackMeOrNot forwards the corresponding response con-
tents to a content analysis engine. The analysis engine first parses responses using its
own HTML parser. Since the HTML parser provided by the underlying browser aims at
rendering the complete web page from the responses, it is not designed to parse incomplete
responses. Thus, TrackMeOrNot implements a custom HTML parser, which is capable of
handling such incomplete responses and focuses on extracting text semantics. Specifically,
this parser constructs the DOM tree without sending new network requests nor evaluating
JavaScript and Cascading Style Sheet, each of which is not related to the content semantics.
Next, TrackMeOrNot scans the DOM tree and extracts texts from it. Non-content texts
(i.e., navigation links and advertisements) are excluded from the final result as those are not
related to the real content semantics.
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TrackMeOrNot then utilizes pre-built machine learning classifiers to summarize the
extracted text contents. For example, a classifier may predict the likelihood that the current
web page contains pornography content. Another classifier may predict whether the web
page is about education. The summarized classification results (probabilities) are then sent
to the central controller for checking with user tracking preference, which we describe in
the next subsection. If the built-in machine learning classifiers are not satisfactory to some
users, they could also select some free online classification services for processing their
navigation request before the navigation request is sent in TrackMeOrNot. The correct
browsing context could be directly decided after checking the returned results with user
privacy preference. However, the users have to build their privacy protection on trust of the
third party service providers and may suffer from unpredictable browsing latency.
While the content analysis engine is processing the content semantics, the page loading
process is not blocked so that TrackMeOrNot introduces minimum overhead in page load
time if TrackMeOrNot does not switch the browsing context.
4.3.4 Tracking Preference Checker
Once the content analysis is finished, TrackMeOrNot checks the privacy sensitivity of the
target website. In other words, using the tracking preference policies and the target website’s
content semantics, TrackMeOrNot determines whether it needs to keep using anonymous
browsing context to prevent tracking or to switch to persistent browsing context to augment
usability.
As described in §4.3.2, TrackMeOrNot checks each policy rule in the order of associated
priority. For example, suppose a user specified drugs in category blacklist as depicted
in Figure 4.3. And further suppose that the content analysis engine returned the target
website has the semantics, drugs. In this case, TrackMeOrNot determines that the browsing
context does not need to be changed. However, if drugs were specified in category whitelist,
TrackMeOrNot will switch to the persistent browsing context, which we describe in detail
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in the next section.
4.3.5 Browsing Context Switch
Based on the current browsing context and the decision made after checking user’s tracking
preference, TrackMeOrNot may switch to the persistent browsing context for the current
navigation request. If a browsing context switch is not needed, TrackMeOrNot simply
does nothing, meaning that the browsing context would be stayed in the anonymous one.
Otherwise, TrackMeOrNot terminates the current pending navigation originated from the
initial anonymous browsing context, and restarts the navigation with the persistent browsing
context.
TrackMeOrNot will also mark the new navigation request so that it will not be inter-
cepted again. Since the machine learning classifiers cannot be 100% accurate, sometimes
TrackMeOrNot may switch to a browsing context that the user does not want. In this case,
the user could manually switch back to the correct browsing context.
4.3.6 Discussion
By isolating privacy sensitive browsing activities in anonymous browsing contexts, TrackMeOrNot
effectively prevents online vendors from linking those activities with a user’s persistent
profile. However, a user may still feel unsafe because other non-local state features may be
used to track the user’s browsing activities as well. For example, stateless fingerprinting does
not use any local states of a browsing context to identify a browser instance. Such stateless
tracking threat has already been addressed in [87]. The solutions could be integrated with
TrackMeOrNot by generating a temporary fingerprint when using the temporary browsing
context. IP anonymity technologies [88] could similarly be integrated with TrackMeOrNot
to defend against IP address based tracking.
Another limitation of TrackMeOrNot is that in an anonymous browsing context TrackMeOrNot
is not able to extract the content of a few websites that only provide services after the user
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has logged in. For example, Facebook does not provide its service if the user does not sign
in with her or his account. As a result, the user has to explicitly specify a whitelist rule for
Facebook if the user wants to use its service, or the user needs to log in her/his account of
Facebook in the anonymous browsing context as well. The current design of TrackMeOrNot
may also allow user’s browsing activities on websites like Facebook to be tracked by other
third-party trackers, if Facebook and other websites explicitly embed tracking scripts of
other vendors into their own websites. However, such behavior is essentially the same as
directly sharing first party data with third party trackers, which cannot be prevented if the
user has agreed with the terms and conditions of these websites that explicitly indicate that
user data will be shared with third-parties.
4.4 Implementation
To demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of TrackMeOrNot, we implemented a
prototype of TrackMeOrNot based on one of the most popular modern browsers, Chromium
(version 45.0.2426.3). Although we only implemented a prototype on Chromium, the design
of TrackMeOrNot is generic and can be easily extended to other browser platforms. In
terms of implementation complexity, the Chromium version of TrackMeOrNot introduced
1,400 new lines of code (200 LoC for navigation interception, 700 LoC for content analysis
engine, 500 LoC for tracking preference and browsing context switching) to Chromium.
In the rest of this section, we first introduce the general architectural design of the
Chromium browser, and then describe how each component of TrackMeOrNot is imple-
mented along with Chromium’s design.
4.4.1 Chromium Browser’s Architecture
Chromium uses a multi-process architecture [89] to utilize process-level isolation between
the browser process and the renderer process. The browser process of Chromium is the main
process that manages UI, I/O, tabs, configuration, etc. The renderer process renders the web
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page using the WebKit layout engine, and multiple renderer processes are associated with
and controlled by the browser process. At the time of creation, the browser process and
renderer processes are strictly bound with a certain browsing context (either persistent or
temporary browsing context), and the current design does not allow to switch between them
after being created.
4.4.2 Tracking Preference Policy
TrackMeOrNot’s tracking preference policy leverages existing preference system in Chromium [90],
which is managed by the browser process. While TrackMeOrNot internally reuses Chromium’s
preference system, it also provides an interface for users to easily configure her/his tracking
preference through Chromium’s browser setting interface itself (i.e., we added the Tracking
section into the Content settings option of Chromium’s Privacy setting). This tracking
preference is loaded into a browser process when the Chromium browser is launched, and
will be used later to enforce tracking policy based on the content analysis results.
4.4.3 Content Analysis Engine
The content analysis engine is implemented inside WebKit in the renderer process. We
intercept each navigation request inside the WebKit layout engine. In our current design,
we only intercept network responses of first-party contents in the ResourceFetcher, as is
discussed in §4.3.3. The network requests for third-party contents are temporarily held
inside the DOM parser of WebKit when a new navigation starts. The hold is released when
the renderer receives a notification from the browser process, or is terminated with the
navigation request if the browser process switches to a different renderer process with a
different browsing context. If a new renderer process is selected for restarting the navigation,
the browser process will set a flag in that renderer process so that the new navigation request
will not be intercepted again.
In order to understand the semantic meaning of a web page, TrackMeOrNot needs to
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parse the corresponding HTML source and extract the content from it. However, the DOM
parser of WebKit might be blocked by network requests that are held [91], so that we are
not able to extract all the text contents with the DOM parser. To overcome this problem,
we implemented a lightweight DOM parser with the libxml2 library [92]. Our DOM parser
creates the DOM tree from the HTML source without loading new resources and evaluating
JavaScript and CSS. After the DOM tree is built, we extract all the text on the web page.
However, the extracted text may contain many non-content text, such as navigation links,
copyright disclaimer, or advertisements. Such non-content text may introduce noise in the
classification procedure. We implemented the CETD algorithm [93] inside WebKit to further
remove non-content text.
A key feature of TrackMeOrNot is to use machine learning algorithms for content
analysis. While there are many online classification web services, we decided to implement
local classification models for privacy and performance concerns that have been discussed
in §4.3. Due to the diversity of web pages on the Internet today, we had to train the machine
learning models with a large set of diverse web pages. However, to the best of our knowledge
none of the widely used web page classification benchmark data sets [94] could meet our
requirement because they either contain very few documents that are not diverse enough or
use coarse-grained labels. We eventually selected the well known AOL query logs [95] for
training our classification models. The AOL query logs include 21 million search queries
from 650k real users. The logs also contain over 19 million user click-through events of
1.6 million unique web pages, which had been visited by real users and represent diverse
human interests. Some sensitive contents that people generally do not want to be tracked
(e.g., pornography) are also included in the data set.
Although the AOL data set is a good fit for our study, unlike other web classification
data sets the AOL data set is not labeled. It is impractical to manually label all the URLs
in the data set. We used the natural language processing API of AlchemyAPI [96] to label
the English web pages that were still accessible in September 2015. Each web page was
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pre-processed with the CETD algorithm to remove non-content text before calling the API.
AlchemyAPI classifies each web page into topic category up to five levels deep [97]. In
total, we were able to label 369,179 web pages with the support from AlchemyAPI 1.
Since some categories have much more web pages compared with other categories, we
further broke down web pages in these popular categories into their second level category.
For example, “art and entertainment” web pages were further broken into “books and
literature”, “movies and TV”, “music”, “shows and events”, “visual art and design” and
“arts/other”. We also manually selected all (second level) categories that are generally consid-
ered as sensitive, i.e., “finance”, “health and fitness/{disease, disorders, drugs}”, “law, govt
and politics/{armed forces, government, law enforcement, legal issues}”, “society/{crime,
dating, sex}”. Eventually, we got 78 categories in our data set. This labeled AOL data set
was also used in our evaluation of TrackMeOrNot in §4.6.
For each of the 78 categories, we built a binary classification model using Linear SVC.
The term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf) of each term in the extracted text
is used as feature. All the web pages in a given category are positive samples. Equivalent
number of randomly selected web pages of other categories are negative samples. The
positive samples and negative samples were randomly and evenly split into a training set and
a test set. We used 10-fold cross validation in the training set to learn the best parameters
for each category, and used the test set for evaluation. The distribution of the ROC AUC
scores of the 78 categories are shown in Figure 4.4. The minimum, mean, maximum, and
standard deviation of ROC AUC scores are 0.84, 0.92, 0.99, 0.03, respectively.
The prediction methods of the trained models are implemented inside WebKit. For each
navigation request, the extracted text is evaluated with all the classification models. The
prediction confidence (decision function in the case of LinearSVC) of each binary classifier
is gathered to select the best label(s) for the web page. In our implementation, the label of
the classification model that predicts positive class with highest confidence is assigned to the
1We would like to thank AlchemyAPI for granting us special academic license in this study.
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Figure 4.4: The ROC AUC score distribution of binary classifiers.
web page. The final prediction result is then sent back to the browser process for tracking
preference check. Since the topic of web pages is very subjective, we plan to enable the
users to use their customized classifiers for their own need in the future.
4.4.4 Tracking Preference Checker
Given the content analysis result returned from the renderer process and the user specified
tracking preference, this phase determines whether the current navigation leads to content
that is privacy sensitive to the user. Based on the result, TrackMeOrNot decides whether
to switch the browsing context or not. This decision procedural follows the algorithm as
illustrated in §4.3.2. If TrackMeOrNot determines that the browsing context should not
be switched (i.e., keep using the anonymous browsing context), TrackMeOrNot notifies
the corresponding renderer process to continue rendering the current web page and does
not perform any additional operations because the renderer process is already handling the
navigation using the anonymous browsing context. On the other hand, if it has to switch to
the persistent browsing context, then TrackMeOrNot will terminate the current navigation
request that is being processed in the renderer process and then switch the browsing context
as we describe more details in the next subsection.
4.4.5 Seamless Browsing Context Switch
In Chromium, one browser process is bound with one fixed browsing context. As a result,
tabs of different browsing contexts (users) cannot be merged within one browser window.
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A naive implementation of TrackMeOrNot will pop-up a new browser window each time
the browsing context is switched, which is very annoying to users. To preserve good user
experience, we break the binding between one browsing context and one browser process
in Chromium. TrackMeOrNot allows one browser process to be associated with multiple
browsing contexts so that the browser process could create and manage renderer processes
with different browsing contexts. All browsing context switching in our implementation are
seamlessly done in the same browser tab without annoying the users. To make the browsing
context switching transparent to the users, we also switch the theme of the browser UI when
switching the browsing context so that the user could easily tell which browsing context
she/he is browsing with. If the user ever wants to use a different browsing context for a
navigation, she/he could click a “switch” button on the navigation bar to manually switch
the browsing context.
4.5 System Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present the system performance evaluation of TrackMeOrNot. A vanilla
build of Chromium (version 45.0.2426.3) was used as the baseline system for comparison.
We measured the web page load time and peak memory usage of the two browsers to show
the impact of TrackMeOrNot on browser performance and user experience. All experiments
were run on Debian Jessie (Linux Kernel 3.16) with a quad-core 3.20 GHz CPU (Intel Xeon
W3565) and 24 GB RAM.
We selected the Alexa top 100 US websites as the data set for system performance
evaluation. Specifically, the two browsers (i.e., the vanilla Chromium and TrackMeOrNot)
sequentially visited the main page of the top 100 websites three times. Note that some top
websites (e.g., googleusercontent.com) can not be directly visited from the browser. Thus,
we selected the next top websites to fill the places of such websites. We report the average
of the three measurements in all the following results.
Depending on the user tracking preference and the web page the user is navigating to,
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TrackMeOrNot can exhibit two different browsing behaviors: 1) staying in anonymous
browsing context; and 2) switching to persistent browsing context. Intuitively, switching
to persistent browsing context in the navigation would impose more run-time overheads in
terms of both page load time and memory usage. To clearly understand how much more
overheads are imposed in TrackMeOrNot, we configured two user tracking preferences
for each of the web page to instruct TrackMeOrNot to either stay in the current browsing
context (Content Analysis Only Configuration, or CAOC) or switch to a different browsing
context (Browsing Context Switching Configuration, or BCSC) in the three visits.
4.5.1 Page load time
Regardless of user tracking preferences, TrackMeOrNot has to always perform content
analysis and tracking preference check, which would result in navigation latency. Addition-
ally, TrackMeOrNot may reload the web page using a different browsing context based on
the result of tracking preference check that further extends the page load time. In order to
precisely measure such extra latency, we first implemented internal hooks in various critical
event handlers in Chromium (e.g., page load completion event), each of which measures a
clock in nano-second precision using clock_gettime().
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 present the result of main page navigation in case of CAOC
and BCSC, respectively. The page load time overhead is the ratio of the extra load time
introduced by TrackMeOrNot to the complete page load time using the vanilla Chromium.
When configured with CAOC, TrackMeOrNot introduced negligible extra latency - 0%
to 10% overhead in the page load time with 1.93% as mean and 1.81% as standard deviation.
We believe the content analysis engine of TrackMeOrNot is very efficient and would not
disrupt the user’s navigation experience in practice for the CAOC case, because minimum,
average, maximum and standard deviation of extra processing time were only 1.00 ms, 39.56
ms, 232.00 ms and 37.40 ms, respectively.
When configured with BCSC, TrackMeOrNot needs to restart the navigation with the
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Figure 4.5: Page load time when visiting each of Alexa top 100 US websites under Content
Analysis Only Configuration (CAOC).
persistent browsing context, thereby incurring more latency to page load time. From our
evaluation, the overhead varied significantly: the minimum, average, median, maximum
and standard deviation of load time overhead were 1.00%, 16.40%, 13.00%, 54.00% and
12.92%, respectively. The extra load time (minimum: 51.00 ms, mean: 340.33 ms, median:
228.00 ms, maximum: 2130.00 ms, standard deviation: 352.60 ms) is inconsistent with the
overhead, because the raw page load time itself using the vanilla Chromium varied a lot. For
example, the vanilla browser loaded www.google.com using 451 ms where TrackMeOrNot
spent 198 ms on resending the request to www.google.com (including content analysis),
imposing 44% (198/451) overhead in page load time. On the other hand, TrackMeOrNot
only took 148 ms to switch browsing context for www.nytimes.com where the complete
page of www.nytimes.com needed 5,539 ms to load using vanilla browser, resulting in only
3% (148/5539) overhead in page load time. Considering that half of the main pages of US
top 100 websites needed more than 2,145 ms (median) to load using vanilla Chromium, we
believe the delay in page loading (median: 228 ms) caused by TrackMeOrNot would not be
observable to normal users.
To better understand the latency introduced when using BCSC, we also recorded the
time to load the main frame HTML source using the vanilla Chromium for each web page.
We present the side-by-side comparison of main frame HTML source load time of vanilla
Chromium and extra page load time of TrackMeOrNot in Figure 4.7. As is evident from
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Figure 4.6: Page load time when visiting each of Alexa top 100 US websites under Browsing
Context Switching Configuration (BCSC).













Chromium Main Frame Request
Content Analysis + Context Switching
Figure 4.7: Main frame HTML source load time (marked as white boxes) v.s. extra page
load time in TrackMeOrNot (marked as black boxes) when visiting each of Alexa top 100
US websites.
the figure, the extra page load time closely matches with the time needed for loading the
HTML source of main frame. If the full page load time is not significantly higher than the
main frame HTML source load time, then TrackMeOrNot will lead to very high overhead
in page load time. However, TrackMeOrNot could be enhanced by caching the main frame
HTML source that is loaded in the previous browsing context and sharing the cached HTML
source with the new renderer process. Thus no extra request needs to be sent, which could
significantly reduce overhead in page load time introduced by TrackMeOrNot. We leave
this implementation optimization as our future work.
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Figure 4.8: Peak memory usage when visiting each of Alexa top 100 US websites under
Content Analysis Only Configuration (CAOC).
4.5.2 Memory
TrackMeOrNot may require more memory in runtime because it includes 78 classification
models (including a large vocabulary of features) in our implementation. In addition, if a
browsing context switch is requested, TrackMeOrNot needs to create new renderer process
which may also increase its memory usage. For these reasons, we measured the peak
memory usage of TrackMeOrNot and vanilla chromium for 15 seconds in each of the 3
visits to a web page.
Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 show the peak memory usage of vanilla Chromium and the
extra peak memory usage of TrackMeOrNot when visiting the main pages using Content
Analysis Only Configuration (CAOC) and Browsing Context Switching Configuration
(BCSC), respectively. The memory overhead is the ratio of extra peak memory usage of
TrackMeOrNot to the peak memory usage of vanilla Chromium. For both configurations,
the memory overheads are between -15% and 22%. The means are 3.06% (CAOC) and
1.68% (BCSC), respectively. We observe that sometimes TrackMeOrNot consumed less
memory than vanilla Chromium, which might be attributed to that smaller dynamic contents
were loaded when using TrackMeOrNot to visit those web pages. Similarly, the memory
over consumed by TrackMeOrNot may also due to the dynamics of web contents. As a
result, TrackMeOrNot did not significantly require more memory than the vanilla build.
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Figure 4.9: Peak memory usage when visiting each of Alexa top 100 US websites under
Browsing Context Switching Configuration (BCSC).
4.6 Anti-Tracking Evaluation
As is mentioned in §4.3, TrackMeOrNot allows users to specify unwanted page visits based
on web content category. Our implementation of TrackMeOrNot includes 78 classifiers
for categorizing the web pages that users visit. TrackMeOrNot compares the output of
the classification models with user specified needs and switch a browsing session between
different browsing contexts. In this section, we demonstrate how effectively TrackMeOrNot
uses the classifiers to conceal users’ privacy sensitive visits. In particular, we first describe
our experimental design. Then, we evaluate how effectively the classifier satisfies user’s
privacy needs.
4.6.1 Experimental Design
To evaluate the effectiveness of TrackMeOrNot on hiding sensitive web browsing activities
– such as browsing pornographic web pages and health related forums – we need to simulate
a series of web page visits and then examine if TrackMeOrNot can accurately conceal user
specified privacy sensitive visits when visiting these web pages. As a user may specify any
category of visits as privacy sensitive browsing activities, we need a sequence of page visits
that covers all spectrum of categories. We selected web pages that had not been used for
training any classifier from the AOL data set discussed in §4.4 as our evaluation web page
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corpus, which contains 43,807 English web pages in 78 unique categories.
To examine the effectiveness of TrackMeOrNot on hiding privacy sensitive visits, we
also need to know users’ needs to browsing privacy. In other words, we need to know the
page categories in which a user is (or not) willing to disclose his or her visits to vendors. To
obtain the users’ needs to browsing privacy, we conducted an online survey through Amazon
Mechanical Turk. The survey was approved by the IRB of our institute. We presented all 78
categories to participants and asked them to choose the page categories in which they are
not comfortable to disclose their visits. In addition, participants were asked to choose the
page categories in which they are comfortable to share their visits. Ultimately, we collected
145 valid responses. The demographic distribution of the 145 subjects is shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 show the top categories of web pages that users specified as blacklist
rules or whitelist rules, respectively. In other words, they represent the page categories on
which users want to hide or disclose their browsing activities from or with online vendors.
From our collected questionnaires, we found 14 participants who expressed strong privacy
concern and did not want to share any of their visits with vendors. We also observed 2
participants who stated that they were not concerned with privacy and wanted to offer all
of their footprints to vendors. Overall, we obtained 129 unique privacy needs from all the
participants.
For each unique privacy need, we encode it by converting it into blacklist and whitelist
rules as discussed in §4.3.2. We illustrate the number of blacklist and whitelist rules across
129 unique privacy needs in Figure 4.10. Note that, for those page categories that a user
does not specify as "comfortable to reveal" or "reluctant to disclose", we convert them into
either whitelist rules or blacklist rules by assuming the users had specified persistent or
anonymous as their fallback browsing context, respectively. Thus, we have two different
rule sets across 129 unique privacy needs (see Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.13).
Including two special whitelist and blacklist rule pairs that indicate "do not disclose
any visits" and "reveal all visits", we configure TrackMeOrNot using the 256 whitelist and
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Table 4.1: Distribution of demographics of survey subjects.
Age Gender
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+
8 58 34 29 16





High school or less Associates Bachelor or higher
32 25 88
22.07% 17.24% 60.69%
Table 4.2: The top-10 page categories in which users do not want to disclose their visits to
vendors.




health and fitness/disorders 52.67
society/crime 51.33
law, govt and politics/armed forces 50.00
law, govt and politics/legal issues 50.00
religion and spirituality 47.33
law, govt and politics/government 47.33
health and fitness/disease 47.33
law, govt and politics/law enforcement 46.00
blacklist rule pairs shown in Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.13. Then, we simulate the visits to
the aforementioned 43,807 web pages using TrackMeOrNot. We examine the accuracy of
hiding blacklist visits and disclosing whitelist visits. In addition, we study the False Negative
Rate (FNR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) of our TrackMeOrNot. Specifically, a page that
needs to be browsed in an anonymous browsing context is a positive sample in our evaluation.
The false negative rate is the ratio of number of false negatives (incorrectly predicted as
negative) to the number of positives (including false negatives and true positives). The false
positive rate is the ratio of number of false positives (incorrectly predicted as positive) to
the number of negatives (including false positives and true negatives). The system would
mistakenly disclose many privacy sensitive visits to vendors when the false negative rate
is high. Similarly, the system may hide many visits that the user feels OK to share with
vendors when the false positive rate is high. We present the evaluation results in the next
subsection.
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Table 4.3: The top-10 page categories in which users are comfortable to share their visits
with vendors.
Category % of votes
arts and entertainment 64.00
food and drink 54.00





home and garden 42.67
news 42.00
education 39.33














Figure 4.10: The number of whitelist and blacklist rules across 129 distinct privacy needs.
4.6.2 Evaluation Result
Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.14 show the performance of TrackMeOrNot in terms of accuracy,
false positive rates and false negative rates for persistent and anonymous fallback tracking
preferences, respectively. We observed that TrackMeOrNot achieved 0.86 accuracy in
hiding and disclosing user visits on average for both persistent and anonymous fallback
tracking preferences. The minimum accuracies were 0.69 and 0.74 for the two different
settings, respectively, where the maximum accuracy in both settings was 1.00. The results
indicate TrackMeOrNot can effectively cloak user specified privacy sensitive visits and
disclose a certain amount of footprints regardless of the fallback browsing context.
We observed some interesting patterns of false positive rates and false negative rates
in regards to the number of blacklist rules in the tracking preference. As is evident in
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Figure 4.11: Tracking preferences using persistent fallback browsing context.












Figure 4.12: Evaluation results on 129 tracking preferences with persistent fallback browsing
context.
Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.14, the false positive rates increased when a user specified more
page categories as his or her blacklist rules. On the other side, we also observed the decrease
in false negative rates as more categories were specified in blacklist. The reason behind these
patterns are that with more categories that are specified as blacklist rules, TrackMeOrNot
relies on more binary classifiers to examine blacklist visits, and consequently a web page is
more likely to be classified as positive.
The average false negative rates of TrackMeOrNotwere about 0.17 and 0.12 and average
false positive rates were about 0.24 and 0.36 when using persistent and anonymous fallback
browsing context, respectively. As is shown in Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.14, the false negative
and false positive rates are complementary. For users concerned more with privacy than
personalized user experience, they may configure TrackMeOrNot to achieve a low false
negative rate and a high false positive rate by specifying more blacklist rules. In contrast,
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Figure 4.13: Tracking preferences using anonymous fallback browsing context.












Figure 4.14: Evaluation results on 129 tracking preferences with anonymous fallback
browsing context.
users may configure TrackMeOrNot with a high false negative rate but a low false positive
rate by trading her or his need for privacy for better usability.
4.7 Related Work
Defense against HTTP cookie tracking. HTTP cookie tracking is a stateful tracking
technology. It stores in a user’s browser a piece of data (including a unique identifier) set by
an online vendor while the user is browsing a website that contains the vendor’s content. The
cookie is automatically sent to the vendor whenever the user visits a website that contains
the vendor’s content in the future. It can be used to analyze the user’s web browsing behavior.
Tracking cookies are widely adopted by advertising networks for the purpose of serving up
"interest-based“ or "behaviorally targeted“ ads. To stop them from tracking a person’s surfing
habits, companies and non-profit organizations (e.g.abine [98], NAI [99] and DAA [100])
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implement a cookie opt-out mechanism which enables users to block and prevent the
advertising network from installing future tracking cookies. A recent study demonstrates
many drawbacks of this approach including poor usability and unreliability [26]. As an
alternative approach, user self-help anti-tracking tools are developed and implemented [15,
16, 27]. They defend trackers by blocking HTTP requests to corresponding vendors. For
example, Adblock plus [15] and Ghostery [16] impede HTTP requests to advertising
networks, and thus browsers cannot report user footprints to the advertising networks. Both
cookie opt-out and self-help anti-tracking tools are designed for defending HTTP cookie
tracking. Considering a number of online vendors have been discovered using advanced
technologies to track users [101], the effectiveness of these approaches wanes. In this chapter,
our proposed anti-tracking mechanism not only can impede HTTP cookie tracking, but also
defend many other previously known stateful tracking technologies, e.g., supercookies.
Defense against Supercookies. Apart from HTTP cookie tracking, another stateful
tracking technology is supercookie tracking. Using this technology, online vendors can
encode a globally unique identifier – supercookies – into a web browser. For example,
vendors can abuse HTML5 local storage feature [102] or Flash Local Share Object [103]
to store a unique identifier on a user’s hard drive for tracking the user’s digital footprints
later on. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two approaches that can be adopted
to impede such advanced tracking technologies. Private browsing [104] is one of these
approaches, which does not store any local data that could be retrieved at a later date. Using
private browsing, a user can therefore prevent vendors from using supercookies to track her
surfing habits. Another defense against supercookies is TrackingFree [105], an anti-tracking
browser that can impede supercookie tracking practice by partitioning a user’s visits into
multiple isolation units based on URL. With this isolation, online vendors can still store
supercookies but not correlate a user’s browsing activities across websites. One problem
of this approach is that the system overhead linearly increases when a user browses more
websites because TrackingFree maintains an isolated browser state for each unique website
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and OS needs to allocate a new memory space for each isolated browser state. Considering
unexpected memory consumption can potentially jeopardize user experience, our proposed
anti-tracking mechanism follows a lightweight design principle which constructs in-memory
isolation units based on browser tabs. In addition, our proposed anti-tracking mechanism
goes beyond the aforementioned two approaches by allowing users to instruct web browser
to selectively block tracking activities. In addition to boosting profits, online vendors use
information collected to personalize user experience. From the usability perspective, our anti-
tracking mechanism therefore allows users to enjoy customized browsing experience without
worrying about privacy invasion, while existing defense restrict data sharing completely and
users cannot obtain any benefits from personalization.
Defense against Stateless Fingerprinting. Different from the stateful tracking technolo-
gies discussed above, a new class of web tracking technologies can use stateless information
to identify users and report their surfing habits. This new class of tracking technologies
neither stores nor retrieves data on user’s hard drive. Instead, it tracks a user by learning
properties of her web browser and forming a unique or nearly unique identifier (i.e., finger-
printing) [86]. To counteract such a tracking mechanism, anti-tracking technologies focus on
making browser fingerprints non-deterministic across multiple browsing sessions [106, 87,
107]. This makes vendors difficult to link a user’s multiple visits. For example, Nikiforakis
et al. designed and developed PriVaricator [87] that utilizes the power of browser fingerprint
randomization to break vendors’ ability to connect the same fingerprint across multiple
visits. Our anti-tracking mechanism is orthogonal to defense against stateless tracking. In
this chapter, we focus on building an anti-tracking mechanism that impedes stateful tracking
based on user demand.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented TrackMeOrNot, a new tracking control mechanism that
allows users to selectively share their online footprints with vendors for better user experience
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while shielding privacy sensitive browsing activities from online trackers. TrackMeOrNot
provides a user with two browsing contexts – anonymous and persistent context – and a web
browser can switch a user’s browsing session between the contexts based on user specified
privacy needs. We demonstrate how a user can specify his or her privacy need and employ
TrackMeOrNot to surf the web without disclosing privacy sensitive visits accordingly.
As TrackMeOrNot allows users to selectively disclose their online footprints, users can
enjoy personalized online experience without worrying about privacy. From the perspective
of online vendors, TrackMeOrNot may persuade users overly concerned with privacy to
share footprints selectively for specific rewards, and vendors may use shared browsing habits
to yield more profits.
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CHAPTER 5
MONITORING AND UNDERSTANDING WEB CONTENT ACCESS BEHAVIOR
OF JAVASCRIPT
5.1 Motivation
JavaScript is broadly used in the creation of modern web applications. Scripts from third-
party providers, e.g., social networks, analytic and user tracking services, ad networks,
are extensively included by web applications to provide a rich, dynamic and interactive
experience to end users. While extending the functionalities of web applications, third-party
scripts are particularly disconcerting, especially considering its flexibility and capacity as
well as the wealth of sensitive data presented in today’s web applications (e.g., credentials,
credit card number, and email address). Third-party JavaScript code is granted unrestricted
privilege to access an embedding web page that it is included. A malicious third-party
JavaScript provider can easily steal authorization cookies and confidential information about
a user from the web pages that embed its scripts, or just arbitrarily alter the content in the
web pages.
Many security conscious developers would embed scripts only from reputable third-party
providers, such as Google and Facebook. By default, however, web browsers allow for
additional JavaScript code to be dynamically loaded by any third-party script that is already
embedded, if no special restriction, i.e., the Content Security Policy, is configured by the
developer. Even if a developer has set up a CSP rule to load remote scripts from a list of
trusted third-party providers, the permitted script can still enjoy full access to the content
of the web application, which can still put threats to the application and its end users. A
web application can be fully controlled by an adversary if a trusted remote provider is
compromised. For example, the website of the popular jQuery library was compromised in
September 2014 [108], putting millions of websites that embed this library directly from
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jquery.com at risk.
A lot of prior work has demonstrated the threats that can be posed by a malicious script
[109, 110, 111]. Many systems and tools are also proposed to help limit the functionality of
a remote script [112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124]. However,
many web developers do not configure security setting for their web applications, because
many security mechanisms are only available as prototypes and are difficult for developers
to learn. More importantly, many developers think the benefit of embedding a third-party
script is greater than the potential harm it can make, because there is no good way to help
them understand the behaviors of the included third-party scripts. It is very hard to reason
about the behaviors of JavaScript code because of its dynamic nature. Both static analysis
and dynamic analysis techniques do not work well for JavaScript, because JavaScript code is
often obfuscated, dynamically loaded from remote servers at run time, and even dynamically
generated on-the-fly. Developers have to trust that the embedded third-party scripts would
not abuse their full privilege.
In this chapter, we present DOM-Logger, a tool to help web developers monitor and
understand the behaviors of third-party scripts that are embedded in their applications.
Specifically, DOM-Logger logs any JavaScript access to a HTML Element object in the
Document Object Model (DOM) tree of a web page. DOM-Logger can also track the creation
of DOM objects to help reason about what content is inserted by a third-party script in a
web page. With DOM-Logger, we conduct a comprehensive study on how JavaScript code
access web content in general. We seek to answer the following questions in our study:
• Who are the most popular third-party JavaScript providers?
• How much content is generated by third-party scripts in today’s web applications in
general?
• How many DOM accesses does a script make in a web page?
• How frequently does a script access content created by other scripts?
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• Is there any third-party JavaScript code that extensively access sensitive data in web
pages embedding it?
Note that we do not focus on analyzing the complete behavior of a specific script in detail in
our study. Rather, we aim to empirically investigate the DOM access behaviors of third-party
scripts in general. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first large-scale study that
reports the DOM access behaviors of JavaScript in modern web applications.
5.2 DOM-Logger
DOM-Logger is a tool for monitoring and logging accesses to HTML DOM Element objects
(DOM objects) by JavaScript code. DOM-Logger tracks the creation of each DOM object and
monitors how the objects are manipulated by JavaScript. We first explain how DOM-Logger
records DOM access logs (§5.2.1), then discuss how DOM-Logger can attribute the creation
of an DOM object (§5.2.2) and support monitoring the behaviors of dynamically generated
scripts (§5.2.3), and finally describe how we implement DOM-Logger in the Chromium
browser.
5.2.1 Recording Accesses
An DOM Element object could be accessed through DOM APIs by JavaScript in the
following ways. We use the keyword element to represent a DOM HTML Element object
in the following examples.
1. Read. In a Read access, the attributes of an element are directly referenced by
JavaScript to get the data associated with it. For example, the textContent attribute
of element object is read to the JavaScript variable text in the code snippet var text
= element.textContent;. JavaScript can also call some methods of an object to
read data, e.g., var className = element.getAttribute("className");.
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2. Write. In a Write access, a JavaScript code directly assigns value to an attribute of an
element, e.g., element.innerHTML = "<div>data</div>";. Note that besides modi-
fying the value of the innerHTML attribute, this code snippet results in that a new <div>
element is created and inserted as a child of element. Some methods can also be called
by JavaScript to modify the attributes of an element, e.g., element.setAttribute
("id", "myID");. In particular, API calls like removeChild, appendChild and
replaceChild on an element object are also recorded as write operation.
3. Execute. In an Execute access, the methods rather than the attribute members of an
element are directly invoked, e.g., element.scrollIntoView();. As we show in the
above examples, note that by executing some methods the Read or Write access to the
element can also be triggered.
Besides the above three types of direct access, an element object can be indirectly accessed
through DOM APIs as well. For instance, the HTML5 Canvas drawImage() method takes
an Image, Video or Canvas element as argument to draw onto the canvas1. The element
passed to drawImage() is read internally in this method.
DOM-Logger is designed to log all direct HTML DOM Element object API calls and
indirect DOM object accesses by JavaScript code. In DOM-Logger, an access is associated
with an access type, which represents the operation on the receiver DOM object, i.e., the
object being accessed. Specifically, an access type can be of one or a combination of the
three operations: Read, Write, and Execute. In addition to logging access type, we record
the member (either an attribute or a method) of an object that is accessed in the log. We
also log all accesses to the global document object, because sensitive APIs such as Cookies,
createElement are invoked through the document object.
To attribute a DOM access to a script, we need to obtain the identity of the accessing
JavaScript code. In HTML, JavaScript code is usually inserted between <script> and
</script> tags as inline script, or stored in an external JavaScript file and loaded with
1http://www.w3schools.com/tags/canvas_drawimage.asp
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<script> tags as external script There are other types of inline JavaScript code. For example,
JavaScript code can be written as the event handler attributes of HTML elements. In
DOM-Logger, each <script> element is assigned with an unique scriptID. An inline script
that is not wrapped within a <script> tag is also assigned with an unique scriptID. Further, a
script is identified by its sourceURL, which is the URL the browser uses to load the remote
JavaScript. Note that the sourceURL of inline scripts is an empty string. We use the URL of
the embedding frame, i.e., the URL that the browser uses to load the HTML document in the
embedding frame, as the sourceURL of inline scripts. We will discuss how we attribute a
DOM access to an inline script that is dynamically generated in §5.2.3. Besides the scriptID
of the accessing script, we also record the row number, column number and the function
name of the specific accessing JavaScript code in one script.
5.2.2 Tracking Element Creation
HTML elements are normally statically written in the HTML source file, parsed as DOM
Element objects and inserted into the DOM tree by the browser parser. As the innerHTML
example we showed in §5.2.1, HTML elements can also be created on-the-fly by JavaScript
through APIs such as document.write("<div>...</div>"), and document.createElement
("div").
One key functionality of DOM-Logger is attributing the creation of one HTML element
object to a script. This is very useful for understanding how a script access different objects
that are created by itself, by the document owner (if the script is not the owner’s script), and
by other scripts. Specifically, we attach a hidden initiator attribute to each DOM object
in DOM-Logger to represent the creator of the object. The initiator attribute is the scriptid of
the script that has created the corresponding DOM object. All parser-created static objects
are assigned a special initiator value – 0 – to represent the owner of the document, i.e., the
first-party. The initiator of dynamically created objects is the scriptID of the JavaScript code
that calls the corresponding element creation API.
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5.2.3 Monitoring Dynamically Generated Scripts
Similar to HTML elements, JavaScript code can also be dynamically generated in web
applications. Specifically, as HTML elements, new <script> elements can be dynamically
created by JavaScript using the same APIs for creating elements. String can also be parsed
as JavaScript code if its an inline event handler or through the API window.eval("...").
Getting the sourceURL of a dynamically inserted <script> element that loads an external
script from a remote host is not different from getting the sourceURL of one static <script>
element. However, it is not straightforward to get the sourceURL of other dynamically
generated scripts because their sourceURL is blank. To overcome such difficulty, we hook
the APIs that are used to generate dynamic scripts. The sourceURL of the JavaScript code
that is calling the script generation API is used as the sourceURL of the newly generated
inline script. For an inline event handler, we search in the access logs of the receiver object
to find the last script that sets the event handler as the generating script (parent script). If no
such an entry is found, the parent script is the one that creates the receiver object and sets
the inline event handler.
To distinguish the dynamically generated script or the child script (either an inline script
or an external script), from the generating script or the parent script (the one that generates
the script), we also record the scriptID of the parent script as the parentScriptID attribute
of the child script. The parentScriptID of all static scripts that are initially embedded by the
document owner is set to 0.
5.2.4 Implementation
DOM-Logger is implemented by modifying the Chromium browser. We decide to implement
DOM-Logger in a full-fledged web browser because some websites may not render correctly
in a headless browser or a simpler user client. Some scripts may even attempt to hide some
operations from uncommon user agents. We inserted access monitoring code in the C++
implementation of the V8 binding layer between the V8 JavaScript engine and the DOM
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implementation in WebKit. When a DOM element is accessed by JavaScript, the access
monitoring code is executed with the C++ method that implements the corresponding DOM
API. The access monitoring code identifies the JavaScript caller by fetching its scriptID,
and then appends the access log to the hidden accessLog attribute of the DOM object. We
inserted the access monitoring code into all the methods that implement a DOM API of all
sub classes of the Node class in WebKit2.
To track the dynamic creation of new elements, we insert additional logging code into
methods that are used to create new DOM objects. This code is used to set the initiator
attribute of the element that is dynamically created. Similarly, we also insert custom logging
code into methods that compile and execute JavaScript in WebKit to monitor scripts that are
dynamically generated. This code sets the parentScriptID attribute of dynamically generated
script and also logs that information in the global Document object. Furthermore, the
sourceURL of all scripts is stored in the Document object when a script object is first created
in WebKit.
The accessLog, initiator, scriptID and parentScriptID attributes of DOM
nodes, and the scriptID-to-sourceURL and scriptID-to-parentScriptID dictio-
naries (also implemented as hidden attribute members of the Document object) can be read
by JavaScript for further analysis. For performance concerns, we implement a lazy update
mechanism for setting the above attributes. The values of these attributes are kept in the
hidden attribute members of the modified C++ classes. They are not updated in the DOM
tree until the attributes are first accessed by JavaScript.
5.3 Collecting DOM Access Logs in the Real World
To understand the behaviors of JavaScript in the real world, we performed a large-scale
measurement experiment of the Alexa top 100,000 websites with DOM-Logger. We first
describe the experiment setup (§5.3.1), then discuss how we group logs of a script collected
2Document and all DOM Elements are sub classes of Node.
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from multiple websites (§5.3.2), and highlight some statistics of the crawled data (§5.3.4).
5.3.1 Setup
We aim to gather a large collection of DOM access logs from web applications in the
real world. Such data set can help understand how JavaScript code accesses web content
in modern web applications. In particular, we are interested in looking for suspicious or
even malicious accesses that are made by third-party JavaScript code. We used our DOM
access logging tool DOM-Logger to perform a large scale web crawl in May 2017. Since
DOM-Logger is implemented in a full-fledged web browser, we are not able to run hundreds
of DOM-Logger crawler in parallel.
For each website in our data set, we used a browser automation tool – Selenium3
– to drive DOM-Logger to browse its main page for up to three times. In each naviga-
tion attempt, DOM-Logger waits for up to 30 seconds till the web page is fully loaded
or the timer expires, whichever comes first. After that, we then executes a script in
DOM-Logger to traverse the DOM tree to instruct DOM-Logger to update all the access
logs and meta data it records in the DOM tree. Specifically, this script reads the accessLog,
initiator, scriptID and parentScriptID attributes of each DOM node4 it visits, and
the scriptID-to-sourceURL and scriptID-to-parentScriptID dictionaries of the
<document> node. Finally, we use Selenium to save the updated DOM tree as a HTML
source file on disk for further analysis. The two dictionaries and the accessLog of the
<document> node are stored in a separate file, because the Document class is not a HTM-
LElement.
Our crawl method has several limitations. First, the DOM access logs of only the main
page of a website are collected in our web crawl. Many websites may load a different set of
scripts in other web pages. Nevertheless, our goal is to obtain a preliminary data set that
3http://www.seleniumhq.org/
4The scriptID and parentScriptID attributes are only accessed if a DOM node is an instance of
<script> element.
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helps understand the behaviors of JavaScript in general, rather than to exhaustively cover all
scripts that may be embedded on all web pages on the Internet. We believe that our crawl of
100,000 web pages is sufficient for achieving our goal. We plan to perform additional crawls
of more web pages of a website in our future work. Second, we do not interact with each
visited web page as a real user would do. As a result, many JavaScript functions that listen
for specific user interactions may not be executed in our visit. Furthermore, some scripts
might have not been loaded because they also depend on user generated events. Although
we cannot cover all execution paths, our measurement can collect the default behavior of
a script, i.e., the access logs that are common among all visitors. Indeed, achieving full
code coverage is extremely difficult (if not impossible) because of the dynamic nature of
JavaScript [125, 126, 127, 128, 129].
5.3.2 Grouping Logs
A script object is uniquely identified by its scriptID in a web page. This unique identifier
of a specific script is not consistent across different web pages and even across different
visits to one web page. To group the logs associated with one script collected on different
web pages, we use the sourceURL of the script as its global unique identifier. However,
multiple scripts with distinct scriptIDs may be mapped to the same sourceURL even on a
single web page. For example, we assign the sourceURL of a parent script to the sourceURL
of a dynamically generated inline script as in §5.2.3 We think such mapping is acceptable
because this set of scripts is written or embedded by the same party. Actually, the inline
scripts can be merged within the external script to represent a group of JavaScript code.
Besides the sourceURL (URL in short) of a script object, we also group DOM logs by the
Origin and the Domain Name (Domain in short) of a script. Such grouping methods allow
us to characterize scripts in different granularities.
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5.3.3 Privileges of Scripts
Although all scripts loaded in one frame have the same privilege as the first-party scripts in
today’s web applications, we think that by default any third-party script should be not trusted
and be "granted" with lower privilege. However, we find that many web applications embed
their own scripts from separate origins other than the first-party origin. For example, Google
embed one script from the origin https://apis.googlecom on its main page https://www.google.
com/. Hosting static content on separate hosts to improve page load time is a common
practice in the development of modern web applications. For web pages like Google’s main
page, we might use the domain of a script to test whether it is owned by the first-party and
should be trusted. We do not think, however, such owner-operated third-party scripts shall
be given the full privilege as first-party scripts, because they might be embedded across
multiple origins and their hosting servers might be compromised one day. What is worse,
some websites host their scripts on hosts of separate domains, which are the domains of the
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) that are operated by the websites. For instance, Amazon
include many scripts from the origin https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com on its main
page https://www.amazon.com/; several scripts on the main page of Bank of America
https://www.bankofamerica.com/ are loaded from the origin https://www2.bac-assets.com.
Similarly, we think such scripts loaded from other domains shall be granted with limited
privilege.
To this end, we classify scripts loaded in one page into four privilege levels as follows.
Note that a smaller numeric value indicates a higher privilege.
Privilege-0 (Priv-0): Scripts in this privilege level are the first-party scripts and are
fully trusted.
Privilege-1 (Priv-1): Scripts in this privilege level are the owner-operated third-party
scripts that are loaded from the same domain of the current web page.
Privilege-2 (Priv-2): Scripts in this privilege level are the owner-operated third-party
114
scripts that are loaded from a different domain of the current web page.
Privilege-3 (Priv-3): Scripts in this privilege level are the third-party scripts that are
not operated by the owner of current web page and shall not be trusted.
Some websites do not have their own CDN infrastructure and ask third-party CDN providers
to manage their JavaScript code. One may argue that such scripts shall be classified to Priv-2
instead of Priv-3. We conservatively classify such scripts to Priv-3 because the uploaded
scripts might be modified by a compromised or malicious third-party CDN provider.
One important measurement goal of this chapter is to compare the behaviors of the
third-party scripts from those of the first-party scripts. We need to correctly assign a privilege
level to one third-party script because it may be operated by the website owner. We can
easily detect Priv-0 and Priv-1 scripts from their URLs. As we discuss above, however, we
cannot simply use the URL, origin or even domain name of a third-party script to decide
whether a third-party script shall be classified to Priv-2 or Priv-3.
To solve this problem, we propose a new technique to determine whether two scripts
with distinct domains are operated by the same organization. Specifically, we inspect the
email addresses in the DNS SOA records5 of the two scripts’ host names. We leverage
the DNS SOA records for this task because many organizations would use the same email
address to register multiple domains. For instance, the email address fields in the DNS
SOA records of domain names fbcdn.com and facebook.com are both dns@facebook.com,
respectively. However, there is one caveat in using the above simple technique to determine
the organization of a URL. Different organizations may use the same Managed DNS
providers6. As a result, the email addresses in their SOA records are the same. For
example, the SOA email addresses of both instagram.com and netflix.com are awsdns-
hostmaster@amazon.com. To overcome the limitations of using email address alone as the




DNS NS record7 of a host or domain name. In order to be classified to Priv-2, a third-party
script shall first have the same SOA email address of the web page that it is embedded in.
Secondly, the third-party scripts and the first-party web page shall have common domain
names of their name servers. We do not strictly require they have common name servers
because the name servers can be dynamically selected from a large pool. Furthermore, we
compile a list of known managed DNS providers and dynamic DNS providers as a blacklist
to filter name servers of those providers. Only if the common name server(s) is not owned
by a public DNS provider shall the third-party script be classified to Priv-2.
Using our technique, we successfully identified Priv-2 scripts on many websites, e.g.,
scripts loaded from https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com on https://www.amazon.com/.
Our technique may incorrectly classify one owner-operated third-party script to Priv-3
in two cases. First, an organization may use one separate email addresses for one of its
domain. For instance, although Twitch is now a subsidiary of Amazon, we classified scripts
loaded from https://www.amazon.com on https://www.twitch.tv/ to Priv4, because the SOA
email addresses of amazon.com and twitch.tv are root@amazon.com and admin@justin.tv,
respectively. Second, an organization may use a managed DNS provider for two or more of
its domains. We were not able to automatically find Priv-2 scripts on one of such domains.
We consider it as a limitation of our current approach.
5.3.4 Crawling Results
We summarize some of the crawling results in this subsection, and will present more analysis
in detail in §5.4.
Overview
Our crawl of the Alexa top 100,000 websites using DOM-Logger is completed in about one
week on a 32-core CPU server with 256 GB memory. In total, we were able to collect
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_DNS_record_types#NS
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data from 96,233 websites (96.3%). We failed to load or save any data from the other
3,777 websites. We manually tried to navigate to some of these websites using a non-
modified Chromium browser but could not load any content in 30 seconds, either. We did
not observe any DOM access log for 4,833 out of the 96,233 (5.0%) websites. Through
manual inspection, we find that these websites either included no JavaScript code (e.g.,
http://www.parsiteb.com/ and http://www.websiteseguro.com/) or/and served blank content
(e.g., http://www.flowsoft7.com/ and http://www.onecount.net8) when we used DOM-Logger
to browse them.
Statistics about Scripts
In our crawl, we have found 422,713 unique scripts (by URL) that are loaded from 134,487
origins of 105,092 domains. We tried to generate a CDF figure of the script distribution
by number of websites that one script is included. But we could only observe the long tail
in the figure. The top-10 JavaScript URLs, origins and domains are shown in Table 5.1,
Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, respectively. The top-10 scripts and origins all belong to Google
and Facebook. In particular, Google takes 9 of 10 seats in both the top-10 scripts and top-10
origins. The top-8 origins are still owned exclusively by Google and Facebook. On average,
a JavaScript URL (script), origin and domain is found on 2.22, 4.45 and 5.07 websites,
respectively. The 90th percentiles of number of websites that a script, origin and domain is
included are 2, 3 and 2, respectively. In other words, 90% of scripts, origins and domains
are found on at most 2, 3 and 2, respectively. The 90th percentiles are smaller than the
averages, suggesting that the third-party scripts on the Internet are dominated by very few
top companies, such as Google and Facebook.
We present the CDF figures of the website distributions in terms of number of scripts,
origins and domains in each privilege level on one website in Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2 and
Figure 5.3, respectively. Note that the domain of Priv-1 scripts is identical to the domain
8Only the string running is enclosed within <body> in the saved HTML source file.
117
Table 5.1: The top-10 JavaScript URLs.
Rank Script Number (%) of websites
1 https://www.google-analytics.com/analytics.js 50607 (52.59%)
2 https://connect.facebook.net/en_US/fbevents.js 14211 (14.77%)
3 https://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/osd.js 13764 (14.30%)
4 https://securepubads.g.doubleclick.net/gpt/pubads_impl_117.js 11014 (11.45%)
5 https://www.google-analytics.com/ga.js 10982 (11.41%)
6 https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js 9698 (10.08%)
7 http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/js/adsbygoogle.js 8307 (8.63%)
8 http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/osd.js 6390 (6.64%)
9 http://www.googletagservices.com/tag/js/gpt.js 6302 (6.55%)
10 http://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js 6109 (6.35%)
Table 5.2: The top-10 JavaScript origins.
Rank Origin Number (%) of websites
1 https://www.google-analytics.com 59888 (62.23%)
2 https://connect.facebook.net 24696 (25.66%)
3 http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com 15759 (16.38%)
4 https://pagead2.googlesyndication.com 14501 (15.07%)
5 https://securepubads.g.doubleclick.net 11088 (11.52%)
6 https://www.googletagmanager.com 9698 (10.08%)
7 https://ajax.googleapis.com 9542 (9.92%)
8 https://apis.google.com 9295 (9.66%)
9 http://ajax.googleapis.com 8285 (8.61%)
10 http://www.googletagservices.com 6312 (6.56%)
of the first-party, such that there is no Priv-1 domain in our result. We observe on average
more Priv-3 scripts (URLs) than Priv-0 scripts, and rarely Priv-1 and Priv-2 scripts – the
average number of scripts (URLs) from Priv-0 to Priv-3 are 3.13, 0.30, 0.01 and 6.80,
respectively. However, few websites include lots of scripts so the mean might not be a
very good metric. The median number of scripts in the four privilege levels are 3, 0, 0
and 5, respectively. The 99th percentile of number of scripts (URLs) from Priv-0 to Priv-
3 are 11, 5, 0 and 29, respectively. In other words, 99% of the websites have at most
11, 5, 0 and 29 scripts in Priv-0, Priv-1, Priv-2 and Priv-3, respectively. In particular,
http://www.aoji.cn/ and http://www.56products.com/ had more than 60 first-party scripts
(Priv-0); http://www.iqilu.com/ and http://www.qingdaonews.com/ embedded 65 and 45
Priv-1 scripts, respectively; https://www.terra.com.br/, http://www.ctrip.com/ and https:
//www.terra.com/ included 21 Priv-2 scripts; more than 60 Priv-3 scripts were found on
http://www.celebzz.com/, http://peopleenespanol.com/ and http://lokalavisen.dk/.
Besides the number of scripts in each privilege level on one web page, we are also
interested in the percentage of scripts in each privilege level. We show the CDF figures of
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Table 5.3: The top-10 JavaScript domains.
Rank Domain Number (%) of websites
1 google-analytics.com 63180 (65.65%)
2 facebook.net 28640 (29.76%)
3 googlesyndication.com 21017 (21.84%)
4 ajax.googleapis.com 17322 (18.00%)
5 googletagmanager.com 15744 (16.36%)
6 google.com 15636 (16.25%)
7 doubleclick.net 13383 (13.91%)
8 googletagservices.com 10852 (11.28%)
9 twitter.com 9279 (9.64%)
10 yandex.ru 5964 (6.20%)















Figure 5.1: Website Distribution by Number of Scripts in Each Privilege.
the website distributions in terms of percentages of scripts, origins and domains in each
privilege level on one website in Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6, respectively. On
average, 41%, 3%, 0% and 56% of scripts (JavaScript URLs) on a website are in Priv-0,
Priv-1, Priv-2 and Priv-3, respectively. Note that the way we calculate the average percentage
of a script is different from calculating the average number. In particular, we first calculate
the percentage of scripts in each privilege level for each website, then calculate the average
percentage values of each privilege across all the websites. The median percentage of scripts
in the four privilege levels are 0.33, 0, 0 and 0.61, respectively. We find that the main
pages of top websites such as https://www.facebook.com/ and https://www.wikipedia.org
only included first-party scripts (Priv-0). On the other hand, more than 98% of scripts
on main pages of websites such as http://peopleenespanol.com/, http://fortune.com/, http:
//www.goodtoknow.co.uk/ and http://time.com/ were Priv-3 scripts. Many of those Priv-3
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Figure 5.2: Website Distribution by Number of Origins in Each Privilege.















Figure 5.3: Website Distribution by Number of Domains in Each Privilege.
scripts were dynamically inserted by other Priv-3 scripts.
5.4 Characterizing DOM Access behaviors of JavaScript
In this section, we analyze how JavaScript code accesses DOM nodes. In particular, we show
that third-party scripts in Priv-3 exhibit very different behaviors from the first-party operated
scripts (Priv-0, 1, 2). We even find that many third-party scripts, including those provided
by the top websites such as Google and Facebook, were "abusing" their full privilege. First,
we present the attribution of DOM element creations to JavaScript (§5.4.1). Then, we study
how JavaScript accessed DOM nodes in general (§5.4.2). Finally, we identify scripts that
120















Figure 5.4: Website Distribution by Percentage of Scripts in Each Privilege.















Figure 5.5: Website Distribution by Percentage of Origins in Each Privilege.
accessed DOM nodes created by other scripts (§5.4.3), and scripts that accessed sensitive
content (§5.4.4).
5.4.1 Initiators of DOM Elements
We are interested in how much content in a web page is generated by the first-party and by
third-party scripts. In particular, we would like to find third-party scripts that create lots of
elements on many websites. We use the initiator attribute generated by DOM-Logger in
this analysis. Note that in this analysis we also include the 4,833 websites on which we do
not find any DOM access log. All DOM nodes on these websites were statically created by
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Figure 5.6: Website Distribution by Percentage of Domains in Each Privilege.
the first-party (Priv-0), i.e., the HTML elements were only generated by the browser DOM
parser when a web page was first rendered.
On average, we found 973 DOM nodes across the main pages of the 96,233 websites.
The 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 99th percentiles of number of elements are 315, 692, 1234,
2053 and 5095, respectively. http://www.hubstatic.com/ is the top website that had 40,051
elements. We present the number of DOM elements created by scripts in each privilege
level in Figure 5.7. Note that we perform the transformation – −log10(1 − Y ) – to the
Y-axis to highlight the Y values that are close to 1. On average, 899.69, 9.85, 0.36 and 63.12
DOM elements were created by Priv-0, Priv-1, Priv-2 and Priv-3 scripts, respectively. In
particular, http://www.hubstatic.com/ is also the top website by number of Priv-0 elements
(40,051); https://www.easymarkets.com/int is the top website by number of Priv-1 elements
(12,336); 4,414 Priv-2 elements make https://www.walgreens.com/ the number website by
number of Priv-2 elements. Surprisingly, 26,280 DOM elements (97.8%) were initiated
by Priv-3 scripts on http://www.sofascore.com/, making it the top one by number of Priv-3
elements. The percentage of DOM elements created by scripts in each privilege level is
shown in Figure 5.7. The means of percentage of DOM elements in the four privilege levels
are 93.60%, 0.67%, 0.03% and 5.70%, respectively. At least 93% of DOM elements on 75%
of websites were Priv-0 elements, showing that third-party JavaScript do not add much new
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content to a website in general.
We also calculate the average number of elements one script had created. Only 212,501
out of the 422,713 scripts had created at least one DOM element in our crawl. On average, a
script initiated 416.76 elements on one web page. However, the median is merely 19. Only
25% of scripts had initiated more than 560 elements on a web page on average. After filtering
scripts that were embedded in less than 100 websites, we find https://static.addtoany.com/
menu/page.js as the top script by average number of created elements (610.68), followed by
https://an.yandex.ru/resource/context_static_r_1853.js (324.20) and https://ajax.googleapis.
com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.8.2/jquery.min.js (273.79). Note that the number of elements initiated
by third-party libraries such as jQuery depends on the caller that calls functions in the
libraries. One may suggest that we shall attribute elements that are created by such a library
to the caller rather than the library. We think it is an open problem. The reason we set the
library as the initiator is that the direct caller of the library may be called by a function of
another script. However, the bottom function in the JavaScript call stack that initiates the
function calls might not expect some intermediate function to call jQuery to create a new
element. Furthermore, after a function of a library is called, the library itself can also call its
other functions to perform arbitrary operations, including creating new elements. Thus, we
set the script of the top (last) function frame in the call stack as the initiator of the newly
created element.
5.4.2 DOM Accesses
We have found that third-party scripts do not create much new content in web pages
embedding them. In this section, we are interested in understanding how JavaScript access
DOM nodes in general. Specifically, we focus on the access type, i.e., Read (R), Write (W)
or Execute (X), of each access. As we discussed in §5.2.1, an Execute access may cause
a DOM object being read or written as the same time. We treat such an access as either a
Read or a Write access in stead of an Execute access.
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Figure 5.7: Website Distribution by Number of Elements in Each Privilege Level.















Figure 5.8: Website Distribution by Percentage of Elements in Each Privilege Level.
The average and median number of the three types of accesses made by scripts in the
four privilege levels across the 91,400 websites are summarized in Table 5.4. Putting all
scripts together, on average they made 17,710 Read, 687 Write and 1,009 Execute accesses
to DOM nodes on one web page. Since there are much fewer Priv-1 and Priv-2 scripts, the
average and median numbers of accesses by those scripts are significantly lower than those
by Priv-0 and Priv-3 scripts. We focus on comparing Priv-3 scripts to Priv-0 scripts. On
average, neither Priv-0 nor Priv-3 scripts performed much Write and Execute operations
on DOM nodes, compared to Read operations. However, we are surprised to find that
third-party scripts in Priv-3 performed nearly 80% more Read accesses than first-party
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Table 5.4: Numbers of Accesses by Scripts in Four Privilege Levels across 91,400 Websites
Privilege Read Write ExecuteMean Median Mean Median Mean Median
0 6,049.75 636 342.45 47 474.74 14
1 791.42 0 45.30 0 67.63 0
2 26.98 0 1.66 0 2.24 0
3 10,842.31 1025 297.31 72 464.65 21
scripts on average. Adding Write and Execute accesses, Priv-3 scripts made up 59.80% of
DOM accesses across all the websites. Note that in §5.4.1 on average there were only 5.70%
DOM elements that were created by Priv-3 scripts. This result suggests that Priv-3 scripts
accessed mainly first-party content rather than their own content. Such high privilege can
be easily abused to read and even modify sensitive first-party content. We will present the
analysis on cross-owner and over-privileged accesses in §5.4.3.
The median numbers in Table 5.4 are an order of magnitude smaller than the means,
indicating that significant number of accesses was observed on very few web pages. For
each web page, we also calculated the percentage of DOM accesses made by scripts in each
privilege level. The CDF figure is depicted as in Figure 5.9. On average on a web page,
45.30%, 4.90%, 0.14% and 49.66% of the accesses were performed by Priv-0, Priv-1, Priv-2
and Priv-3 scripts, respectively. The median percentages of both Priv-1 and Priv-2 scripts
are 0. The medians of Priv-0 and Priv-3 scripts are 33.87% and 51.15%, respectively. This
result also demonstrates that the majority accesses were made by Priv-3 scripts.
Table 5.5 lists the top-10 websites that were mostly accessed by Priv-3 scripts. The
third column shows the number of DOM nodes on this website. We present the number and
percentage of accesses made by Priv-3 scripts on each of the website in the fourth column.
Note that we do not include accesses by scripts in a higher privilege level in the calculation.
On these 10 websites, over 99% accesses were made by Priv-3 scripts. We also check which
Priv-3 scripts performed such significant number of accesses on each website. We find that
the script http://w.sharethis.com/button/async-buttons.js appears as the top accessing Priv-3
script on 6 websites. It made up more than 98% Priv-3 accesses on 5 websites and 94%
accesses on one website. Similarly, more than 93% Priv-3 accesses were made by one single
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Figure 5.9: Website Distribution by Percentage of Element Accesses by Scripts in Each
Privilege Level.
Table 5.5: Top-10 Websites Accessed By Priv-3 Scripts.
Rank Website Number of Elements Number of Priv-3 Accesses
1 http://www.houstonmethodist.org 1185 880040 (100%)
2 http://www.catholicculture.org 947 869789 (100%)
3 http://www.jtsstrength.com 812 851977 (100%)
4 https://www.cashstar.com 979 841391 (100%)
5 http://www.wirebat.com 1087 832846 (100%)
6 http://www.mp4d.com 3399 823251 (100%)
7 http://horrorfreaknews.com 2242 820903 (99%)
8 http://www.siggraph.org 793 811867 (100%)
9 http://www.nfpa.org 978 789928 (100%)
10 http://www.fnews.gr 1159 783494 (99%)
script on the other 4 websites.
To discover the top accessing scripts, we also count the average number of DOM accesses
by each script and show the top-10 scripts in Table 5.6. Scripts that are embedded in less
than 100 websites are not shown. The third column is the number of websites that one script
was included. The async-buttons.js script for implementing the social widget of ShareThis
loaded from the host w.sharethis.com is the top Priv-3 script in terms of average number of
DOM accesses. We cannot find a good excuse for needing to make more than 136K accesses
on average for it.
5.4.3 Cross-Owner and Over-Privileged Accesses
We study how a script access content created by other scripts in this section. Specif-
ically, we define two types of such accesses by one script: cross-owner access and
126
Table 5.6: Top-10 Priv-3 Scripts by Average Number of DOM Accesses.
Rank Script Num. Websites Average Num. Accesses
1 https://ws.sharethis.com/button/async-buttons.js 108 160066.56
2 http://w.sharethis.com/button/async-buttons.js 466 136770.57
3 http://cdn.viglink.com/api/vglnk.js 149 86684.05
4 http://load.sumome.com/ 339 71050.01
5 https://load.sumome.com/ 241 42914.30
6 http://s1.adform.net/banners/scripts/adx.js 204 34739.58
7 http://cdn.revcontent.com/build/js/rev2.min.js 136 26846.01
8 http://widgets.outbrain.com/outbrain.js 310 22454.04
9 https://widgets.outbrain.com/outbrain.js 105 21754.16
10 http://cdn.doubleverify.com/avs674.js 161 16297.48
Table 5.7: Numbers of Cross-Owner Accesses across 86809 Websites.
Privilege Read Write ExecuteMean Median Mean Median Mean Median
0 6245.23 437 334.22 24 485.49 16
1 744.27 0 30.74 0 61.70 0
2 25.23 0 1.26 0 1.99 0
3 10898.29 1164 134.47 24 430.27 19
over-privileged access. Cross-owner access is an access to a DOM element initiated by
JavaScript with different script (URL), origin or domain. Over-privileged access is an access
to a DOM element in a higher privilege. We allow scripts in a higher privilege to access
content in a lower privilege. Note that we do not study access to Cookies in this section.
The mean and median numbers of cross-owner DOM accesses by scripts in the four
privilege levels across 86,809 websites are listed in Table 5.7. It might first look strange
that Priv-0 scripts also made cross-owner accesses. Remember that the way we determine
an access as cross-owner access is by comparing either the URL, origin or domain of the
script and that of the initiator of the accessed DOM object. An access by the Priv-0 script
https://www.a.com/lib.js to one first-party object whose initiator is http://www.a.com/ is
determined as a cross-owner access. This access, however, is not an over-privileged DOM
access. As a result, we observe on average over 6,245 cross-owner Read accesses by Priv-0
scripts on one website. Priv-3 scripts even made over 10,898 cross-owner Read accesses
on one website on average. Priv-1 and Priv-2 scripts did not perform much cross-owner
accesses, because only few scripts on the 86K websites were in the two privilege levels. An
interesting observation is that Priv-0 scripts did more cross-owner Write accesses than Priv-3
scripts. One possible explanation is that many DOM elements were dynamically inserted by
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Table 5.8: Numbers of Over-Privileged Accesses to Priv-0 Elements across 82327 Websites.
Privilege Read Write ExecuteMean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1 762.35 0 31.20 0 63.76 0
2 25.80 0 1.29 0 2.07 0
3 10026.78 1343 128.79 25 374.45 12
Table 5.9: Numbers of Cross-Owner and Over-Privileged Accesses across Scripts.
Type Num Scripts Read Write ExecuteMean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Cross-Owner 343981 4520.63 12 126.36 2 247.18 0
Priv-0 Element 122095 7292.36 6 108.74 3 296.87 0
Priv-1 Element 3023 1243.62 9 6.46 0 82.63 0
Priv-2 Element 181 640.60 21 0.44 0 25.70 0
Priv-0 scripts as children of first-party elements initiated by other Priv-0 scripts. Note that
an access to an object in the same privilege level might be determined as cross-owner access
if the accessing script is not the initiator of the object. Some people might think such an
access is not an abuse of one’s privilege. Thus, we demonstrate the results of over-privileged
DOM accesses next.
We present in Table 5.8 the mean and median numbers of over-privileged DOM accesses
to Priv-0 DOM elements by scripts in the three low privilege levels across 82,327 websites.
First party scripts in Priv-0 are granted full privilege and hence can access any content
they wish. Compared with Table 5.7, the numbers of the three low privileged scripts are
close. This result indicates that many cross-owner DOM accesses by Priv-[1-3] scripts are
actually over-privileged accesses. In other words, low privileged scripts did not access much
content created by other scripts in the same privilege level. Priv-3 third-party scripts, in
particular, "abused" their privilege. We enclose the word abused in quotation marks because
those over-privileged accesses might be for legit purposes. We will inspect whether an
cross-owner or over-privileged access is really security sensitive in §5.4.4.
Finally, for each script we compute the average number of cross-owner and over-
privileged accesses it made on one web page. The mean and median numbers of cross-owner
as well as over-privileged DOM accesses across scripts are demonstrated in Table 5.9.
Since there were quite few Priv-1 and Priv-2 elements, we did not find many scripts in a
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Table 5.10: Top-10 Scripts by Average Number of Cross-Owner Accesses.
Rank Script Num. (%) Websites Avg. Num. Accesses
1 https://ws.sharethis.com/button/async-buttons.js 108 (100%) 159053.77
2 http://w.sharethis.com/button/async-buttons.js 466 (100%) 135391.04
3 http://cdn.viglink.com/api/vglnk.js 149 (100%) 86497.47
4 http://load.sumome.com/ 339 (100%) 68623.35
5 https://load.sumome.com/ 241 (100%) 41629.46
6 http://s1.adform.net/banners/scripts/adx.js 204 (100%) 34242.25
7 http://cdn.revcontent.com/build/js/rev2.min.js 136 (100%) 26720.16
8 http://widgets.outbrain.com/outbrain.js 310 (100%) 21848.04
9 https://widgets.outbrain.com/outbrain.js 105 (100%) 21416.42
10 http://cdn.doubleverify.com/avs674.js 161 (100%) 16297.48
Table 5.11: Top-10 Over-Privileged Scripts by Average Number of Priv-0 Element Accesses.
Rank Script Num. (%) Websites Avg. Num. Accesses
1 https://ws.sharethis.com/button/async-buttons.js 108 (100%) 152534.46
2 http://w.sharethis.com/button/async-buttons.js 466 (100%) 129011.62
3 http://cdn.viglink.com/api/vglnk.js 149 (100%) 84487.91
4 http://load.sumome.com/ 339 (100%) 63649.95
5 https://load.sumome.com/ 241 (100%) 38697.28
6 http://s1.adform.net/banners/scripts/adx.js 146 (72%) 37019.80
7 http://widgets.outbrain.com/outbrain.js 310 (100%) 20348.87
8 https://widgets.outbrain.com/outbrain.js 105 (100%) 19656.70
9 http://cdn.revcontent.com/build/js/rev2.min.js 136 (100%) 17764.19
10 http://cdn.doubleverify.com/avs674.js 161 (100%) 13158.71
lower privilege accessed these objects. There are 182% more scripts that ever performed
a cross-owner access than low-privileged scripts that accessed a Priv-0 element. Indeed,
many of the cross-owner accessing scripts are first-party scripts. We find that the mean
values are significantly greater than the median values, which indicates that quite few scripts
performed extensive cross-owner and/or over-privileged accesses. The top-10 cross-owner
accessing scripts and top-10 over-privileged scripts that accessed Priv-0 elements are listed
in Table 5.10 and Table 5.11, respectively. We sort the scripts by the average number of
accesses to Priv-0 elements. Scripts that were found in less than 100 websites are filtered.
The numbers in parentheses in the third column are the percentage of websites that one
script is included and made cross-owner or over-privileged access. We find that except
for http://s1.adform.net/banners/scripts/adx.js, all other 9 scripts performed an cross-owner
or over-privileged access on all websites they are embedded in. Surprisingly, the top-10
scripts in Table 5.6 are also the top-10 cross-owner accessing and over-privileged scripts
in these two tables. Furthermore, the majority of accesses they did are cross-owner and
over-privileged accesses. We investigate whether their accesses are sensitive or not next.
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5.4.4 Sensitive DOM API Accesses
We have shown that many third-party Priv-3 scripts were accessing (high-privileged) content
created by other scripts. Third-party scripts have legit reasons for accessing others’ content.
For example, an ad library needs to insert new elements into dedicated region in the DOM
tree; a social widget library needs to insert its buttons into specific place on a web page; a
developer may use libraries like jQuery to manipulate the DOM. There are also reasons for
not letting third-party scripts arbitrarily perform any operation on any content in a web page.
First, a lot of sensitive user data (e.g., name, email, address etc.) is directly presented in
many websites today as an effort to provide personalized experience. Third-party scripts
shall not access any of such data. Second, HTML elements such as <form> and <input>
are used for collecting user inputs by web applications. Third-party scripts shall not access
these tags without a good excuse, either. In particular, modern web browsers automatically
fill the saved user login credentials, contact information, and billing information for a user
in such elements. All such data is stored in plain text in the DOM tree and can be easily
manipulated by JavaScript. Third, sensitive user credentials are usually stored as Cookies in
the browser. While an analytic script may need to set a Cookie in the website it is included
to track visitors, other third-party scripts have no good reason to access Cookies.
In this section, we investigate whether third-party scripts were abusing their privileges
to access sensitive content in a web page. One may argue that without accessing some data
first, a script cannot determine whether the accessed data is sensitive or not. Indeed, how
to present sensitive user data in a web application depends on the web developer. Thus,
we conservatively determine accesses to <form> and <input> elements and to document
Cookies as sensitive accesses. Since the global <document> object is not a DOM element, it
has no initiator. We manually assign 0 as its privilege. Furthermore, we only study sensitive
accesses that are an over-privileged access, as defined in §5.4.3.
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Table 5.12: Numbers of Over-Privileged Accesses to Priv-0 Sensitive Elements across 35961
Websites.
Privilege Read Write ExecuteMean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1 31.77 0 0.90 0 2.06 0
2 1.38 0 0.03 0 0.06 0
3 232.57 30 3.76 0 18.20 0
Accesses to Sensitive Elements
We list the mean and median numbers of over-privileged accesses to Priv-0 sensitive elements
across 35,961 websites in Table 5.12. We find that sensitive DOM elements were primarily
Read by JavaScript instead of being Written or Executed. Priv-3 scripts still performed a
large number of Read accesses on average to Priv-0 sensitive elements. The medians are
much smaller than the means, indicating that the majority of sensitive accesses took place
on very few websites. On 10% of the 35,961 websites, the Priv-0 sensitive elements were
Read, Written and Executed by Priv-3 scripts for at least 376, 8 and 22 times on average,
respectively.
For each script we count the numbers of over-privileged sensitive element accesses it
made on each web page and then compute the average. We show in Table 5.13 the mean
and median numbers of over-privileged sensitive content accesses across scripts. Very few
scripts in a lower privilege accessed sensitive elements in Priv-1 or Priv-2. The medians
are also much smaller than the means, in particular for Priv-0 sensitive elements. The 99th
percentiles of number of Read, Write and Execute accesses to Priv-0 sensitive elements are
6448, 149 and 543, respectively. The top-10 over-privileged scripts that accessed Priv-0
sensitive elements are listed in Table 5.14. Scripts are sorted by the number of websites
they had ever accessed one Priv-0 sensitive elements. The numbers in parentheses in the
third column are the percentage of websites that one script is included and accessed Priv-
0 sensitive elements. Five scripts are served by Facebook and accessed Priv-0 sensitive
elements on more than at least 74% of websites they were included. We found that these
libraries actually access all elements on any web page embedding them. The percentage
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Table 5.13: Numbers of Sensitive Content Accesses across Over-Privileged Scripts.
Type Num Scripts Read Write ExecuteMean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Cookies 38400 80.73 7 27.27 2
Priv-0 Element 18192 525.28 25 9.26 0 40.18 1
Priv-1 Element 221 112.08 16 0.59 0 15.32 0
Priv-2 Element 9 36.33 18 0 0 5 0
Table 5.14: Top-10 Over-Privileged Scripts by Number of Websites They Accessed Priv-0
Sensitive Elements.
Rank Script Num. (%) Websites Avg. Num. Accesses
1 https://connect.facebook.net/en_US/sdk.js 4114 (80%) 46.77
2 https://connect.facebook.net/en_US/all.js 2108 (85%) 46.65
3 http://connect.facebook.net/en_US/sdk.js 1040 (83%) 38.50
4 https://mc.yandex.ru/metrika/watch.js 618 (10%) 36.33
5 http://connect.facebook.net/en_US/all.js 540 (88%) 41.44
6 http://cdn.krxd.net/ctjs/controltag.js.7dbac51c9aa7b4135991e8daeb9ced57 530 (80%) 78.75
7 https://connect.facebook.net/ja_JP/sdk.js 497 (74%) 31.67




10 https://cse.google.com/coop/cse/brand 435 (100%) 12.83
is not 100% because there was no Priv-0 sensitive element on some websites embedding
them. Three scripts were served by Google. Two of them are Google’s ad libraries and
only accessed Priv-0 sensitive elements on less than 8% of the websites including them.
However, the other Google’s script accessed Priv-0 sensitive elements on every website
it was embedded. We find that the string "input" is coded in the rest two scripts from
https://mc.yandex.ru and http://cdn.krxd.net, indicating that they intentionally attempted to
access <input> tags.
Accesses to Cookies
The mean and median numbers of over-privileged accesses to Cookies across 77,992
websites are demonstrated in Table 5.15. On 10% of the 77,992 websites, their cookies on
average were Read and Written by Priv-3 scripts for at least 75and 29 times, respectively.
38,400 Priv-3 scripts had read and written Cookies for 80.73 and 27.27 times on average,
respectively. The median number of Read and Write accesses to Cookies are 7 and 2,
respectively. The 99th percentiles of number of Read and Write accesses to Cookies are 472
and 112, respectively.
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Table 5.15: Numbers of Over-Privileged Accesses to Cookies across 77992 Websites.
Privilege Read WriteMean Median Mean Median
1 0.84 0 0.15 0
2 0.06 0 0.02 0
3 38.84 22 13.26 8
Table 5.16: Top-10 Scripts by Number of Websites They Accessed Cookies.
Rank Script Num. (%) Websites Avg. Num. Accesses
1 https://www.google-analytics.com/analytics.js 50520 (100%) 23.05
2 https://www.google-analytics.com/ga.js 10967 (100%) 36.57
3 https://securepubads.g.doubleclick.net/gpt/pubads_impl_117.js 10711 (97%) 12.26







7 https://www.google-analytics.com/plugins/ua/linkid.js 4003 (100%) 1.31
8 https://ssl.google-analytics.com/ga.js 3578 (100%) 34.28





The top-10 over-privileged scripts that accessed Cookies are listed in Table 5.16. Scripts
are sorted by the number of websites they had ever accessed Cookies. Eight scripts are
served by Google. Except for the two ad libraries (the 5th and 6th scripts) that accessed
Cookies on 85% websites embedding them, the other six scripts accessed Cookies on at
least 97% scripts embedding them. In particular, the three Google Analytics scripts and the
10th script loaded from https://apis.google.com accessed Cookies on every page they were
included. The rest two scripts from https://mc.yandex.ru and https://script.hotjar.com also
accessed Cookies on all websites that they were found. Note that the watch.js script from
https://mc.yandex.ru is also the 4th script in Table 5.14. We believe Google Analytics and
hotjar (one other Analytics service provider) have legitimate reasons to access Cookies. On
the other hand, we are concerned with their ability to access other Cookies that belong to
the first-party domains. We do not think the other third-party scripts have the need to access
the Cookies of the first-party website. Although we do not have evidence showing that their
accesses were malicious, such ability can be abused some day. We leave it as a future work.
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5.4.5 Summary
We have analyzed the DOM access logs collected with DOM-Logger to understand the
behaviors of JavaScript code in general. On average most content on a web page is generated
by the first party. Third-party scripts made up the majority accesses to DOM elements,
including those created by other scripts in a higher privilege. Many third-party scripts,
including those served by Google and Facebook, abused their privileges to access sensitive
content in web pages. Our results demonstrate the need to restrict the privileges of third-party
JavaScript code in today’s web applications.
5.5 Related Work
Monitoring JavaScript Behavior. Mostly closed to our monitoring tool is ScriptInspec-
tor [130]. It is also a browser-based monitoring tool that can intercept, record and check
third-party script accesses to sensitive resources against security policies. Besides the DOM,
ScriptInspector can intercept API calls to resources such as local storage and network.
However, ScriptInspector is not able to attribute actions to inline scripts that are dynamically
generated. Furthermore, it only logs the domain name of the accessing script, thus cannot
differentiate distinct scripts loaded from the same domain. As we have discovered, scripts
loaded from the same domain and even the same origin can exhibit completely different
behaviors. ScriptInspector attributes an access to all unknown third-party domains in the
JavaScript call stack, whereas we attribute to the top (last) script in the stack.
Browser extensions like Ghostery [16] can help users understand what third-party script
providers are found on the web pages they visit. Browser extensions such as AdBlock
Plus [15], uBlock Origin [131] and Privacy Badger [132] can block scripts in specific
categories, e.g., tracking and advertising.
Measurement Studies. Yue and Wang presented the first measurement study of insecure
JavaScript practices on the web [133] They found more than 66.4% websites included
remote scripts and over 44.4% websites used eval() to dynamically generate JavaScript
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code in a set of 6,805 websites. Ratanaworabhan et al. compared the behavior of JavaScript
web applications with the JavaScript benchmarks and found that the benchmarks were not
representative of many real websites [134]. Richards et al. analyzed the dynamic behavior of
popular JavaScript libraries [135], and studied the use of eval() in popular websites [136].
Lekies et al. detected and validated DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities on the Alexa top 5,000
websites [137]. Son and Shmatikov examined insecure use of postMessage() and found
exploitable vulnerabilities in 84 popular websites [138]. The above work focused on specific
unsafe APIs in JavaScript and performed measurement study to detect vulnerable websites.
In contrast, we empirically study the use of DOM APIs by JavaScript code and report access
to sensitive content in web applications.
Nikiforakis et al. did a large-scale crawl of more than three millions web pages from
Alexa top 10,000 websites, focusing on the remote JavaScript code inclusion relation-
ships [139]. They analyzed the evolution of JavaScript inclusion over time and developed
host-based metrics to assess whether a JavaScript provider could be compromised to serve
malicious code. Lauinger et al. studied the use of vulnerable or outdated JavaScript li-
braries over 133K websites and found 37% of the websites included at least one vulnerable
library [140]. They leverage the network view of Chrome debugging protocol to deter-
mine the causal inclusion relationships. Such approach cannot determine the initiator of
dynamically generated inline scripts. Different from these two studies, we focus on how
the included remote JavaScript code manipulate content in a web page, rather than how it is
included.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented DOM-Logger, a tool for assisting web developers in
monitoring the DOM access behaviors of scripts embedded in their applications. We
performed a large-scale crawl of the main pages of the Alexa top 100K websites using
DOM-Logger. We found that in addition to the 3.13 first-party scripts, 6.8 third-party scripts
135
were included on a web page on average. The 10 most popular scripts were all served
by Google and Facebook. Third-party scripts did not insert much new content into the
embedding web pages. Rather, they made extensive accesses to first-party content, including
sensitive elements and document Cookies. In particular, we show that some popular scripts
from both Google and Facebook were abusing their privileges to access sensitive content on
most web pages that embed them. Our results demonstrate the need for more fine-grained
approach to restricting the privilege of third-party JavaScript code.
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CHAPTER 6
FINE-GRAINED ACCESS CONTROL POLICY FOR THE DOCUMENT OBJECT
MODEL
6.1 Motivation
Third-party JavaScript code is commonly embedded in web pages today to enrich user
experience. Web developers can easily augment their applications with rich features by
including third-party scripts that provide functionalities such as programming enhancement
(e.g., jQuery library), visitors tracking (e.g., Google Analytics), advertisements (e.g., Dou-
bleClick), and social integration (e.g., Facebook widget). While some of the libraries can
be statically hosted on web developers’ own domains, many others are dynamically loaded
from the library providers’ servers or through Content Delivery Networks (CDN) for auto
updating and speeding up page loading [139, 141].
The flexibility of including third-party JavaScript comes with security caveats [139,
109, 111]. Today’s web applications handle a wealth of sensitive user data (e.g., password,
billing information, email address), which is accessible to all third-party scripts loaded in
the same page (origin). Although the Same-Origin Policy (SOP) prohibits accesses from an
embedded page (or a parent page) loaded in a different origin, malicious scripts included in
the same page (origin) can easily steal such information and eavesdrop on user’s input on the
page. This is because they operate at the same privilege level as the owner of the web page.
Furthermore, they can arbitrarily manipulate the page (e.g., modifying content and posting
messages on behalf of a user) and include other third-party content, which slow down page
rendering and may expose users to malicious links or content (e.g., a drive-by-download
attack link).
We observe the root of cause of the aforementioned security implications is the lack
of privilege restriction on third-party JavaScript. Numerous researchers have attempted
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to restrict the privileges of third-party content [112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119,
120, 121, 122, 123, 124]. These methods restrict the capabilities and features of JavaScript
through 1) rewriting or wrapping third-party JavaScript code using custom APIs [112, 121,
123, 113, 114, 115, 116], or 2) confining third-party scripts in an (isolated) environment to
limit their functionality [117, 119, 120, 118, 122, 124]. Many other mechanisms control the
flow of sensitive information to prevent information leakage [142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147,
148]. However, the conventional mechanisms have limitations in terms of compatibility,
granularity, usability, and completeness. First, some mechanisms completely disable certain
features of a third-party script, require JavaScript code rewriting or wrapping, or even
modification of server code. Second, they provide coarse-grained protection, i.e., a third-
party script is either granted full access to all DOM elements or denied access completely.
Third, many solutions request developers to specify security policies for every third-party
script that might be included, which is impractical. Lastly, many solutions can only prevent
information leakage but not content manipulation.
Content Security Policy (CSP) is a recent web security standard proposed to mitigate
the threats from third-part JavaScript code. In particular, CSP prevents cross-site scripting
(XSS) and code injection attacks by allowing web developers to designate what content
is permitted to be loaded into their web pages. CSP, however, cannot completely solve
the above problems, either. First, CSP has not been widely deployed by websites because
CSP requires server modification to remove inline JavaScript and eval statements [149].
Second, writing a CSP policy without disrupting the application’s functionality is difficult
and time consuming [150]. Third, the restriction by CSP is still all-or-nothing, i.e., CSP does
not restrict the privileges of “malicious” scripts provided by whitelisted and compromised
hosts [151, 108].
In this chapter, we focus on the problem of how to restrict both read and write accesses
by third-party JavaScript code at per-object granularity. We have designed DOM Access
Control Policy (DOM-ACP), a fine-grained and resource-centric access control mechanism to
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protect individual DOM elements from unauthorized third-party scripts. DOM-ACP policies
are associated directly with resources that need protection, thus are more flexible than
capability-based policies. In particular, a rule in a DOM-ACP policy specifies which JavaScript
code (principal) has what privilege (access rights) to access which elements (resource). We
followed the fail-safe defaults and least privilege security principles in our design to limit
a third-party script’s access permission to its necessary minimum, i.e., JavaScript cannot
access a protected DOM element unless explicitly granted by the web developer.
DOM-ACP allows developers to write both inline policy and external policy to facilitate
easy deployment. We let developers use the new accessControl DOM attribute to write
access control policy inline for a specific DOM element and its child elements. We also
enable developers to use Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) that they are familiar with to define
policies for a group of objects in separate policy files, that can be reused across many
web pages. The external DOM-ACP policy can be configured with the new Access-Control-
Policy HTTP header and requires no modification of both server-side and client-side code.
DOM-ACP is backward-compatible and does not conflict with existing security mechanisms
such as SOP and CSP. Indeed, DOM-ACP works as an additional layer of protection that
complements CSP to further restrict the privileges of allowed third-party JavaScript code.
DOM-ACP provides both confidentiality and integrity to sensitive content in web applica-
tions, and significantly reduces the harm that can be caused by malicious third-party scripts.
DOM-ACP would not cause compatibility issues for benign third-party scripts because they do
not perform unauthorized access to protected sensitive content. Although the current design
of DOM-ACP only supports restriction on DOM object access and selecting elements with
CSS, DOM-ACP can be easily extended to limit access to other website data (e.g., Cookies,
HTML5 Web Storage, and remote communication functions) by third-party JavaScript code,
and support XPath selection.
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6.2 Background
Preventing unauthorized access to components in web applications1 is important. In this
section, we briefly review two standard security mechanisms that are implemented in today’s
browsers. We then explain their limitations with two example web applications, motivating
us to design DOM-ACP.
6.2.1 Web Permission Policies
Same-Origin Policy (SOP). The SOP is the fundamental concept in today’s web application
security model. It restricts the interaction among components from different origins (authors),
which are 3-tuple of URI scheme, hostname, and port. The policy specifies that a web
browser permits scripts in one browsing context 2 to access resources in another browsing
context through DOM APIs only if they are from the same origin. For example, resources
in the http://a.com context can only be accessed by code executing in other contexts that
are in the same origin. Code executing in http://b.com context should certainly never be
allowed access.
The SOP prohibits code from a third-party origin from stealing or modifying data
from the first-party origin. However, it does not prevent an included third-party JavaScript
executing in the browsing context of the first-party origin from disclosing or modifying
the data. For example, data can be leaked by writing in the src attribute of an <img> or
<script> element or by sending through an XHR request to a remote host.
Content Security Policy. To prohibit or limit communications that are allowed by the SOP,
modern browsers have implemented the Content Security Policy (CSP). CSP allows a web
developer to create a whitelist of trusted origins through the Content-Security-Policy HTTP
header, and instruct the browser to only communicate with and load resources in specific
types (e.g., JavaScript, stylesheets, images, etc.) from those origins in a browsing context.
1Throughout the chapter, we use JavaScript and script interchangeably.
2 The different components in a web browser are organized in browsing contexts, which are the content
and JavaScript execution environment in a page or frame.
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Unsafe JavaScript features (e.g., inline script and eval()) can also be disabled by setting
CSP rules.
CSP is introduced to prevent cross-site scripting (XSS), code injection and clickjacking
attacks. The restriction put by CSP is all-or-nothing. Once a third-party JavaScript is
permitted to execute in the context of the first-party origin, CSP does not further limit its
access to the DOM in this context. The script may not be able to send data to arbitrary
remote origin any more. It can still, however, manipulate the DOM to compromise the
integrity of the web application.
6.2.2 Motivating Examples
We introduce our motivating examples with web applications which suffer from information
theft and content manipulation by included malicious third-party scripts. The status-quo
web permission policies can protect neither of the two applications from the attacks. These
examples demonstrate the requirement for fine-grained and resource-centric access control
mechanism for web applications and motivate our design of DOM-ACP.
e-Commerce. e-Commerce is an online retail website (e.g., www.e-Commerce.com). Like
many other similar websites, e-Commerce has a checkout page that asks for the name, credit
card number, expiration date, zip code and other billing information from its customers.
e-Commerce includes JavaScript from a third-party analytics library (say, gstatics.com) in
its web application, including the checkout page. This analytics library can help e-Commerce
attribute transactions to come up with better business strategies, and help operators of
e-Commerce set up ad campaigns that target customers who did not complete a checkout.
However, it can also leak any sensitive data on e-Commerce to other websites.
To limit the risk of including this library, the developers of e-Commerce may set a CSP
rule to load JavaScript only from gstatics.com. Such a rule protects the data of e-Commerce
from being directly leaked to unknown parties. It does not, however, prevent gstatics.com
from accessing sensitive data (e.g., the billing information) and further sharing with other
141
parties remotely.
e-Pay. e-Pay is an emerging online payment platform. To simplify the website development,
e-Pay includes the popular jQuery library. Since jQuery is very likely to be cached by a user’s
browser already, e-Pay decides to fetch jQuery dynamically through a Content Delivery
Network (CDN) rather than hosting a static version on their own server. Unfortunately, this
gives jQuery full access to the content of e-Pay, and makes jQuery a very alluring target
for attackers. For example, jQuery hosting website was compromised in 2014 [108]. As
a result, an attacker can manipulate the payment amount and even change the recipient of
a payment to the attacker’s account on e-Pay, if a user has downloaded the compromised
jQuery library.
Unlike the case of e-Commerce, where the confidentiality of the web application is at
risk, this example shows that the integrity of a website can be compromised by included
third-party JavaScript. The SOP certainly cannot prevent such compromises. CSP cannot
help either, unless the web developers do not allow any third-party JavaScript to be loaded
from remote servers, which is impractical.
6.3 DOM Access Control Policy
This section presents the DOM Access Control Policy (DOM-ACP), a new permission mech-
anism for DOM. DOM-ACP provides a fine-grained access control mechanism (§6.3.1),
applying access control policies to each DOM element or sub-tree. This resource-centric
design lets developers focus on specifying which elements are sensitive while not worrying
about the detailed behaviors of each third-party script. The policy rule and language of
DOM-ACP follows the standard notion of file system permissions in UNIX-like systems.
DOM-ACP policies can be written either inline with the resources (§6.3.2) or in external
policy files (§6.3.2) to enable flexible adoption without source code modification. We further
provide a policy generator (§6.3.3) to assist web developers in generating basic policies for
their applications.
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6.3.1 Design of DOM Access Control Policy
We first discuss the assumptions and goals we made in designing DOM-ACP (§6.3.1), and
introduce the components of a DOM-ACP rule (§6.3.1). We then describe how the access
control rules are expressed in the form of access control list (§6.3.1), and finally show how
the rules are enforced (§6.3.1).
Assumptions and Goals
We assume that all third-party scripts, including those are allowed in CSP policies, could
be malicious or compromised. DOM-ACP is designed as an additional layer of protection
to complement CSP, by preventing unauthorized third-party scripts from directly reading
and writing individual or grouped sensitive DOM objects. A script that is granted access
privilege might indirectly disclose sensitive data to one that is not. For example, the script
can intentionally store sensitive data in a variable in the global scope to allow any other
script to access it. Such collusion attacks can be prevented with information flow control
techniques, and are out of the scope of DOM-ACP.
Components
We define the three components of a DOM-ACP rule – resource, principal, and access right –
as follows.
Resource. The resource is an object to be secured, which is either a DOM object (element)3
or a DOM (sub-)tree. A web page consists of various resources in terms of sensitivity,
e.g., a log-in box implemented with a <form> tag and a website logo displayed in an <img>
element. Existing web permission mechanisms allow each third-party script to either access
all resources or no resource, which is too coarse-grained. On the contrary, DOM-ACP allows
web developers to define flexible and diverse access control rules for data objects in different
sensitivity levels. For simplicity, the current design of DOM-ACP only focuses on DOM
3We use object and element interchangeably.
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elements. We can easily support other types of resources that are accessible through DOM
APIs (e.g., Cookie and Local Storage) in the near future.
Principal. The principal describes the JavaScript code(s) that a DOM-ACP rule applies to.
A principal can be a specific URL of a script, or a security origin and a host name pattern
that represent a set of scripts from an origin and a domain, respectively. For example, the
security origin principal http://www.a.com represents all JavaScript codes loaded from host
www.a.com through HTTP and port 80. In our current design, browser extensions are treated
as trusted user JavaScript code. As a future work, we plan to include browser extension as
principals to restrict their privileges as well.
Access Right. The access right specifies the permitted operations – read and/or write
– of a principal on a resource. These operations can be performed directly or indirectly.
First, the attributes or methods of a DOM object can be directly accessed or called in a
JavaScript code. For example, element.getAttribute("className") and var text =
element.textContent directly read the className and the textContent attributes of the
element, respectively. Second, a DOM object can be passed as an argument in a receiver
DOM object’s method, which then performs read or write operations on the argument
internally. For example, Canvas drawImage() in HTML5 takes an Image, Video or Canvas
object as an argument, reads the object internally and draws it onto a canvas4. Furthermore,
DOM-ACP requires a script to have both read and write permissions in order to register
event handlers on elements.
DOM Access Control List
All DOM-ACP rules that apply to the same DOM object are managed in the DOM access
control list (DACL) data structure, which is associated with the DOM object. Specifi-
cally, a DACL is a list of access control entries (ACE). Each ACE defines the access right
of a principal on the associated object. Every DACL has a special ACE, the default ACE,
4http://www.w3schools.com/tags/canvas_drawimage.asp
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which has an empty or the "default" principal, and defines the default access permission
of all third-party scripts on the corresponding DOM object. A negative default access right
("None") is automatically implied if one is not explicitly defined by the developer. Such fail-
safe defaults design choice effectively blocks any unauthorized accesses to resources, thus
restricting the privileges of third-party scripts to their necessary minimum (least privilege).
If a DOM object has child objects, i.e., it is the root node of a DOM sub-tree, its DACL
is automatically inherited by child objects who do not have one, such that web developers
need to define only one policy at the root node and can apply it to all objects in the tree. In
case that a DOM object or DOM sub-tree cannot find a DACL to inherit, a DACL that grants
full-privilege ("RW") to all scripts is assigned. Such design is backward-compatible, and
eliminates the work of writing DOM-ACP policies for resources that do not need protection.
Enforcing Access Control Policy
DOM-ACP follows the following rules to determine whether an access should be granted or
not.
Accessing Receiver Objects. DOM-ACP checks the access right of a script when it accesses
a protected DOM object. DOM-ACP immediately grants the access if the accessing script
is first-party. Otherwise, DOM-ACP searches the ACE whose principal best matches the
accessing script ("default" matches all third-party script) in the receiver object’s DACL.
The type of access (read and/or write) is determined by the specific DOM API that is
invoked, and is checked with the access right assigned in the ACE. The access is allowed
only if all the requested permissions are granted by the developer.
DOM-ACP may also need to perform additional permission check in two special cases,
where other DOM objects are implicitly accessed in addition to the receiver object.
Accessing Child Objects. Some DOM interfaces provide JavaScript with the ability to
access the child objects of a receiver object. For example, invoking the innerText property















Figure 6.1: Overview of DOM-ACP’s design.
attributes or methods are invoked, DOM-ACP also checks the accessing script’s permission on
all child objects of the receiver object. The access is allowed only if the principal is allowed
to access all child objects and the receiver object.
Accessing Arguments of Method. If a DOM method needs to access DOM object(s)
that is passed as argument(s), DOM-ACP also performs permission check on the argument
object(s) in addition to the receiver object.
6.3.2 Writing an Access Control Policy
The flexibility of DACL allows a web developer to define various access control policies
for DOM elements or DOM sub-trees. DOM-ACP supports two different types of policies –
inline (§6.3.2) and external (§6.3.2).
Inline DOM-ACP
We introduce the new accessControl DOM attribute to let developers directly associate
a DOM-ACP policy with elements that need protection. The attribute accessControl is
immutable to third-party script, meaning that even a third-party script granted with full
privilege on a DOM object cannot change the policy, nor escalate the privilege of other
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scripts. A third-party script can, however, set once the accessControl attribute for an
element that is dynamically created by it. On the contrary, a first-party script has the ability
to update the attribute so that it can dynamically grant/revoke permissions to/from any
third-party script.
Figure 6.1 presents an example of HTML snippet that defines an inline DOM-ACP policy
for the element #balance. The attribute accessControl of #balance carries two rules
(ACEs) that are separated by semicolon. The first rule sets the default access right to "None",
indicating by default any third-party script has no right to access this DOM object. This neg-
ative default rule is optional because DOM-ACP can automatically create it. The second ACE
indicates that principal http://static.bank.com is permitted to perform read operation.
In other words, this inline policy ensures that, only scripts from https://static.bank.com
– except for scripts from https://bank.com that have full privilege on the entire DOM – are
permitted with only the right to read the element #balance.
External DOM-ACP
The inline policies are fairly simple and can be easily adopted to small websites. However,
they might not be very suitable for complex web applications, whose web pages contain
thousands of elements that are dynamically constructed from multiple templates and modules,
that might be used in other web pages as well. DOM-ACP also supports external policies, in
which the same rules can be applied to multiple elements, and can be reused across multiple
web pages. External DOM-ACP borrows the syntax from Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) and
enables developers to select DOM elements with the easy-to-use CSS selectors. Specifically,
each access control rule in external DOM-ACP consists of a CSS selector and a definition
block, which contains one or more ACEs that are separated by semicolons.
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1 input {




6 "default" = None;
7 "https://static.bank.com" = RW;
8 }
Listing 6.1: An example of external DOM-ACP.
Listing 6.1 is an example of external DOM-ACP. The 1st rule defined in line 1-3 specifies
that all third-party scripts can only read but write <input> elements; the 2nd rule defined
in line 4-8 indicates that <input> elements whose type is either email or password and
whose class is auth can only be accessed by scripts from https://static.bank.com (and
the owner) with full privilege and no other third-party script can access such elements. In
case where two or more rules select the same object, the last rule seen in the policy file
is applied. For example, rule #2 precedes rule #1 in Listing 6.1. Furthermore, external
DOM-ACP has higher priority over inline DOM-ACP.
6.3.3 Policy Generator
The effectiveness of DOM-ACP on protecting web applications depends on the security
policies defined by web developers. However, writing a policy may not be trivial, especially
for developers who are not security experts. Thus, we present a tool that helps web developers
generate a basic policy for their applications.
The policy generator first defines a rule to prevent all third-party scripts from reading
sensitive input fields. Specifically, it uses the autocomplete attribute introduced in the
HTML5 specification5 to identify elements that may contain sensitive data. Web developers
5https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/forms.html#autofill
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can easily extend the rule to cover all elements that may be used for collecting user inputs.
They can also add additional rules to protect custom data or grant permission to specific
third-party scripts.
Secondly, we leverage our monitoring tool DOM-Logger to report all write accesses
made by third-party scripts. For each first-party element that is modified by a third-party
script, we grant the write permission to the accessing script on the element. We use the
css-selector-generator 6 library to automatically generate an unique CSS selector for an
element that is associated with such a rule. Web developers can then revise the policies to
disallow or allow certain scripts to write specific nodes. The policy may be very large if too
many elements are written in an application. Our policy generator can also combine the
rules by gradually removing leaf elements that are children of other elements which are also
modified by the same script(s).
6.4 Implementation of DOM-ACP
We implemented a prototype of DOM-ACP in Chromium (version 47.0.2526.73). We opt
for an implementation in browser because browser can mediate all JavaScript accesses
to the DOM, which is analogous to operating system kernel that can mediate all system
calls. Figure 6.2 shows the overview of our implementation. Specifically, we extended the
V8 Binding layer between V8 JavaScript Engine [152] and WebKit [153] in Chromium’s
rendering engine – Blink [154]. We modified the Blink IDL compiler [155] to insert our
access control enforcement code (the gray box in Figure 6.2) into the binding code. The
DOM implementation code in WebKit ( 3 ) is not executed if an access is denied by our
policy enforcement code ( 2 ).
For instance, in Figure 6.2, the access control policy is enforced as follows: 1 The
JavaScript code tries to access the id attribute; 2 DOM-ACP first checks the access control






















Figure 6.2: Workflow of DOM-ACP’s implementation when protecting the id attribute of an
element.
error; 3 WebKit returns the corresponding id as requested.
In the rest of this section, we first briefly introduce V8 Binding in Blink (§6.4.1), then
show how inline and external DOM-ACP policies are supported (§6.4.2) and how the policies
are enforced in the browser (§6.4.3), and finally discuss how we extended the V8 Binding
layer to mediate JavaScript access to DOM elements (§6.4.4).
6.4.1 V8 Binding
In Blink, V8 Binding is the layer between V8 JavaScript engine and WebKit layout engine.
Their communication interfaces are specified by Web IDL [156, 157], which is an interface
definition language that defines how DOM and other layout engine interfaces are bound to
ECMAScript. Blink parses the IDL files and automatically generates the binding code using
its IDL compiler when Chromium is being built.
1 [ CheckSecurity=Caller
2 ] interface Element : Node {
3 [Reflect] attribute DOMString id;
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4 [CheckSecurity=(Caller,ReadSelf)] DOMString? getAttribute(
DOMString n);
5 };
Listing 6.2: IDL file example.
Listing 6.2 is a simplified IDL file that defines the DOM interface of class Element.
The keywords within the brackets are extended attributes, which are options to control how
binding codes are generated inside IDL compiler. Line 3 declares the id attribute of class
Element. Figure 6.2 shows how this attribute is implemented in WebKit and exposed to
JavaScript. Specifically, WebKit implements the Element::getIDAttribute() method in
C++ ( 3 ), and exposes this method to V8 through V8 Binding ( 2 ). The binding code in 2
is automatically generated by the IDL compiler, and is called by V8 when the JavaScript
code in 1 is executed.
6.4.2 Supporting Access Control Policy
Inline Policy
We introduced the accessControl DOM attribute that developers can use to write inline
DOM-ACP policy for an element. Specifically, we defined a new read-only attribute in
the IDL file of the Node interface7, as readonly attribute DOMString accessControl,
and declared accessControl as a new HTML attribute name. The string representation
of access control policy specified in the accessControl attribute is returned when the
attribute is accessed in JavaScript. JavaScript cannot directly change the value of this
attribute because a setter method was not generated for it by IDL compiler. However, it
could be modified indirectly through the setAttribute("accessControl", "RW") method
or removeAttribute("accessControl") method. We addressed the problem by modifying
the two methods to disallow third-party scripts to modify the accessControl attribute of an
7Node is the base class of Element and many other classes in DOM.
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existing element. Note that a third-party script can set the accessControl attribute of an
element it creates dynamically, but cannot further modify the value after it is set.
A policy defined in the accessControl attribute is transformed to a DACL, that can be
used to query the access right of a script in Blink. Specifically, the source (URL) of a script is
matched with the principal in each ACE and the access permission of the best matching ACE
is returned. If the accessControl attribute of an Element object is not defined, the query
is passed to its parent Element objects until a policy is found or NULL pointer is reached.
Such dynamic query allows the automatic propagation of a DOM-ACP policy defined at a
root element to all its decedent nodes. In the latter case where no policy is defined in any
ancestor node, full permission ("RW") is returned to preserve compatibility.
External Policy
We let developers write external DOM-ACP policy using the Access-Control-Policy HTTP
header without modifying any application code. Our current prototype uses a HTTP proxy
to parse the external policy and creates the accessControl attributes on the fly. As a future
work, we plan to discard the proxy workaround, and parse the policy file internally in the
browser with CSS parser. We also plan to enable developers to use a <meta> tag to include
an external DOM-ACP policy file just as how they can include an external CSS file today.
6.4.3 Enforcing Access Control Policy
Blink enforces the same-origin policy in class BindingSecurity. We extended this class
with our access control enforcement code, which is executed in the V8 binding code to check
the authority of every access to every DOM object. Figure 6.2 illustrates how DOM-ACP
enforces a policy.
To check the authority of a JavaScript access, we need to identify the source of JavaScript
code, which we implemented in the getPrincipal()method ( 2 ). Specifically, we achieved
this by looking from the JavaScript Call Stack for the top (oldest) ScriptCallFrame object,
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that performs the access. The source of the accessing script is returned from the sourceURL
() method of the ScriptCallFrame. In particular, the sources of both inline JavaScript code
and bookmarklet are empty in Blink. We instrumented the <script> object creation code
inside Blink to track the creation of inline code. If an inline script is created by another
JavaScript code, the source of the creator is assigned to the inline script. If it is initially
loaded as part of the page HTML source, the source of current document is assigned.
The permission of a script is checked (shouldAllowAccess() in 2 ) after its source is
identified. If the script is first-party, i.e., its security origin is identical to that of the current
frame, the access can be immediately granted. Otherwise, we query the DACL of the DOM
object that is being accessed with the identity of the accessing JavaScript code. The returned
permission is compared with the type of access, which can be Read and/or Write and is
determined based on the DOM attribute or method that is being accessed (we will discuss
in details later). The DOM implementation in WebKit is called ( 3 ) only if the script has
all the required permissions. Otherwise, the access is denied. Note that it is not always
necessary to identify the source of a script. An access can be automatically allowed if the
DACL of the DOM object being accessed has only the default ACE that grants full privileges
to all JavaScript code. DOM-ACP will also check the script’s privilege on other objects that
can be indirectly accessed in a DOM attribute or method as we discussed in §6.3.1.
6.4.4 Generating Access Control Code
To ensure complete mediation, the access control enforcement code implemented in §6.4.3
needs to be executed in every access to every DOM element. We extended the IDL compiler
to automatically insert our code into the V8 binding code.
We modified the existing IDL files of all types of DOM elements by using the CheckSecurity
extended Web IDL attribute. Blink uses this attribute to instruct the IDL compiler to insert
security check (e.g., SOP) code into V8 binding code. We introduced the Caller and four
additional options to this attribute: ReadSelf, WriteSelf, AccessChild, and WriteChild.
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Caller tells the compiler to insert our access control code into the V8 binding code of
an attribute or a method of an interface (class). The other four options are used addi-
tionally to specify the type of access. ReadSelf and WriteSelf are used for methods
that read and write the data of the receiver DOM object, respectively. For example,
Element::getAttribute() can read, while Node::appendChild() can write. In particu-
lar, ReadSelf and WriteSelf are both used for addEventListener(). AccessChild is used
for attributes or methods that additionally access child elements of a receiver object. For
instance, Element::innerHTML recursively retrieve/modify the content of all child objects
in addition to the receiver object. WriteChild is similar to AccessChild but is used for
methods that only modify a child object. Node::replaceChild(Node node, Node child)
is an example of such methods. Note that WriteChild also implies WriteSelf. Listing 6.2 is
an example of modified IDL file. CheckSecurity=Caller is specified at interface level (line
1), meaning that our code will be inserted into the V8 binding code of all members of the in-
terface. ReadSelf is additionally used to tell IDL compiler that the method getAttribute()
performs a read operation (line 4).
Depending on the option of CheckSecurity and the attribute or method being passed,
the IDL compiler inserts the access control code using the following rules.
1. Attribute. Read and Write are the type of access of the getter and setter8 methods of
an attribute, respectively.
2. Method. The four additional attributes indicate the type of access of a method. In
particular, the IDL compiler will generate code to perform access check on child objects if
AccessChild or WriteChild is specified. The code calls the shouldAllowAccess() method
with a child object(s) as argument.
3. Method accessing other object(s). An object can be indirectly accessed as argu-
ment of a method, as discussed in §6.3.1. We checked the type of arguments of all methods
8A setter method is not generated for read-only attributes.
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when the Web IDL files are parsed. If the type of an argument is Element or its sub-class,
we insert code to perform access check on the argument object as well.
6.4.5 Summary
We closely followed the design of DOM-ACP (§6.3) in our implementation on Chromium.
In total, we introduced 1,108 lines of change (1,005 insertions, 103 deletions). Our imple-
mentation of DOM-ACP could be easily extended to support any new DOM interfaces in the
future by specifying the CheckSecurity extended attribute in their IDL files. Although we
only implemented a prototype on Chromium (all browsers which use Blink, to be more
precisely), the design of DOM-ACP is generic and can be easily implemented on other browser
platforms.
6.5 Case Studies
In this section, we demonstrate how DOM-ACP can effectively prevent unauthorized direct
read and/or write accesses to protected DOM elements by third-party JavaScript code. In
particular, we evaluated DOM-ACP with information theft and content manipulation attacks
against popular websites and the two example applications in §6.2.
6.5.1 Protecting Real Websites
In this experiment we aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of DOM-ACP with popular websites
and malicious scripts trying to attack them. We visited the Alex US top-100 websites
through a HTTP proxy using a vanilla Chromium browser and the DOM-ACP prototype for
comparison. We respectively injected two malicious scripts into all web pages with the
proxy. First, the information theft script attaches keypress event listeners to all <input>
DOM elements to steal user-typed authentication data. Second, the content manipulation
script removes all child elements of <body> to display a blank web page.
We wrote the external DOM-ACP policies as shown in Listing 6.3 to prevent the attacks
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and applied it to all real websites with the proxy. Line 2 and 6 grant full privileges to all
scripts so that the real websites can be rendered properly. Line 3 disallows scripts loaded
from http://malice-1.net which we used to host the first attack script to access <input> tags.
Line 7 allows the second attack script to only read but not write <body> and its children.
1 input {
2 "default" = RW;
3 "http://malice-1.net" = None;
4 }
5 body {
6 "default" = RW;
7 "http://malice-2.net/attack.js" = R;
8 }
Listing 6.3: External DOM-ACP policy that protects real websites.
Without surprise, DOM-ACP could prevent the synthetic malicious scripts from attacking
the Alexa US top-100 websites whereas the vanilla Chromium browser could not. Specif-
ically, in the vanilla Chromium browser, the information theft script was able to steal
authentication data typed by a victim user on 84 out of 90 websites with a log-in feature9. In
contrast, DOM-ACP prevented the information theft script from accessing any <input> ele-
ments. Therefore, the information theft attack was throttled in the very first stage. Similarly,
the content manipulation script could delete the content of all the 100 websites in the vanilla
Chromium browser. But such attempts were completely prohibited by DOM-ACP.
6.5.2 Protecting e-Commerce and e-Pay
In the second experiment, we protected the two motivating example web applications
with DOM-ACP. We used osCommerce10 as e-Commerce and implemented e-Pay in PHP. We




included a third-party analytics library (https://www.analytics.library) to track user engage-
ment in both applications. We assumed that https://www.analytics.library was compromised.
As a result, the compromised script launched two kinds of attacks against the two ap-
plications, respectively. The first attack steals billing information entered by a user on
e-Commerce. The second attack manipulates the recipient of a transfer on e-Pay.
We wrote the external DOM-ACP policy for e-Commerce as shown in Listing 6.4. In
particular, the first rule (line 1-4) grants only read permission to all third-party scripts and
full privilege to the analytics library on <body> and its children. The second rule (line 5-6)
prevents any third-party script from accessing elements used for checkout. Specifically,
we found that the checkout page templates in osCommerce have named their <form> as
name="checkout_xxx" (line 5). The <input> selector (line 6) was used to automatically
select sensitive input elements that can be automatically filled by browsers, such as zip-code
(postal-code) or credit card number (cc-number). The empty definition block implies that
DOM-ACP should use the negative permission ("None") default ACE.
1 body {
2 "default" = R;




Listing 6.4: External DOM-ACP policy for e-Commerce.
Similarly, we added "transfer-data" to the class attribute of the enclosing tag in
e-Pay and defined two rules. The first rule was identical to the first rule in Listing 6.4 so we
omit it in Listing 6.5. The second rule (line 1) denies all third-party scripts’ accesses to any
elements with class="transfer-data" (including their children).
1 .transfer-data {}
Listing 6.5: Abbreviated external DOM-ACP policy for e-Pay.
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With the two policies, DOM-ACPwas able to prevent the above attacks against e-Commerce
and e-Pay. The two policies can be used as external DOM-ACP templates for many other
similar websites already. The developers of the two websites can also write a CSP policy
that blocks the third-party library to prevent the attacks. It, however, comes at the price of
loss of functionality.
6.6 Performance Evaluation
In practice, the acceptance of new browser features largely relies upon its performance. In
this section, we evaluate the performance overhead of the aforementioned browser prototype
in terms of its page load time and peak memory usage.
Setup. We set up our experiment testbed on a Debian Jessie (Linux Kernel 3.16) machine
with a quad-core 3.20GHz CPU (Intel Xeon W3565) and 24 GB RAM. We visited the front
pages of Alexa US top-100 websites using our prototype and a vanilla build of Chromium
(version 47.0.2526.73), and compared page rendering performance between each other. To
ensure an accurate measurement, we used both browsers in turn to visit a page 20 times. For
each visit, we also reset the user directories for each browser.
Metric. We used page load time and peak memory usage to evaluate the performance of
our prototype system and the vanilla Chromium browser. The page load time represents
how long it takes to fetch and render a web page (including third-party content and ads)
completely in a browser. The peak memory usage indicates the highest memory usage
during a page rendering.
Strategy. The performance of our prototype browser highly depends on number of
DOM elements that are protected by a DOM-ACP policy and number of accesses to them
by JavaScript. Therefore, we evaluate performance in three different settings: protecting
nothing, protecting <input> elements and protecting everything. In particular, the first
setting uses no DOM-ACP policy, the second setting uses a policy that denies access by
third-party scripts to <input> elements, and the last setting uses a policy that denies any
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third-party script access. Such policies would break all third-party scripts in real websites.
To ensure a fair comparison, we configured DOM-ACP to allow access after the authority
check is performed in this experiment.
Protecting nothing. This setting serves as a baseline experiment that measures the perfor-
mance on visiting legacy websites that do not deploy DOM-ACP. Since none of the elements
had the accessControl attribute, the accesses were immediately granted by DOM-ACP. As a
result, the overheads were negligible: 0% on average in both page load time (median: 0%;
standard deviation (σ): 5%) and peak memory usage (median: 0%; σ: 3%).
Protecting input elements. Under the second setting, we observed the overhead in page
load time was also negligible (mean and median: 0%; σ: 8%) because very few resources
were needed for authority check. The overhead in memory usage also remained negligible
(mean and median: 0%; σ: 7%).
Protecting everything. The last setting measures the worst-case performance of the
prototype. We discovered that our prototype browser’s page load time increased by 276 ms
(9.63%) on average across the 100 websites with a median of 82 ms (7%) and a standard
deviation of 17% in comparison with the vanilla browser. Our prototype browser did
not incur much overhead in memory usage. The memory overhead only increased by
approximately 2% on average (median: 1%; σ: 7%).
Summary. Our evaluation showed that the prototype of DOM-ACP introduced modest
performance overhead (9% in page load time and 1% in peak memory usage) in the worst
case. In real applications there are not too many elements that contain sensitive data, and
the overhead would be much lower when securing them only.
6.7 Related Work
In this section, we summarize various techniques related to our DOM protection mechanism.
Protecting DOM elements. DOM-ACP is inspired by several prior researches of protecting
sensitive DOM elements. ESCUDO [158] places different elements in rings with decreasing
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privileges to prevent XSS attacks. Objects can be accessed only by first-party JavaScript
from same or higher privilege rings. DOM-ACP policies are more flexible and easier to deploy
than ESCUDO’s hierarchical policies. Proctor [159] prevents browser extensions from
accessing sensitive DOM elements in a coarse granularity. DOM-ACP can be easily extended
to enforce fine-grained access control on extensions. Ryck et al. [160] isolate sensitive
data in shadow DOM tress from JavaScript code (including first-party) outside the shadow
DOM trees. This approach requires significant modification of web applications. In contrast,
DOM-ACP does not engage web application re-engineering. ScriptInspector [130] inspects
and records third-party script accesses to sensitive elements and is a great tool that can help
web developers write DOM-ACP policies.
Constraining JavaScript. Another line of work restricts the functionality of third-party
JavaScript to prevent DOM access. ConScript [117], WebJail [118] and TreeHouse [124]
support policies that restrict features of third-party script at script or function level. Such
restrictions are too coarse-grained, i.e., they cannot selectively protect a subset of DOM ele-
ments. JCShadow [122] confines JavaScript objects in multiple isolated shadow JavaScript
contexts to provide access control to objects in JavaScript context. DOM-ACP complements
JCShadow to provide fine-grained access control to DOM objects. Similarly, Akhawe et
al. [119, 120] separate an HTML5 application into isolated unprivileged child iframes but
require changing application code. Caja [114], ADsafe [115] and ADsafety [116] restrict
third-party code to a subset of JavaScript. BrowserShield [161, 112], Phung et al. [113],
JSand [123], and JaTE [121] rewrite or wrap JavaScript code to enforce security policies
without browser modification. Such code instrumentation cannot provide fine-grained access
control to DOM elements, either. Furthermore, the above solutions may cause compatibility
issues because JavaScript code needs to be rewritten in customized APIs or executed in
isolated environment.
Information flow control. DOM-ACP can protect the sensitive data in a website from
being directly read by unauthorized scripts. The information flow control (IFC) mechanism
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achieves a similar goal that prevents sensitive data from being leaked to untrusted remote
servers. Over the past years, a large amount of research utilizes the information flow control
technique [142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148] to identify or prevent information theft
attacks in the context of the web. In particular, the IFC technique tracks each piece of
sensitive data and analyzes the data flow to ensure the sensitive data does not go across a
pre-defined control boundary. While such a technique has been demonstrated to be effective,
it introduces high performance overhead in general. For example, the IFC based mechanism
in [148] involves a 15.6× overhead. One advantage of IFC solutions is that they can track the
data flow among JavaScript objects. Such technique can complement DOM-ACP in preventing
privileged scripts colluding with unprivileged ones. On the other hand, IFC technique is less
suitable for preventing content manipulation threats that DOM-ACP also aims to mitigate.
6.8 Summary
Although third-party JavaScript code is immensely useful to end users and web application
developers, they pose serious security threats due to a lack of fine-grained privilege restric-
tion. In this chapter, we proposed DOM-ACP to protect sensitive data in web applications from
being directly accessed by unauthorized third-party JavaScript code. DOM-ACP allows web
developers to specify inline and external access control policies for the DOM objects that
need protection. DOM-ACP prohibits direct read and write access to the protected DOM ob-
jects from unauthorized third-party scripts. DOM-ACP is backward-compatible and does not
require modification of application code. We implemented a prototype of DOM-ACP on the
popular Chromium browser and demonstrated the effectiveness of DOM-ACP in safe-guarding




Third-party content is widely included by modern web applications and mobile applications
to enhance functionality. It usually operates at full privilege as the embedding application
and can make unrestricted accesses to all the content, including sensitive direct user data,
in the application. A third-party content provider can also gather indirect data about a user
in an application and across multiple applications that embed its content, often without the
user’s consent. In this dissertation, we explored the problem that the confidentiality and
integrity of a user’s direct data and indirect data may be compromised through the practices
of embedding third-party content.
We have identified two classes of new threats targeting individual user arising from
embedding third-party content in web applications and mobile applications. Specifically, we
demonstrated that a malicious first-party application can embed content of other applications
to pollute and infer a user’s indirect data in the other applications. These findings advanced
the security research community’s understanding about the emerging threats that can be
posed to end users. We also developed new technique to provide end users with selective
control to opt out from unwanted web tracking. Our new technique achieved a good balance
between a user’s need for privacy and the user’s online experience. We further studied the
over-privileged third-party JavaScript code in modern web applications and proposed new
permission mechanism to restrict the privilege of third-party script. Our study revealed that
the over-privileged third-party scripts made extensive accesses to first-party web content,
including sensitive content, in today’s web applications. A very disconcerting observation is
that such over-privileged scripts were prevalent in today’s web applications.
Although this dissertation has studied only very few applications and threats, we vision
that many more threats caused by the practices of embedding content from third-party
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providers will emerge in the future. In particular, powerful cross-platform third-party
providers can potentially put serious threats to end users. The fundamental causes of these
threats are that a lot of system and application designs do not follow the least-privilege
security principle, nor do they provide sufficient isolation between content that mutually
distrusts.
Without taking a principled and security-by-design approach to (re)designing existing
insecure systems and new systems, we can never prevent new threats from emerging. Ad-
mittedly, preserving the flexibility and benefit of embedding content while ensuring security
cannot be an easy task. Many mitigation techniques require significant change of existing
systems and applications. They suffer from the criticism about harming compatibility or
usability and are rarely deployed in practice. On the other hand, techniques that preserve
compatibility and good user experience often do not provide sufficient security guarantee
in rare cases. We conclude that designing compatible and usable techniques that secure
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